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RESEARCH REPORT

Collective Conflict, Violence and the Media in Canada

by

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Collective Conflict, Violence and the Media in Canada

Introduction

This monograph, written under the auspices of the Ontario Royal Commission on Violence in the Communications Industry, surveys the academic literature on the relations between the media, collective conflict and violence; analyzes international, Canadian, and Ontario data on these phenomena; analyzes the violent content of major Ontario newspapers; examines seven modern cases of violent conflict in the Province, and makes recommendations to the Commission.

The dearth of Canadian research on this particular aspect of the Royal Commission's terms of reference which we have undertaken, required that a unique approach be adopted. There has been practically no rigorous study of domestic unrest in this country. For its investigation of television and social behaviour, the U.S. Surgeon General's Advisory Committee could command immediate research on the topic partially because of the extensive work done by universities over the years and also because of the voluminous evidence produced for the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders and the Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. In other words, before the Surgeon General's inquiry began, there already existed a large amount of data on violence. In Canada this material still does not exist, and therefore any attempt to evaluate the role of the media on violence requires a different, more general approach than that employed in the United States.

In view of this major consideration, a practical, multiple research proposal was adopted. While the approach had to be comprehensive, it was extremely limited by the amount of time and especially funds which could be made available. While the effect of the media on violence was to be the topic, in Canada the data had to be analyzed for

both variables. While the setting was to be Ontario, we were asked to place the data in a comparative international setting. While strict social science requirements were to be met, we were to generate practical policy recommendations.

All of these requirements led us to adopt what we term a pyramidal approach. Beginning with the general literature discussed in Chapter I, we proceed to outline the impact of the media on 18 nation states and Canada. At the next stage, relations between the media and violence in Ontario are discussed. In such a pyramidal approach different methods had to be imposed on various sections of the report, so no single research design was possible. The following list summarizes the approaches:

Chapter I - Conjectures and Problems in the Literature. In this chapter we summarize the concepts, approaches, and conclusions presented in research in this field.

Chapter II - International and Canadian Data Analysis. In this chapter we examine the relations between media and violence in the 18 countries which have a free press and a level of economic development similar to Canada. Several data sets on domestic conflict exist, but this is the first direct attempt to study whether or not the variation in media affects variation in this phenomenon. After placing Canada in this international context, the chapter examines the historical occurrence of violence in this country and also illustrates how Ontario and Quebec violence fit into the Canadian milieu.

Chapter III - Violence and the Print Medium in Ontario. In this chapter we attempt to determine how much and what kind of violence is reported in the Province of Ontario. The print medium is the chosen field and 150,000 pages of the Globe and Mail for the years 1965 to 1975 are

examined. 129 cases of collective violence, involving at least 50 people and nine cases of individual political violence were reported in what is purported to be Canada's leading newspaper. Using the methods of content analysis we evaluate the extent and variety of coverage accorded these events by this major news source.

Chapter IV - Case Studies and Illustrations. From the 129 cases we chose six for intensive examination. The seventh case study was drawn from the list of individual acts of political violence. These seven events represent the various types of collective conflict and violence and all received extensive media exposure. The cases include: an anti-Nazi demonstration in Toronto in 1965, a police-hippie confrontation in the Yorkville district of Toronto in 1967, an anti-Vietnam war demonstration in front of the United States Consulate in Toronto in 1970, a labour strike at the Texpack plant in Brantford in 1971, a personal attack on Premier Kosygin during his tour of Parliament Hill in 1971, an anti-Soviet demonstration at the Ontario Science Centre during Premier Kosygin's visit to Toronto in 1971, and a clash between Native Indians and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police on Parliament Hill in 1974. Three newspapers - The Globe and Mail, The Ottawa Citizen, and The Toronto Star, were examined for each of the cases to evaluate their treatment of these events. Regarding each case we also interviewed a number of participants, police and newsmen about how the media handled the events. The question to be answered in this section was not whether the media caused violence or how much violence was in the media, but if the presence of the media affected the events, their sequence, and their consequences.

Chapter V - Basic Conclusions and Recommendations. The basic conclusion is that although there is inconclusive, contradictory and unsubstantial evidence to support the idea that real life violence is caused by

media violence, there is evidence to support the view that on occasion the media can, and do, exacerbate some conflict situations. This conclusion suggests the need for practical reforms in police-media relations.

Chapter I

Conjectures and Problems in the Literature

Adult Canadians have all witnessed incidents of collective conflict and violence, such as the student protests of the 1960's and the war in Vietnam. Extremely few, however, witnessed these or similar events in reality. The vast majority watched them on television, heard about them on the radio, read about them in the newspapers or were informed by their friends and acquaintances. Clearly, most of our information about such violence is received from an intermediary body - be it acquaintances or the media - and it is likely that our personal contacts will have received their knowledge from the media.

The effects of such communications on individuals and society have long been recognized as significant for the political system. While specific consequences are difficult to isolate in the web of other social events, it is certain that most citizens rely heavily on the mass media for their information about Canada and the world. Richard R. Fagen, author of Politics and Communication, shows how a bizarre hoax to convince Americans that the President was dead could be carried out successfully by only 2,000 mass media personnel.[1] In Canada we only need to recall the "communication war" between the Front de Libération de Quebec and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau over the Cross and Laporte kidnappings to realize how we experience such important events.

A less contentious example may be drawn from the work of a foremost student of the media. Walter Lippman's Public Opinion reads:

> "There is an island in the ocean where in 1914 a few Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Germans lived. No cable reaches that island, and the British mail steamer comes but once in sixty days. In September it had not yet come, and the islanders were still talking about the latest newspaper which told them about the approaching trial of Madame Caillaux for the shooting of Gaston Calmette. It was, therefore, with more than usual

> eagerness that the whole colony assembled at the quay on a day in mid-September to hear from the captain what the verdict had been. They learned that for over six weeks now those of them who were English and those of them who were French had been fighting on behalf of the sanctity of treaties against those of them who were Germans. For six strange weeks they had acted as if they were friends when in fact they were enemies."[2]

The actual effects of the media on Canadian society may not be easy to determine, but the circumstantial evidence for their importance in collective conflict and violence is great. The Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, chaired by Senator Keith Davey, found that adult Canadians spend 30 to 40 minutes daily reading their newspaper and that eight out of every ten of them use all three media - newspapers, radio and television - on a daily basis.[3] Of course, these surveys mask different levels of interest and concern across the population. As T. Joseph Scanlon put it: "...that some persons watch a truly staggering 53.9 hours of television a week should not obscure the fact that others average only 4.8 hours."[4] Collective conflict events in particular are normally experienced only vicariously through the mass media. Regional studies have confirmed this contention. An Ottawa-Hull survey showed that four-fifths of the population learned about the murder of former Quebec labour minister Pierre Laporte in 1970 directly from the media.[5] Carleton University Journalism students found that two-thirds of their sample population in Kingston learned directly from the media that kidnapped British diplomat James Cross had been found.[6]

To assert that the media is important to society is not however to determine in what way there are relationships between them. It is difficult to establish in a convincing fashion exactly how the mass media shape behaviour. Most scholarly work in political science indicates the complexity of relationships between the media and general political behaviour.[7] And, in a similar manner, communications literature shows

a complex interactive pattern between the mass media and its effects.[8] Modern mass media have not displaced personal contacts, face-to-face communications or other channels of communication but they have provided new links to existing networks and offered independent forms of communication. Therefore, to single out the effects of the media on collective conflict and violence is going to require the skills of social scientists for generations and early definitive success cannot be expected.

The Media and Violence

Complex social reality is unlikely to be "explained" by any single factor - such as the media. The allegation that the Commission cannot establish that the media is the cause of violence is really rather premature.[9] The 1972 report of the United States Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee, based on sixty reports and a million dollar expenditure, was not able to do that either.[10] But that report and others,[11] undertaken independently or on government contract, have provided insightful hypotheses and established a basis for the need to continue probing into such relationships. If public policy is to be based on the best social science available at any given time, then despair about the difficulties of discovering ironclad relations between violence and the media cannot be allowed to prevent efforts to establish tentative generalizations.

The study of violence itself is replete with theoretical, philosophical and political difficulties. If causal relations ever were established between media output and violence in society it would have immediate policy consequences. Benjamin D. Singer put it this way: "Some would have argued that reportage of such events, particularly the dramatized reportage so prevalent on television, is a determinant of such events as air hijacking, arson, bombings, mass murders, campus disturbances, and urban riots. The policy implications of this question are enormous

and ultimately become matters of political philosophy."[12] However, even if causal relations are not established in a conclusive scientific manner the issue is already part of public discussion as the Commission has shown through its public hearings. Contrary to the views of some scholars, negative findings in this field will also have policy implications. Research grants may vanish, but the policy considerations do not disappear merely because social scientists find no positive correlations.

The Commission has taken a rather broad definition of violence in order to make their subject as comprehensive as possible. They have taken as their definition the following:

> "...Violence is action which intrudes painfully or harmfully into the physical, psychological or social well-being of persons or groups.
>
> ...Violence or its effects may range from trivial to catastrophic.
>
> ...Violence may be obvious or subtle.
>
> ...It may arise naturally or by human design.
>
> ...Violence may take place against persons or against property.
>
> ...It may be justified or unjustified, or justified by some standards and not by others.
>
> ...It may be real or symbolic.
>
> ...Violence may be sudden or gradual."[13]

Such a broad concern is justified in order to provide an exhaustive treatment of the subject, but it must be restricted for specific research purposes. Social science requires that definitions be operationalized so that empirical referents can be determined. Moreover, many definitions tend to assume that violence is not part of the normal fabric of society. Collective conflict and violence occur with such frequency that they cannot be regarded as aberrations. Disorder may not be the norm of Canadian society, but neither is it rare in political systems. H. L. Nieburg, in his volume Political Violence: The Behavioural Process,[14] argued:

> "Extreme and violent political behaviour cannot be dismissed as erratic, exceptional, and meaningless. To set it apart from the processes that are characteristic of society is to ignore the continuum that exists between peaceable and disruptive behaviour; it is to deny the role of violence in creating and testing political legitimacy and in conditioning the terms of all social bargaining and adjustment. Violence in all its forms, up to and including assassination, is a natural form of political behaviour."

One does not need to accept the contentious judgment of the author of this quote to understand that there is some merit to the argument that the role of violence in society may be considered "good" or "bad" depending on the ideology, motives and even success of the perpetrators. Crime, itself, is a political concept according to many writers.[15] However, even if definitions are coloured by ideology, public officials must learn to deal with the short-run interference in democratic processes and personal harm that emanate from violence. One instrumental approach to the philosophical problem is to restrict the definition to harmful violence. Nieburg, for example, who wishes to show that violence is merely another instrument in politics, defines it as:

> "acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behavior of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system."[16]

While this type of definition is helpful for making the concept of violence as wide as possible and for diminishing the use of the term to depict only erratic or deviant behaviour, it is not very useful either for the science of violent behaviour or for public policy debate. There is simply no way that we have found to operationalize this definition to provide measures of collective conflict and violence in order to carry out empirical research. Moreover, in this report we wish to steer the discussion away from whether such behaviour is beneficial or harmful in the long term, but to ascertain what relations exist between the media

and this phenomenon. Thus, while this report will initially focus on the relationship between the media and the phenomenon of collective conflict in general, it is our ultimate intention to concentrate on the violent aspects of conflict. Conflict is used here as a generic term to connote the entire spectrum of confrontation politics. It may be legal or illegal, violent or non-violent, but it always implies the threat or use of physical force. Violence, on the other hand, entails the actual use of physical force. In later chapters this definition will be operationalized in order to measure levels and types of collective conflict and violence.

Research Survey

A simplistic formulation of the essential research problem is - does media coverage of violence cause violence? Of course, a researcher cannot expect such a simple pattern to exist in the real world. Such an assertion implies that media presentation is both a necessary and sufficient condition for violence. Obviously, other factors - such as social conditions, deprivation, expectations, motives etc., are significant as well. Moreover, in order to use statistical approaches the formula must read - does variation in media presentation of violence effect variation in real violence. On the assumption, however, that all the media do is report accurately real life violence, then the problem becomes even more complex as it may be that violence in the real world causes more violence in both the media and the world. In such a case the media are not producing any violence, they are merely presenting a picture of how violence generates more violence.

Another contention of research in this field is that the media do not depict all events in society, but select only a few, and of these even fewer are received by the audience. Links in the selection chain

are difficult to disentangle, but in order to hold the media responsible for violence in the world their precise and singular effect must be demonstrated.

Efforts to handle these hypotheses and assumptions have produced volumes of materials and propositions. The literature, however, is diffuse as it runs across several disciplines and is often contradictory. Ideally, if public policy decisions are to be made on the basis of research, the findings must at least be consistent. Let us now focus on the established research in order to determine what Canadian research is warranted, and how we should proceed.

Laboratory and Experimental Research

More experiments have shown that aggressive behaviour and probably later violence, is increased by witnessing media violence than have claimed the contrary, but results are not conclusive.[17] Such research indicates that many people, but not all, are affected significantly by different types of violent media content. The implications to be drawn from the research have divided researchers into conflicting camps and schools. A brief submitted by the Ontario Psychological Association to the Royal Commission stated unequivocally that it has been clearly demonstrated that violence presented in the media increases aggressive and probably later violent behaviour of consumers.[18] Albert Bandura,[19] Leonard Berkowitz[20] and Frederic Wertham,[21] while somewhat more cautious in the interpretation of their findings,have concluded that there is a strong case for asserting that there are adverse behavioural effects from media violence. Seymour Feshbach[22] has concluded that viewing aggression can have cathartic value by releasing tensions that might otherwise have led to overt aggression. Robert M. Liebert[23] found

precisely the opposite: he concluded that television viewing did not produce a cathartic effect. Moreover, another group of scholars has argued that current evidence about the relations between the media and violence is inconclusive. This view is typified by the research of Joseph Klapper[24] and Walter Weiss.[25] Still others have concluded that media violence may have an effect on potentially criminal adults[26] or on "social misfits," as those perhaps more prone to violent behaviour are more likely to view violent programs.[27] The effect of punishment in the media may also be significant. Bandura[28] has argued that if the media presented anti-social aggression being punished it might inhibit imitation of the acts. In this line, one researcher thinks television programming during the 1970s may have inhibited imitation because "TV crime is almost always unsuccessful."[29]

There are problems of measurement and comparability in all of the laboratory studies but on the whole they meet the test of internal validity better than all other forms of research in this field. That is to say, the relation between cause and effect is reasonably clear and irrelevant causal factors are controlled. The laboratory work is inconclusive, however, both because the studies were conducted immediately after the viewing of programs and therefore did not address themselves to questions about the retention of the image of violence, and because the laboratory is always an artificial environment whose relevance to real life situations is questionable. As Anthony G. Greenwald put it in his discussion of research: "In short, the laboratory conditions under which witnessing aggression is known to increase aggression differ somewhat from the life conditions typical of television-viewing children."[30] The same could be said of all the laboratory research.

On the whole, then, the results of research and even that of the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee have been inconclusive. Even when

the violence studied in the media was only about news the same results have been found - contradictions in the literature. Possibly the most agreed upon conclusion is found in Greenwald's contention that: "The audience for which we need particularly to be concerned about the effects of crime-relevant news communications consists of those who have low internalized restraints against committing the depicted crimes."[31] Another scholar, Colin Seymour-Ure, examined the literature on mass media effects on violence only to conclude "Different research projects are equivocal about this; but some suggest no more than that latent violence may be made manifest by media among a small minority of audiences."[32] In other words before public policy judgments can be made we need to know what the internalized norms of society (or groups within it) are in order to know how media presentation will affect them.

The conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that only studies of real life situations will complete the analysis in order to project policy ideas onto the stage for public debate. It is interesting to note in this regard that neither the Eisenhower nor the Kerner Commission found that the media was a major factor in causing collective conflict and violence. They did, however, level serious charges at the media about the handling of such phenomena.

Field Studies

The methods of Content Analysis, Survey Research, Aggregate Data and Case Studies have all been used in attempts to establish the effects of the media on violence. The difficulty with all of them derives from the impossibility of controlling all social variables in order to establish the precise independent effect of the media. Thus, unlike the laboratory studies they do meet the criterion of what might be termed external validity, but not that of internal validity. The second

difficulty derives from the simple fact that the public is not homogeneous. The idea that the media is like a hypodermic needle which can be employed to inject the mass public continues to plague research in the field. The factors of selective perception, retention, value systems, and personality characteristics all mediate the effects. Societies do not react as one organic whole to stimuli from the media or anything else. Moreover, researches have also found that informal social relationships, opinion leaders and similar group variables play roles in mediating between mass communication and attitude formation.[33]

Human networks as well as the media convey information and other messages. Katz and Lazarsfeld describe this process as the two-step flow of communications: ideas are taken from the media and passed along networks of people.[34] In Canada, Scanlon has shown that during crises these people networks can be traced; he found 39 chains of individuals and seven stages in this second communication step, but almost all could be traced back to the media.[35] For a study of social conflict it is also important to bear in mind that such communication paths may change with the intensity of the issue, and consequently in violence situations different paths may be taken. When President John Kennedy was assassinated 49% of the population first discovered the news from another individual.[36]

A. Content Analysis

Are the media neutral or do they screen out certain events and emphasize others? Analysis of the content of media messages has confirmed that the mass media extensively use violence in real and fictional ways. Content analysis may not indicate how the media affect people, but it does describe what the media are presenting to their audiences. In other words, content analysis indicates what media officials believe

their audiences wish to have communicated. It cannot be argued that advertisements "sell" products but that substantive entertainment programs and news substance are not being "sold" to the public. Reporters and broadcasters obviously believe that violence "sells". Whether or not the audience "buys" the product of advertisement or issues presented on entertainment and news programs cannot be answered by content analysis. However, an assumption of content analysis research is that if owners expect advertisements to affect consumption patterns then it can be assumed that all media communications affect other forms of behaviour.

Two different types of content analysis are employed by researchers. The most frequent is simply description of the output and classification of media products to bring out some analytic characteristic. The essential argument is that there is an agenda-setting process in the media which exerts influence on the public by choosing certain issues to emphasize or omit in presentation and editorial comment. This is often referred to as events data. The second, called inferential content analysis, or evaluative assertion analysis, is an attempt to deduce the sources, attitudes, presuppositions, etc., behind the simple descriptions. In such research it is often assumed that inferences can also be made about audience reception of the messages. It presumably suggests, compels or otherwise affects audience response. Such inferences, however, are extremely tenuous as there need to be independent estimates of their validity by survey research or case study techniques.

In the study of television output there is almost unanimous agreement about the existence of high violence content. Practically every study in the report entitled Mass Media and Violence and the six volumes from The Surgeon General's Commission confirmed this contention.

George Gerbner and the Annenberg School of Communications, for example, concluded:

> "The world of television violence is a place in which severe violence is commonplace....At the very least, it can be said that the messages being sent about violence are inconsistent with a philosophy of social behaviour based upon involved cooperation, non-violent resolution of conflict, and non-violent means of attaining personal ends.[37]

This particular report does not examine television or radio, but there are theoretical reasons for believing that in the field of collective conflict and violence the print media is equally as important as these subjects. In fact, as far as the agenda setting hypothesis is concerned there is evidence that the broadcast media uses the product of the print media. The foremost specialist on the American news media, Ben H. Bagdikian, put it this way: "Instead of creating a comprehensive news system that offers a service independent of the printed news networks broadcasting uses the product of the printed news....."[38] Examinations of the Canadian media have come to exactly the same conclusion: newspapers play a key role in preparing the messages which are disseminated by other media channels.[39]

Findings about the content of the print media are extremely extensive, but we can summarize some of the main conclusions. It has been reasonably confirmed that the content of American newspapers includes about 10% on crime and accidents. Probably the most precise assessment is that about one tenth of the non-advertising content of United States dailies was concerned with "violence" in the 1939-50 period, it varied in the 1960s from 2 to 34%, and no reliable data has yet been processed for the 1970s.[40] Conclusions about the effects of this violent content are however tenuous. One of the Eisenhower reports assessed the situation in these terms - "There is no rigorous evidence, one way or another, as to whether violence in the print media has

beneficial, harmful or no effect in the real world.....Best guess: It is more likely that media-depicted violence has an undesirable "triggering" effect than that it has a desirable "catharsis" effect. This triggering function is probably only operative among some small fraction of the population who have predispositions toward such violence in the first place, and even then only under certain restricted circumstance."[41] Content analysis can provide important information about violence in the communication industry, but no one has been successful in scientifically indicating its effects by inferential methods.

B. Aggregate Data and Survey Analysis

The artificiality in experimental research is offset by work in the comparison of real life data - or the examination of aggregate data. In this method of investigating the relations between violence and the media, attempts are made to account for the variations in the rates of occurrences of some behaviour - in this case - levels of violence - by some other variables which have not been artificially created. We should not expect simple, unidirectional explanations because the mass media operate as part of a complex network of factors and to show its independent contribution is difficult - many would say impossible. Moreover, lack of a basic model for the behaviour of whole societies and the inability to control all external variables limits the predictive power of such correlational studies, but they are required to confirm whether or not the experimental research is related to reality and to generate further propositions that may be tested under laboratory conditions.

Attempts to measure the amount of crime and/or violence and show how it correlates with the media have been quite frequent in American Social Science literature. The basic data employed in the

United States has been Uniform Crime Reports and they show that crime has been on the increase since the 19th century, especially in the 1960s. Attempts to show that there are significant statistical relations between this data and that on violent content in the media have usually failed. George A. Comstock summarized his researchers' conclusions as showing no "meaningful correlation" between the trend in all forms of media and the rate of real crime as measured by the Uniform Crime Reports for the years 1933-1968.[42]

This conclusion does not end the question about effects. In the same research Clark and Blankenburg in a study of the attention given to violence found that "newspapers reflect the violence of the real world."[43] While Deutschmann had found great variation in the amount and kind of violence reported in various New York dailies,[44] S. G. Levy after an examination of 6,000 issues of American newspapers published from 1819 to 1968 argued that the trends in newspaper content fairly accurately reflected real violence in America.[45]

Even if a relationship were found and the conflicts and the methodological weakness in the studies were eliminated,there would still remain the chicken-and-egg question about whether the media affect levels of violence or merely reflect it. The strongest assertion that the media instigate violence is found in Berkowitz and Macaulay's contagion thesis. These authors found extraordinary jumps in criminal aggression in the United States following the John F. Kennedy and Speck killings.[46] The results were suggestive of a validation of the thesis, but that was all. Their contagion thesis has been attacked on practically every ground - philosophical, methodological, and even on the data itself.

The roughest attack came from H. L. Nieburg who declared sarcastically that the contagion theory is obviously correct! Imitation, fadism, mimicry, socialization, - experience itself all came before the television

set. As Nieburg conceives it we would not have had any violence or revolutions in the past (that is, before the existence of mass media) if the contrary argument were to hold. If the contagion thesis were taken at face value then societies would have totally collapsed everywhere in a tumultous period of contagious violence in which the media caused violence which in turn caused more media violence. Nieburg concludes: "This doctrine attracts not only besieged public officials who require a scapegoat but also the media men themselves, for whom it tends to confirm and inflate their claims of importance - and their revenues."[47] Furthermore, although there have been several empirical attempts to examine the contagion hypothesis, methodologists claim even more basic criticisms. Desmond Ellis makes two valid criticisms. First, the police may have upgraded their categories of violence after the Kennedy and Speck killings and rendered the data non-comparable. Second, if Berkowitz were correct there should have been an increase in crime among Canadians after these tragic events because they were equally exposed to the same violence in the media at that time; but he could find no such evidence in the equivalent Canadian data.[48]

In short no one who has used real life data has found a natural law about the relations between the media and violence. As the leading students of this relation between real and media violence put it in their examination of all American data for the Surgeon General's Committee: "Intervening naturalistic and normative factors prevent a cataclysm; some people, for example, never receive the violent message, some don't understand it, and some (most, one hopes) inhibit themselves from imitating the event."[49]

The lack of ability to find the media responsible will not surprise scholars and should not upset the public since it is extremely rare that single variables are found to account for a behaviour pattern

as widespread as the use of violence. Moreover, the studies have discovered other information of corollary interest. In television programming, for example, we know that the entertainment world of violence is unlike the real world of violence. Survey research on television viewing shows: "The norms for violence contained in the television world are in stark contrast to the norms espoused by a majority of Americans."[50] For example, television programs stage most violence as between strangers while in fact most violence is between acquaintances.[51] When the Eisenhower Commission found that the "more violent prone types" also watched more violent programs they concluded: "The high degree of coincidence between preferences for media violence and experience with actual violence, coupled with norms in support of such acts suggests that the television world of violence has the capacity to reinforce "violents" in their beliefs and actions in the real world."[52]

Surveys on television viewing and actual effects on aggressive behaviour are contradictory. The earliest studies by Schramm, Lyle and Parker[53] found no association, but the Lefkowitz[54] and the McLeod[55] studies found moderately positive associations between exposure and aggressive behaviour. Interpretationsof these research findings also differ. Liebert[56] et al.interpret these studies to have demonstrated a causal relationship while Ellis finds this contention invalid on the ground that only the most "extreme" subjects could have accounted for all the variation present in the data.[57]

The results of all this work on aggregate data and the accompanying surveys is mixed.[58] The relations between real violence and media exposure, and real violence, media and attitudes have not really been determined. The Eisenhower Commission summarized all the findings as indicating a reciprocal relationship between norms of behaviour and

experience; that "many of the 'violents' in experience are also high approvers of violence and vice-versa."[59] No research since that period has convinced us that causation has been shown to exist between media exposure and violence in real life. The best materials remain in the laboratory studies with their concomitant difficulty of overcoming their artificiality. They prove little about what to do about the mass media in the real world. If there is some evidence about causation in the laboratory studies but only hints in the aggregate data and survey research projects then particular cases should be examined. Such research will not meet all the canons of physical science, but its descriptions and illustrations may help to sort out some of the conflicts in the literature and help to make policy decisions.

C. Case Studies and Illustrations

None of the Eisenhower, Kerner or Surgeon General's Reports was able to establish that the media cause violence, but the latter provided some weak associations and the Kerner and Eisenhower reports provided interesting heuristic examples. The following samples, selected for their interest and possible relation to Canada, should suffice to illustrate research in this field. The object is not to prove cause and effect relationships but to illustrate how the media may exacerbate problems and create news about violence which masks the real message that dissidents and authorities are trying to convey.

> "A newspaper reporter equipped with pencil and pad subtly influences the event he is covering; a still photographer with his cameras dangling about his neck may change it more. And a television camera crew, with their lights and large equipment, can transform the event into an entirely different scene. So much so, in fact, that it is questionable if TV is capable of reporting the news objectively."[60]

> "By now it was something after 8 p.m. and the television crews needed something to show on the 10 o'clock news... Up came the three-man television crew: a camera man

with a hand-held camera, a sound man and a light man. Very discreet in the dark.
"May as well get it."
You could sense the disappointment in his voice, because pictorially it wasn't much of a demonstration. The light man held up his 30-volt frezzi and laid a four-foot beam of light across one section of the picket line. Instantly the marchers' heads snapped up, their eyes flashed. They threw up their arms in the clenched Communist fist. Some made a V with their fingers, and they held up their banners for the cameras..."[61]

"Conflict between the police, who want to maintain or restore order, and reporters, who wish to provide full coverage of a volatile event, does arise as it did in Chicago. Mayor Daley and the Chicago police accused the media of interfering with the maintenance of order. Newsmen, in turn, complained of excessive restrictions on their coverage. That there is some truth to both complaints makes the problem no easier to resolve."[62]

"Many protest organizations have their own cameramen and some persons were impersonating television network newsmen in Chicago. Nothing, it is clear now, pleased some demonstrators more than indiscriminate police violence toward the news media."[63]

"If destructive and fatal riots occur in American cities this year, a major share of the blame must fall upon the shoulders of sensational 'journalists' and overnight pundits of the press who are assiduously stoking the fires of unrest." Quoted by Quinn Tamm, Executive Director of the International Association of Police Chiefs.[64]

This view is not only held by policemen. The following is the view of two leading scholars.

"Again we are dealing with a process of social learning, especially for potential participants. Rioting is based on contagion. The process by which the mood and attitudes of those who are actually caught up in the riot are disseminated to a larger audience on the basis of direct contact. Television images serve to spread the contagion patterns throughout urban areas and the nation. Large audiences see the details of riots, the manner in which people participate in them, and especially the ferment associated with looting and obtaining commodities which was as much at the heart of riot behaviour. Television presents detailed information about the tactics of participation and the gratifications that were derived... The media disseminate symbols of identification used by the rioters and their rationalizations. The mass media serve to reinforce and spread a feeling of consciousness among those who participate or sympathize with extremist

> actions, regardless of the actions' origins. In particular, television offers them a mass audience far beyond their most optimistic aspirations."[65]

The above quotations do not constitute a scientific sampling of opinions in case studies about the effect of the media on violence. They do, however, illustrate that some scholars, media personnel and participants in violence believe that the media do contribute to the process of violence. In all the American cases concern was expressed over how the media's coverage of demonstrations and riots provide publicity for the acts of participants whether they were insurgents or policemen. The methods of coverage may have an influence on the behaviour of everyone who is either recorded by, or receives the message from, the media.

Conclusion

After surveying the conflicting evidence about media effects from these various methodologies the researcher is left somewhat bewildered. Possibly J. D. Halloran best summarized the feeling when he wrote:

> "The student is confronted by a veritable avalanche of relevant variables (predispositions, subjective perception, retention, selection, contextual organization, image of source, group membership, activity of opinion leaders, class membership, level of frustration, family background, educational level, availability of social mechanisms and nature of the media to name a few) and it is perhaps not surprising that a preliminary survey of the field leaves one with the impression that we have not advanced very far."[66]

Halloran's ten-year-old statement remains valid today. The totality of research tends to ask - do the mass media cause discernible effects on audiences - and the inevitable answer is "It all depends." The media do not inevitably produce effects, but there is no doubt they are significant in the process. William R. Catton puts the view clearly:

> "If it has not been demonstrated that mass communications can regiment the population, or that these media have corrupted our society, neither has it been proven that they are inherently (or at least under our free enterprise system) harmless."[67]

While a number of evident discrepancies exist, there does seem to be general agreement that the media is saturated with violence. Unfortunately, there is little consensus on the societal impact of this phenomenon. Although social scientists argue that the entertainment media convey norms of violence as a means of conflict resolution, not one would argue that the media is the sole or prime determinant. Moreover, despite the vast amount of research that has been carried out in this field, it has proven impossible to make unambiguous, causal inferences about the relationship between the media and real violence. To date the research has been inconclusive and is replete with inconsistencies. Experimental, aggregate data, survey research and content analysis studies are found to be remarkably discordant in the conclusions they reach about the media and real violence. There seem to be, however, three discernible viewpoints which emerge from the literature. Some social scientists believe that the media can stimulate aggressive tendencies which under certain conditions can lead to aggressive, and possibly violent, behaviour. Others believe that the more violent prone groups or individuals in society are likely to be most affected by violence in programming and print media. Finally, there are some scholars who argue that while the media may not cause violence, they definitely exacerbate collective conflict and violent situations. These conclusions are based almost uniquely on American data, and on American constitutional, procedural, organizational and cultural considerations. In this report we wish to determine which of the above conclusions are valid for Canada and what policy decisions should be taken.

Footnotes to Chapter I

[1]Richard R. Fagen, Politics and Communication (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), pp. 42-43.

[2]Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1954), p. 3.

[3]Canada. Parliament, Senate. Report of the Special Committee on Mass Media, Vol. III (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), p. 5.

[4]T. Joseph Scanlon, "The Not So Mass Media: The Role of Individuals in Mass Communication," in Journalism, Communication and the Law, ed. by G. Stuart Adam (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 106.

[5]Dennis P. Forcese, et al., "The Methodology of a Crisis Survey" (paper presented to annual meeting of Canadian Anthropology-Sociology Association, St. John's, Nfld., June 1971), p. 4.

[6]T. Joseph Scanlon, "News Flow about Release of Kidnapped Diplomat Researched by J-students," Journalism Educator, XXVI (Spring 1971), pp. 35-38.

[7]V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (N.Y.: Knopf, 1961); Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959).

[8]For a summary of the general literature in this field see Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960).

[9]This seems to be the charge of Thelma McCormack in "LaMarsh's Law and Order," Canadian Forum, August 1976, pp. 23-28.

[10]U.S. Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior. Television and Social Behavior: Technical Reports to the Committee. 5 volumes. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972). (Hereinafter referred to as Television and Social Behavior).

[11]The basic, but by no means exhaustive, list of research can be found in Television and Social Behavior; the 13 volumes of reports from the U.S. National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, especially D. L. Lange, R. K. Baker, and S. J. Ball, Mass Media and Violence: A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. Vol. 9 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969); U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report. Otto Kerner, chairman (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968); Otto Larsen, ed., Violence and the Mass Media (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); Charles U. Daly, ed., The Media and the Cities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

[12]Benjamin D. Singer, Communications in Canadian Society (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1975), p. 241.

[13]Communique from the Royal Commission on Violence in the Communications Industry.

[14]H. L. Neiburg, Political Violence: The Behavioral Process (N.Y.: St. Martins Press, 1968), p. 5.

[15]See the discussion of political crime in Stephen Schafer, The Political Criminal (New York: The Free Press, 1974).

[16]Nieburg, op. cit., p. 13.

[17]That is to say more experimental studies have reported statistically significant increases of aggression after witnessing aggression than have reported the opposite. See, for example, Walter Weiss, "Effects of the Mass Media of Communication," in Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliott Aronson (Vol. 5; Rev. ed; Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 77-195; and the sixty reports of the Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee summarized in Television and Social Behavior.

[18]Ontario Psychological Association, "Brief Presented to the Royal Commission on Violence in the Communications Industry," The Ontario Psychologist, 8 (August, 1976), pp. 61-68.

[19]Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters, Social Learning and Personality Development (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963).

[20]Leonard Berkowitz, "The Effects of Observing Violence," Scientific American, 210 (February 1964), pp. 35-41. The exact finding was that "viewing justified aggression increases aggressive tendencies among persons recently frustrated," in Leonard Berkowitz and E. Rawlings, "Effects of Film Violence on Inhibitions against Subsequent Aggression," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66 (1963), pp. 405-12.

[21]Frederic Wertham, "School for Violence," N.Y. Times, July 5, 1964.

[22]Seymour Feshbach,"The Stimulating versus Cathartic Effects of a Vicarious Aggressive Activity," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63 (1961), pp. 381-385.

[23]Robert M. Liebert, "Television and Social Learning: Some Relationships between Viewing Violence and Behaving Aggressively," in Television and Social Behaviour, vol. 2, pp. 1-42.

[24]Klapper, op. cit.

[25]Weiss, loc. cit., p. 77-195.

[26]Anthony G. Greenwald, "Do Crime and Violence in the Mass News Media Modify Behaviour?" (unpublished paper, 1971.)

[27]Jack Lyle, "Television in Daily Life: Patterns of Use (Overview)," in Television and Social Behaviour, vol. 4, p. 24, and passim.

[28]Albert Bandura, "Influences of Models' Reinforcement Contingencies on the Acquisition of Imitative Responses," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1 (1965), pp. 589-595. In another study of the effects of viewing controlled violence in television programmes versus viewing blander programmes the result was that no effects could be found. Seymour Feshbach and Robert D. Singer, Television and Aggression: An Experimental Field Study (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971).

[29]J. R. Dominick, "Crime and Law Enforcement on Prime Time Television," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 57 (1973), p. 245. See also J. R. Dominick and B. S. Greenberg, "Attitudes Towards Violence: The Interaction of Television Exposure, Family Attitudes and Social Class," in Television and Social Behavior, vol. 3, pp. 314-346.

[30]Greenwald, op. cit,, p. 5.

[31]Ibid., p. 16.

[32]Colin Seymour-Ure, The Political Impact of the Mass Media (London: Constable, 1974), p. 45.

[33]For theoretical discussion of this point see Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (N.Y.: Columbia Univ. Press, 1948); Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report on an Hypothesis," Public Opinion Quarterly, 21 (Spring 1957), pp. 61-78; Joseph T. Klapper, op. cit.

[34]Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1964), and Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, op. cit.

[35]Scanlon, "The Not So Mass Media," p. 110.

[36]Bradley S. Greenberg and Edwin B. Parker, eds., The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1965), p. 182.

[37]Lange, Baker and Ball, op. cit., p. 338.

[38]Ben H. Bagdikian, The Information Machines (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 138.

[39]C. McNaught, Canada Gets the News (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940); Arnold Edinborough, "The Press," in Mass Media in Canada, ed. by John A. Irving (Toronto: Ryerson Press 1962); and Arthur Siegel, "Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the F.L.Q. Crisis: A Study of the Impact of the Press on Politics" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, Department of Political Science, 1974), p. 6.

[40]Lange, Baker and Ball, op. cit., p. 499.

[41]Ibid., p. 501.

[42]George A. Comstock, "New Research on Media Content and Control (Overview)," in Television and Social Behaviour, vol. 1, p. 16.

[43]David G. Clark and William R. Blankenburg, "Trends in Violent Content in Selected Mass Media," in Television and Social Behaviour, vol. 1, p. 229.

[44]P. J. Deutschmann, News-Page Content of Twelve Metropolitan Dailies (Cincinnati: Scripps-Havard Research, 1959).

[45]S. G. Levy, "A 150 Year Study of Political Violence in the United States," in Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, A Report submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention and Violence, ed. by H. G. Graham and T. R. Gurr (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 84-100.

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[47]Nieburg, op. cit., p. 30.

[48]Desmond Ellis, "Violence and the Mass Media," Proceedings of Workshop on Violence in Canadian Society (Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto; Toronto, September 8, 9, 1975), p. 92.

[49]Clark and Blakenburg, loc. cit., p. 189.

[50]See Marvin Wolfgang, Patterns in Criminal Homicide (Philadelphia: University of Penn. Press, 1948) which also showed 94% of homicides occur within racial groups and in only 12% of homicides were the assailant and the victim strangers.

[51]Lange, Baker and Ball, op. cit., p. 363.

[52]Ibid., p. 367.

[53]W. Schramm, J. Lyle, E. Parker, Television in the Lives of Our Children (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1961).

[54]M. M. Lefkowitz, L. D. Eron, L. O. Walder, L. R. Huesmann, "Television Violence and Child Aggression: A Followup Study," in Television and Social Behaviour, vol. 3, pp. 35-136.

[55]Jack M. McLeod, Charles K. Atkin, and Steven H. Chaffee, "Adolescents, Parents, and Television Use: Self-Report and Other-Report Measures from the Wisconsin Sample," in Television and Social Behaviour, vol. 3, pp. 239-314.

[56]R. Liebert, J. M. Neale, and E. S. Davidson, The Early Window: Effects of Television on Children and Youth (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1973).

[57]Ellis, loc. cit., pp. 95-99.

[58]The validity of surveys is difficult to assess as functional variables are difficult to control. 20% of negro males in the USA declared themselves ready and willing to participate in riots as an act of protest, but only 3% actually had. See Lange, Baker and Ball, op. cit., p. 487. Moreover, the results of future experimental studies conducted in naturalistic settings may prove more helpful in establishing cause and effect relations. See F. B. Steuer, N. N. Applefield, and R. Smith, "Televised Aggression and the Later Personal Aggression of Pre-School Children," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 11 (1971), pp. 442-447.

[59]Lange, Baker, and Ball, op. cit., p. 361.

[60]Sophy Burnham, "Telling It Like It Isn't," New York Times Magazine, Sept. 16, 1968, p. 13, quoted in Lange, Baker & Ball, op. cit., p. 89.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Lange, Baker & Ball, op. cit., p. 93.

[63]Ibid., p. 93-4.

[64]Ibid., p. 103.

[65]Cited in H. D. Graham and T. D. Gurr, eds. op. cit., p. 440.

[66]J. D. Halloran, The Effects of Mass Communication (Leicester: University of Leicester Press, 1965), p. 29.

[67]Lange, Baker and Ball, op. cit., p. 217.

Chapter II

International and Canadian Data Analysis

The first part of this chapter presents an analysis of the relationship between mass media and collective conflict in a comparative international setting, utilizing the aggregate data techniques currently employed in social science research. In the second part, the focus shifts to a consideration of the data on conflict and violence in Canada both in an historical and contemporary perspective. The peaceable kingdom myth is characterized as an exaggeration and violence in Canada is placed alongside that of other states for comparative purposes. Together the two parts help to confirm the basic conclusions from Chapter I, set the examination of Canadian and Ontario violence in a wide context and provide a backdrop for later discussions of seven cases of collective conflict and violence.

International Data

In recent years a considerable amount of energy has been expended by social scientists in an attempt to determine the social and psychological conditions underlying collective conflict and violence. As a result, there currently exists a substantial body of literature on the causes of this phenomenon - ranging from broadly based presidential commission reports to a few very sophisticated attempts at causal modeling.[1] In line with the proposition that comparison is the essence of social science, a great many of these studies have taken a cross-national or cross polity perspective; that is they have attempted to isolate the causes of civil disorder by examining variations in the level of collective conflict among different samples of nations, and relating these variations to socio-economic and demographic factors utilizing a number of statistical techniques. As a result of such

studies, this phenomenon has been variously attributed to such general psychological factors as relative deprivation,[2] as well as to more specific social and demographic factors such as cultural and ethnic divisions,[3] the destabilizing effects of rapid economic growth,[4] government repression,[5] income and land inequalities,[6] crowding[7] etc., and numerous combinations of these and other variables.[8]

During this same period, as indicated in Chapter I, there has also existed, particularly among social psychologists, an interest in the effect that exposure to media violence has on behaviour. The current experimental literature is replete with studies indicating that such exposure not only frequently provides the exposed individual with a model for aggressive behaviour, but in some instances can also inculcate a person with predispositions to, and justifications for, such activity. As a result there has been a great deal of concern about the social effects of the violence presented by the mass media. This concern has been greatly augmented by the fact that the media, especially television, are now considered by many scholars to be one of the predominant agents of socialization.

Despite the public concern and scholarly musings over these two subjects, there has not been any direct attempt to examine the effect of media exposure in the various analyses of collective conflict and violence.[9] Although a number of communications variables have been used in some studies they have been employed solely as an index of the level of social modernization in a country, and have not been examined as a contributory factor in themselves.[10]

The first part of the chapter will, therefore, attempt to examine the relationship between the mass media and collective conflict and violence on a comparative basis. The relationship to be tested will be a derivation of what has sometimes been referred to as the hypodermic

hypothesis. This proposition assumes that all media are "saturated" with violence and that the larger the "dosage" of media exposure the greater the subsequent behavioural effect. Thus, the amount of violence and the amount of media in countries should correlate. While this latter assumption may seem overly behaviouristic in that it presupposes a mechanistic and homogeneous response and ignores any individual input on the part of the communications receiver, it does conform to the research task required by the Commission.

The Media

Creating an index of media exposure has been greatly facilitated by the extensive research which has been undertaken on communications structures and modernization,[11] and by the fact that communications data are relatively abundant. The communications data used in the construction of the present index have been derived from the Taylor and Hudson World Handbook data set.[12] The items employed and the base year for the data were the following:

a) Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population 1960[13]

b) Radio receivers per 1,000 population 1960[14]

c) Television receivers per 1,000 population 1960[15]

d) Cinema attendance per capita 1960[16]

In combination these measures serve as an adequate reflection of the extent to which media structures in any country are present for the purpose of informing and socializing a population. It should be noted that such general measures overlook the importance of such factors as interpersonal communications and personal characteristics which have been singled out in Chapter I.[17] Unfortunately these factors are not easily quantifiable, but, in any case, they are not integral to the examination of the hypothesis of this chapter.

The Sample

As it is the function of this commission to investigate the impact of the mass media on violence in a Canadian context, the countries in this sample were selected on the basis of their resemblance to the Canadian experience in terms of their level of development and the character of their communications industry.[18]

As Table 1 indicates, the availability of mass media, as measured by the four component indicators (Newspaper circulation, radio receivers, television receivers and cinema attendance) is largely a function of economic development.[19] With the exception of cinema attendance, all the media indicators are highly correlated with this factor.[20] Over and above the level of media development, consideration was also given to media character - particularly the political constraints under which a country's media operate. It would seem a valid assumption that the content of the media and its subsequent impact are largely contingent on the political environment. An effort to allow for this factor and to further "Canadianize" the sample population was made by introducing a press freedom variable into the sample selection process. This variable was based on an index created by the University of Missouri School of Journalism and measures the freedom of a country's broadcasting and press system to formulate independent opinions and to criticize their own local and national governments.[21] Conversely, the Press Freedom Index is also intended to reflect the ability and willingness of a government to withstand potentially adverse criticism, and might therefore be interpreted as a measure of the level of democratization existing in a country.

It is quite interesting to note that although the media in Canada are both extensive and independent, in other countries these two characteristics are not necessarily related.[22] In fact, as Table 2 indicates, there is little correlation between the level of media

TABLE 1

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LEVEL OF MASS MEDIA DEVELOPMENT*

	Economic development
Newspapers circulation per 1,000 population	.81 (118)
Radio receivers per 1,000 population	.90 (119)
Television receivers per 1,000 population	.83 (91)
Cinema attendance per capita	.51 (95)

* In this table the upper figure in each row is the product moment correlation coefficient, and the lower figure in parenthesis is the number of nations on which the correlation is based.

TABLE 2

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIA DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PRESS FREEDOM*

	Press freedom
Economic development	.24 (87)
Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population	.38 (87)
Radio receivers per 1,000 population	.37 (86)
Television receivers per 1,000 population	.30 (74)
Cinema attendance per capita	.16 (72)

* In this table the upper figure in each row is the product moment correlation coefficient, and the lower figure in parenthesis is the number of nations on which the correlation is based.

development and media freedom. Correlatively, there is little relationship between economic development and media freedom or democratization as some analysts previously have assumed.[23]

Based on these economic and media considerations, a sample of 19 countries was selected for analysis. All countries selected ranked among the top 30 in the Taylor and Hudson World Handbook data set (N=136) in terms of both economic development and press freedom. The countries employed in the analysis are Canada, the U.S., Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand, France, West Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Finland, The Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Venezuela, Ireland and Japan.[24]

Comparative Collective Conflict

An attempt has been made in this section to limit the use of the term violence because of the semantic pitfalls that this word entails.[25] In later chapters we will come "closer" to the data and specifically examine violence data only. In this chapter, the focus will be on what might be called collective conflictual behaviour. This phenomenon can be both violent and non-violent and is not necessarily anti-systemic, or anti-status quo, although it is in all instances extra-parliamentary.

Collective conflict has been operationalized here using six conflict event variables derived from the Taylor and Hudson data set.[26] The following event variables, selected from the data file, measure both the extent and intensity of domestic conflict and violence:[27]

1) Riots - Any violent demonstration, or clash of a large group of citizens. Violence implies the use of physical force, and is generally evinced by the destruction of property, the killing or wounding of people (physical injury), or the use of riot control equipment. Riots are distinguished from armed attacks on the basis of whether the attack seems to have been organized, whether it is goal directed, or whether it involves all, or most of the participants acting purposefully.

2) Armed Attacks - Acts of insurrectionary violence committed by, or involving, organized groups with weapons of any kind, when these acts are intended as protests, or acts of revolt, or rebellion against a government, its members, policies, intended policies, etc.

3) Political Strikes - Any strikes by industrial or service workers, or students for the purpose of protesting against a government, its leaders or a government policy or action.

4) Deaths from Political Violence - The number killed in conjunction with any domestic intergroup violence in the nature of armed attacks, riots, demonstrations, etc.

5) Anti-government Demonstrations - Organized violent gatherings of a large number of people for the purpose of protesting against a government, its actions or policies, or one or more of its leaders. Demonstrations that became riots are excluded.

6) Pro-Government Demonstrations - A gathering of people whose purpose was to lend support to a government, its policies and actions or to one or more of its leaders. This category also includes demonstrations for or against a foreign government, its policies, leaders, or visiting representatives which also show support or satisfaction for the demonstrators' own regime.

The inclusion of the last indicator, one which has been previously ignored as a conflict measure, is defensible given the scope of this study. It would seem that the virtual existence of pro-government demonstrations assumes or implies that there exists on the other hand a certain level of anti-government conflict or sentiment; otherwise such manifestations would be unnecessary. Hence, as conflict necessarily involves a minimum of two parties, both pro and anti-government demonstrators would be engaging in a form of conflict behaviour as challengers to, and defenders of, the 'status quo.' A subsequent factor analysis bears out this relationship between pro-government demonstrations and other forms of conflict.

Data on each of the above conflict measures were obtained from the data set and aggregated into one 11 year time period encompassing the years 1955-1965.[28] The question of the interrelationship of these

conflict measures is extremely important in that they can be, and have previously been, analysed in a variety of different ways. Some studies have approached each of these indicators as discrete phenomena, that is, as conceptually unrelated. Others have attempted to analyse them in terms of a smaller number of underlying dimensions.[29] Although there are logical, and theoretically interesting, arguments for the first technique,[30] a factor analysis of a number of cross-national data sets of various sample sizes and time frames, has usually supported the latter approach.[31] Factor analysis is normally relied on in such cases to give coherence to a variety of forms of conflict, with the factor labels subsequently becoming the conceptual phenomenon to be explained.[32] Thus, a great many quantitative analyses of domestic conflict have utilized this technique to reduce the complexity of language and events related to conflict to a parsimonious set of dimensions which indicate the underlying phenomenon.[33] This type of analysis has usually uncovered two underlying dimensions of domestic conflict. The first of these dimensions which is often denoted as turmoil - or anomic conflict - is indexed by riots, general strikes, and demonstrations. The other, which has been variously referred to as internal war, rebellion or revolution, is characterized by such events as terrorism, deaths and assassinations. The usual interpretation given to this differentiation is that terrorism and assassination, along with deaths resulting from collective conflict, are indicative of a different level and intensity of conflict than strikes, riots and demonstrations. The relationship between the two dimensions has, however, remained for the most part, unspecified. It is assumed nevertheless, that each dimension presupposes a different set of preconditions and causal linkages. Therefore, if it were possible to discern two dimensions of conflict for this sample, it would not be improbable that the relationship of the mass media to each dimension

would be substantially different. As will be seen, however, a factor analysis of the events data for this particular sample raises some question about the general applicability of such a dimensional division.

Before this factor analysis was employed, each conflict indicator was first logged.[34] Theoretically, this logarithmic transformation of each variable best stabilizes variance and, more importantly, maximizes linear relationships.[35] The transformed data were then factor analysed. Although there is little consensus in the relevant literature on the optimum technique, many analysts have persuasively argued for a principle components solution in such a context, and therefore this technique is utilized here.[36] It would appear evident from the results as shown in Table 3 that the principal components method was unable to distinguish the two purported dimensions of conflict behaviour with respect to the present sample. Rather, all the variables in this analysis load highly on the same factor, clearly suggesting that there exists only one dimension of conflict in these countries.

The uniformity of the results generated by this factor analysis suggest at the outset two alternative strategies. One approach would be to take the highest loading variable on factor 1, in this case riots, and use it as a representative variable.[37] While this strategy has frequently been employed in this type of analysis it is considered by many analysts to entail unnecessary information loss. A more realistic and reliable approach would be to construct a composite operational measure by way of the summation of the data for all six indicators. Given the distribution of the component variables, a logarithm of this sum should provide the most appropriate composite index.[38] This index will hereafter be referred to as collective conflict. As well as the statistical reasons put forward for this collapse of the data into one index called collective conflict, this would also seem to best meet the

TABLE 3

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS: CONFLICT EVENT VARIABLES 19 NATION SAMPLE 1955-1965

Variables	Factors [a]	
	I	II
Riots	.923	.200
Deaths from domestic political violence	.898	-.351
Armed attacks	.905	-.170
Anti-government demonstrations	.849	.480
Pro-government demonstrations	.914	.014
Political strikes	.896	-.152

[a] Block loading $\geq$ .600

test presented by the Royal Commission - to show whether or not media presentations affect the general phenomenon of "violence."

Analysis

In order to examine the "hypodermic hypothesis" with respect to the relationship of media exposure to conflict two sets of regression equations will be employed. The first equation will examine the relationship of media exposure to the composite index collective conflict. A second series of equations will also be introduced to analyse the effect of media exposure on each of the individual conflict measures. This has been done because the composite measure may obscure the possibility of media exposure having different effects on the various forms of such behaviour.

An initial question arises concerning the treatment of the four media variables which we have proposed to use in the analysis. It is argued that mass media is really an indivisible concept, in that its various elements substitute for, and reinforce, each other. Hence it is felt that a problem frequently arises when an attempt is made to examine individual items. The overlap of functions (eg. newspapers, television, etc.) makes it difficult to single out any one of the mass media as being a source of influence. Furthermore, the media have often been conceptualized as a unitary concept with the justification that the high degree of interrelationship of its components makes any one a possible substitute for the other.[39] While the essence of this argument is comprehensible, it is not without serious flaws. First, most of the psychological literature on media and violence differentiates between the behavioural effects of observing violence, and reading, or hearing about it.[40] Moreover, our own factor analysis of the four media variables (Table 4) indicates that in this sample of countries with a

TABLE 4

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS:
MASS MEDIA VARIABLES
19 NATION SAMPLE

Variable	Factor[a] I	II	III
Newspapers per 1,000 population	.460	.127	.877
Radios per 1,000 population	.884	.127	-.331
Television per 1,000 population	.925	.143	-.137
Cinema attendance per 1,000 population	-.320	.946	-.053

[a]Block loading > .600

high level of media development, the various components are not highly interrelated. While it appears that television and radio variables are highly covariant, newspapers and cinema attendance are not related either to them or to each other. Therefore, there should be some reservations about constructing a composite variable called media. The effect, then, of each of the media variables on conflict will be examined separately in the following analysis.

The Collective Conflict Equation

Table 5 shows the results of a multiple regression using collective conflict as the dependent variable and each of the media exposure measures as independent variables.[41] Economic development has also been included as an independent variable. This has been done to reduce the amount of specification error in this equation.[42]

The results of this regression suggest that the volume of media exposure has little relationship to collective conflict. Employing normal significance criteria, i.e. a parameter estimate at least 2 times its standard error and a significant F statistic, we find the impact of most of the media variables to be negligible. Only the estimated coefficient for newspaper circulation proved to be statistically significant. However while this factor would appear to account for 29% of the variation in levels of collective conflict for this sample as indicated by the r^2, the parameter estimate for the newspaper circulation variable has the wrong sign. This indicates that there is a negative relationship between newspaper circulation and collective conflict across this sample. These initial findings would thus argue strongly in the direction of rejecting the hypodermic hypothesis.

A similar series of results was generated by the regression of the media exposure variables on the individual forms of conflict

TABLE 5

REGRESSION OF MEDIA VARIABLES

ON COLLECTIVE CONFLICT (N=19)

Independent Variables	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	R^2	F Statistic
Economic development	.0001	.0004	.09	.02
Newapaper circulation per 1,000 Population	-.0069	.0023	.27	9.28
Radio receivers per 1,000 Population	-.0021	.0026	.01	.68
Television receivers per 1,000 Population	.0097	.0065	.09	2.25
Cinema attendance per capita	-.0257	.0550	.01	.22
Constant	3.903			

R^2	Standard Error of the Estimate
.50	.97009

behaviour. Tables 6 through 11 show the results of these equations. As with the collective conflict equation, the only variable to have a consistently significant, but negative, impact was newspaper circulation. In 5 of the 6 regressions (The anti-government demonstration equation being the exception) this variable proved significant. Overall, the level of newspaper circulation was determined to explain 15% of the variance in the number of riots, 37% of the variance in the number of deaths, 44% of the variance in the number of armed attacks, 33% of the variance in the number of pro-government demonstrations and 25% of the variance in the number of political strikes. In all instances, however, the estimated coefficient again indicates the existence of a negative relationship between newspaper circulation and collective conflict.

In light of these results, a series of supplemental regressions were run using collective conflict and each of its individual forms as dependent variables, and newspaper circulation as the independent variable. The results of this analysis, as shown in Table 12, indicate again that in 6 of the 7 regressions (the anti-government demonstration equation once more being the exception) the level of newspaper circulation had a significantly negative effect on the particular forms of collective conflict.[43]

The impact that newspaper circulation has been found to have on collective conflict is interesting. Generally, it can be assumed on the basis of this analysis that the greater the newspaper circulation the lower the level of collective conflict in a society. Figure 1 offers a graphic illustration of the relationship between newspaper circulation per 1,000 population and collective conflict for the 19 nations in this sample. As illustrated, the countries which have the highest level of newspaper circulation (generally) have the lowest levels of domestic conflict. This alone would seem to be an outright refutation

TABLE 6

REGRESSION OF MEDIA VARIABLES ON RIOTS (N=19)

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	R^2	F Statistic
Economic development	-.0002	.0007	.11	.08
Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population	-.0093	.0044	.15	4.46
Radio receivers per 1,000 population	-.0001	.0005	.00	.04
Television receivers per 1,000 population	.0180	.0125	.11	2.08
Cinema attendance per capita	-.0413	.1069	.01	.15
Constant	5.019			

R^2	Standard Error of the Estimate
.38	1.885

TABLE 7

REGRESSION OF MEDIA VARIABLES
ON ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS (N=19)

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	R^2	F Statistic
Economic development	.0002	.0008	.26	.04
Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population	-.0061	.0046	.04	1.74
Radio receivers per 1,000 population	-.0022	.0053	.00	.18
Television receivers per 1,000 population	.0174	.0132	.09	1.74
Cinema attendance per capita	-.0364	.1121	.00	.11
Constant	3.267			

R^2	Standard Error of the Estimate
.40	1.977

TABLE 8

REGRESSION OF MEDIA VARIABLES ON
PRO-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS (N=19)

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	R^2	F Statistic
Economic development	.0002	.0005	.12	.20
Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population	-.0082	.0028	.33	8.43
Radio receivers per 1,000 population	.0013	.0032	.01	.16
Television receivers per 1,000 population	.0014	.0081	.00	.03
Cinema attendance per 1,000 population	-.0728	.0688	.04	1.11
Constant	3.662			

R^2	Standard Error of Estimate
.50	1.213

TABLE 9

REGRESSION OF MEDIA VARIABLES
ON POLITICAL STRIKES (N=19)

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	R^2	F Statistic
Economic development	-.0003	.0005	00	.31
Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population	-.0069	.0030	.26	5.18
Radio receivers per 1,000 population	.0014	.0035	.01	.15
Television receivers per 1,000 population	.0068	.0087	.03	.61
Cinema attendance per capita	.0215	.0743	.00	.08
Constant	2.728			

R^2	Standard Error of the Estimate
.30	1.310

TABLE 10

REGRESSION OF MEDIA VARIABLES
ON ARMED ATTACKS (N=19)

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	R^2	F Statistic
Economic development	.0004	.0006	.14	.45
Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population	-.0155	.0038	.45	16.46
Radio receivers per 1,000 population	-.0025	.0044	.01	.32
Television receivers per 1,000 population	.0114	.0110	.03	1.08
Cinema attendance per Capita	.0332	.0933	.00	.13
Constant	5.371			

R^2	Standard Error of the Estimate
.62	1.645

TABLE 11

REGRESSION OF MEDIA VARIABLES ON DEATHS (N=19)

Independent Variables	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	R^2	F Statistic
Economic development	.0001	.0007	.07	.03
Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population	-.0135	.0043	.38	9.89
Radio receivers per 1,000 population	.0009	.0049	.00	.03
Television receivers per 1,000 population	.0068	.0123	.02	.30
Cinema attendance per capita	-.0602	.1044	.01	.33
Constant	4.956			

R^2	Standard Error of the Estimate
.49	1.840

TABLE 12

REGRESSION OF NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION ON CONFLICT VARIABLES (N=19)

Dependent Variable	Parameter Estimate	Standard Error	R^2	F Statistic
Collective conflict	-.0049	.0023	.20	4.37
Riots	-.0058	.0043	.10	1.79
Deaths	-.0110	.0041	.30	7.24
Armed attacks	-.0121	.0041	.33	8.50
Anti-government demonstrations	-.0019	.0048	.01	.15
Pro-government demonstrations	-.0066	.0029	.24	5.43
Political strikes	-.0059	.0026	.23	5.14

FIGURE 1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COLLECTIVE CONFLICT AND NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION PER 1,000 POPULATION.
19 Nation Sample 1955-1965



Correlation (R)	-.452	Intercept (A)	3.38
Standard Error of the Estimate	1.066	Significance	.026
R Squared	.20	Slope	-.005

For a key to the interpretation of this figure see footnote 44.

of the hypodermic hypothesis. Furthermore when this negative relationship is combined with the negligible relationships found for the other media variables we do not seem unduly hasty in rejecting this proposition altogether. Hence at this rather abstract level of analysis we can state that no relationship exists between media exposure and collective conflict.[45] This does not mean to suggest that no relationship between media and conflict could be discovered but rather that none was determinable at the level of analysis used here. Hence, it would appear that a further investigation of this relationship requires a different methodological strategy, more specifically one which is less abstract than aggregate data analysis. The best alternative in this case would seem to be what is referred to as the country specific approach. By limiting our focus to one country we can attempt a more intensive examination of some of the dynamics of the media-conflict relationship, as well as some of its subtleties which often defy precise measurement. For this reason the following section will examine the historical occurrence of collective conflict in Canada.

Collective Conflict in Canada

The myth of the "peaceable kingdom" has been one of the most durable themes in Canadian political culture.[46] The assumption that pervades this idea is that Canadians have traditionally been, and remain, a thoroughly non-violent people. It has been noted by one prominent historian that practically all Canadian textbooks in history, political science and sociology presume that Canada has always been a tranquil and pacific society; one that evolved from colony to responsible government to independence by peaceful debate.[47] Or as Joseph Howe characterized the advent of responsible government in Nova Scotia - without the breaking of a pane of glass.[48] Implicit in the optimistic parochialism

of this myth is the further suggestion that Canadian history has been relatively free of the violence and extremism that have characterized the growth and development of the United States. It is, thus, a general point of consensus that not only was Canadian Confederation bloodless in contrast to the revolutionary origin of the United States but also that our history has been virtually free of the lawlessness and violence that characterized the American frontier experience. The Hollywood image of the rugged individualistic gunman or the roving bands of night riders to which we are exposed by the American media is thought to have no parallel in Canadian history where the West was secured by a law enforcement agency - the Mounties. Moreover it is also a fundamental supposition in the peaceable kingdom myth that Canada has experienced substantially less radical and criminal violence than has occurred in the United States. While the occurrence of a few comic opera rebellions and some rather bothersome strikes are acknowledged, citizens assume complacently that resorting to violence has been atypical of the Canadian experience.

Unfortunately the uncritical acceptance of this thesis has caused misjudgements about the degree of abnormality represented by conflict behaviour in this country and posed obstacles to its understanding. Largely as a result, domestic conflict has been neglected for some time as a field worthy of serious research. The conscious and unconscious perpetuation of the peaceable kingdom myth also accounts, to a large extent, for the current tendency in private, political and academic circles to react to contemporary expressions of conflict with a good deal of shock. It has also led to the acceptance of certain misplaced conclusions about the undercurrents present in our own society as seen in the attempt of many politicians to attribute the 'contretemps' of the sixties to the fall-out of American violence, or to various

imaginary conspiracies.

Although it is not incorrect to assume that social strife in this country has never reached the quantity or the intensity of American violence, such a comparison is both insidious and irrevelant. The fact that there has been appreciably less violence in Canada over the past two centuries than has occurred in the United States should not be construed to mean that civil conflict has been adventitious to the development of Canadian society. The fact is that there has been appreciably more violent conflict in the past than most of us are aware of. It has been less dramatic and less well publicized than in the United States, but it has nonetheless been an integral part of the Canadian political process.[49]

Even a selective review of some violent incidents in Canadian history seems to bear out this contention. First of all while the lack of bloodshed over Confederation is something of a moot point neither the pre nor post Confederation period was totally calm or serene. Until 1867 Canada gave the image of a relatively disorderly country in which overt conflict was frequent between white and Indians, French and English Canadians and Americans, fur trading interests, and rebels supporting Papineau and McKenzie vs the Tory establishment.[50] Neither was the Canadian experience with manifest destiny as tranquil as it has usually been portrayed. Social disorder was generally characteristic of the Canadian frontier due to the highly competitive nature of frontier economics which centred on the timber and fur trade.

There are two recurrent themes in the later history of Canadian collective conflict: religion and race. Sectarian violence was especially prominent in this country during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Violent encounters between Orangemen and Irish reached such ritualistic dimensions that every March 17th and July 12th brought with it a call

to arms.[51] The nineteenth century also witnesses a number of small scale civil wars with serious racial overtones. Undoubtedly the pre-eminent among these was the Riel Rebellion in the west.[52] There was also what has been called the Shiners War which raged in Ottawa (then Bytown) between 1837 and 1845.[53] While now something of a curio of Canadian history this struggle for recognition and economic security epitomized the social disorder in Ontario during the period.

There have also been some very substantial outbreaks of election violence during the last hundred odd years. Intimidation and "Teddy Boy" tactics were at one time an almost integral part of political campaigning in this country. Again, this was frequently due to the sectarian nature of the competing political parties. Whatever the reason most election days were, as one prominent Orangeman characterized them, "days of blood and fire."[54] During the mid and late 19th century, campaign slogans such as "No Popery No Surrender" or "Vote Conservative or your barns burn" were quite prevalent.[55] Often they had significantly more impact than more recent electioneering practices. While the present century has been quite tranquil in comparison it too has witnessed some very violent elections. The federal election in 1911 over the reciprocity treaty occasioned numerous incidents of mob rioting and street fighting.[56] The federal election of 1935 was highlighted by a series of sectarian incidents which assumed, according to one historian, the dimensions of a small war.[57] More recently a rather substantial riot broke out in Montreal on the eve of the 1968 federal election when militant separatists confronted Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau on the reviewing stand of the St. Jean Baptiste Parade.

With the exception of the 1960's which are examined below, most of the major violence of the present century, with certain notable exceptions (eg. election violence, the conscription riots in Quebec

in 1918, the V.E. and the V.J. day rioting and various episodes of Doukhobor violence) has been labour related.[58] Such conflict has been extensive and often quite bitter as much of it involved the fundamental question of the right to unionize. Between 1910 and 1966 Canada had 227 strikes marked by explosions of violence.[59] Many of these incidents, moreover, had significant political implications and federal troops and the RCMP were frequently used to suppress them.[60]

While none of the incidents of Canadian economic violence was comparable to the Ludlow Massacre in Colorado in 1914 or the 1937 Memorial Day massacre during the Little Steel strike in Chicago some of them were incredibly vicious. One of these incidents, the Winnipeg General Strike, has been called one of the most significant violent occurrences in Canadian history.[61] Others, such as the strikes at Murdochville and Asbestos, have also had significant societal repercussion. The history of labour violence in the twentieth century rings like a litany of the major industrial and railway centres in Canada. While many of these incidents are not as well known as those mentioned above, they have nevertheless had a significant impact on the economic structure of our society and to an extent also on the political structure due to the frequent interventions of various levels of government.

This cursory review of Canadian history should serve to implant some doubts about the unrealistic tranquility and rationality which is often attributed to our society. While it is not necessary to assume that violent conflict is endemic to Canadian society there do seem to have been some significant antagonisms in the social fabric. Awareness of this fact may permit a better perspective from which to judge the degree of extra-normality of contemporary expressions of violence and their causes.

Contemporary Collective Conflict in Canada in a Comparative Perspective

During the 1960s disorder in Canada seemed part of a global epidemic. For some time the list seemed endless - Paris, London, Rome, Montreal, Chicago, Warsaw, Peking. No country appeared to escape unscathed. Civil conflict was so pervasive that one Canadian psychiatrist referred to the sixties as the age of the psychopath.[62]

According to the data used in the preceding cross national analysis Canada experienced, during the period 1955-1965, 24 anti Government demonstrations, 19 riots, 1 political strike, 10 pro government demonstrations, 92 armed attacks and 8 conflict related deaths. A time profile showing the occurrence of these incidents is shown in Figure 2. It indicates that almost 85% of these incidents took place between the years 1962-1965.[63] In light of the previous discussion about the recurrence of racial conflict in this country it should be noted that most of the incidents recorded here, specifically the armed attacks and the conflict related deaths may be attributed to two ethno-political groups the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors sect and the Front de Liberation Quebecois. The violence of the Sons of Freedom reached its apogee in 1962 and little has been heard from this group since.[64] From 1963 onward most of the violence can be attributed to the FLQ and separatist unrest in Quebec. Moreover, four of the eight deaths resulting from domestic unrest can be attributed directly to this organization.

To a large extent the Canadian experience with disorder over the last couple of decades has not been markedly dissimilar from that of many other countries. An analysis of various data sets using different conflict measures, different time frames and different samples of nations all seem to indicate that although Canada had a relatively low level of intra-societal conflict it was somewhere around the median for advanced

industrialized nations.

Viewed in terms of the 19 highly democratic, and industrialized countries used in the preceding analysis Canada ranked slightly above the median for such countries. As Table 13 indicates, Canada ranked seventh in the incidence, and sixth in the rate of domestic conflict although in both cases it was far removed from Venezuela which was the most violence prone country in the sample. In terms of the particular forms of conflict Canada ranked ninth in the number and seventh in the rate of riots, eighth in the number and seventh in the rate of anti government demonstrations, sixth in the number and fifth in the rate of pro-government demonstrations and ninth in the number and eighth in the rate of political strikes. It was ranked fifth, however, in the level and fourth in the rate of armed attacks. Canada was also fifth in the number, and seventh in the rate of deaths from domestic violence.

The particular character of this sample tends to exaggerate the relative prominence of conflict in this country as most of the countries in it have relatively low levels of conflict. Table 14 shows this sample integrated into a larger universe of 84 nations: of the 20 countries with the lowest levels of collective conflict 10 were also in the preceding sample. Canada in this sample ranks at position 49, again slightly above the median for nations with similar socio-economic characteristics,but was far removed from Indonesia and Hungary both of which had bitter periods of major civil strife during the era.[65]

Some of the other large cross-national analyses using different measures have placed Canada slightly further down the list. In Ted Gurr's survey of civil unrest of 114 nations and colonies from 1961-1965 Canada ranked 80th.[66] In a more recent study,Gurr and Bishop using measures of both physical and structural violence ranked Canada 68th out of 86 countries.[67]

FIGURE 2 TIME PROFILE OF CANADIAN COLLECTIVE CONFLICT, 1955–1965



TABLE 13

INCIDENCE OF COLLECTIVE CONFLICT: 19 NATION SAMPLE 1955-1965

Nation	Collective Conflict Total**	Rate *	No. of Riots	Rate	No. of Anti Govt Demonstrations	Rate	No. of Pro Govt Demonstrations	Rate	No. of Political Strikes	Rate	No. of Armed Attacks	Rate	No. of Deaths	Rate
Venezuela	2230	247.8	157	17.4	34	3.8	25	2.8	15	1.7	448	49.8	1546	171.8
United States	2149	11.0	325	1.7	925	4.7	66	0.3	17	0.08	628	3.2	184	0.9
France	962	19.6	70	1.4	183	3.7	65	1.3	44	0.8	498	10.1	102	2.0
Italy	335	6.4	101	1.9	18	0.3	22	0.4	25	0.5	135	2.5	34	0.5
Japan	203	2.0	69	0.7	116	1.2	3	0.03	6	0.06	6	0.06	2	0.0
United Kingdom	177	3.2	60	1.0	94	1.7	3	0.05	2	0.03	115	2.1	3	0.0
Canada	154	7.7	19	1.0	24	1.2	10	0.5	1	0.05	92	4.6	8	0.4
West Germany	141	2.4	27	0.5	67	1.1	25	0.4	1	0.01	21	0.4	0	0
Belgium	114	12.7	40	4.4	40	4.4	7	0.8	9	1.0	12	1.3	6	0.7
Ireland	37	12.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.3	32	10.6	1	0.3
Austria	33	4.7	18	2.6	2	0.3	3	0.4	3	0.4	6	0.9	1	0.1
Denmark	16	3.2	0	0	15	3.0	0	0	0	0	1	0.2	0	0
Finland	15	3.0	4	0.8	1	0.2	6	1.2	0	0	1	0.2	3	0.6
Switzerland	10	1.7	3	0.5	0	0	1	0.2	1	0.2	5	0.8	0	0
Australia	9	0.8	1	0.09	2	0.2	0	0	0	0	6	0.5	0	0
Netherlands	7	0.6	1	0.08	2	0.2	3	0.3	0	0	1	0.08	0	0
Sweden	6	0.8	5	0.6	0	0	1	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	5	1.3	0	0	2	0.5	2	0.5	0	0	1	0.3	0	0
New Zealand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

* All Rates per million 1965 Population

* * For the purpose of comparison Collective Conflict Total includes assassinations

TABLE 14

INCIDENCE OF COLLECTIVE CONFLICT

84 COUNTRY SAMPLE 1955-1965

Indonesia	90621	Panama	209
Hungary	40200	Japan	203
Malaysia	10805	Afghanistan	199
Argentina	7325	United Kingdom	177
Cuba	5419	Ethiopia	159
China	5239	Turkey	156
India	5068	Canada	154
Dominican Republic	4799	Spain	153
Iraq	4543	West Germany	141
Colombia	4512	Chile	140
Taiwan	3382	Portugal	115
Laos	2808	Belgium	114
Pakistan	2578	Israel	108
Tunisia	2577	East Germany	97
Morocco	2276	Greece	93
Sudan	2262	Ghana	88
Venezuela	2230	Costa Rica	79
United States	2149	Egypt	75
Cyprus	1898	Thailand	64
Syria	1569	Libya	48
South Africa	1175	Rumania	44
Bolivia	1141	Czechoslovakia	41
Burma	1007	Ireland	37
France	962	Uruguay	36
Lebanon	844	Austria	33
Albania	785	Cambodia	32
Peru	766	Korea	26
Poland	727	El Salvador	18
USSR	538	Denmark	16
Iran	497	Finland	15
Mexico	462	Bulgaria	13
Haiti	458	Switzerland	10
Philippines	442	Australia	9
Sri Lanka	440	Netherlands	7
Nicaragua	375	Sweden	6
Italy	335	Norway	5
Paraguay	264	Yugoslavia	4
Ecuador	256	Liberia	3
Guatemala	252	Iceland	2
Jordan	234	Luxembourg	0
Honduras	211	New Zealand	0
Brazil	210	Saudi Arabia	0

Nevertheless, in both cases it was still around the median of the developed subsample.

A rather ingenious attempt to construct instability profiles of various nations has also been undertaken by the Feierabend group at the University of San Diego. This group attempted to distinguish political instability events in terms of the intensity of aggressive behaviour utilizing a seven point scale of political events ranging from zero denoting extreme stability, to six denoting extreme instability. For example, a general election was an event associated with the lowest position. Resignation of a cabinet official had a weight of one, peaceful demonstrations a weight of two, and the assassination of a significant political figure but not a head of state, a weight of three. Mass arrests or the assassination of a chief of state occupied position four. A coup d'etat was assigned position five, and a civil war was given a weight of six, the highest rating for political instability.[68]

On the basis of this scale 84 countries were assigned to 6 groups depending on the most unstable event each had experienced. Hence a nation which had experienced a civil war was given a group score of 6, those that had experienced a coup d'etat would be placed in position 5, those with mass arrests would be assigned to group four. Subsequent to the placement of each country in a particular group the sum total of each nation's stability rating was calculated. To avoid distortion of the data the stability profiles were calculated independently for 3 six year periods of time (1948-1953, 1954-1959, 1960-1965) and the ranking within the group was then calculated by averaging the highest strife event in each of the 6 year periods.

Feierabend's stability profiles for each nation are shown in Table 15. All nations within a group have the same average of highest strife events. The ranking within the group was contingent on the sum

TABLE 15

POLITICAL INSTABILITY PROFILES FOR EIGHTY-FOUR NATIONS, 1948-1965

1		2		3		4		5		6	
						France	13435				
						South Africa	13422				
						Brazil	13209				
						Morocco	13194				
						Portugal	13190				
						Turkey	13189				
						Poland	13179				
						Thailand	13152				
						Jordan	13145				
						Cyprus	13123	Argentina	16445		
						Hungary	13113	Bolivia	16318		
						Philippines	13105	Cuba	16283		
						Czechoslovakia	13100	Iraq	16274		
						China	13086	Colombia	16244		
						Cambodia	13071	Burma	16213		
						India	12360	Venezuela	15429		
				Belgium	10162	Iran	12237	Syria	15329		
				Chile	10156	Pakistan	12231	Korea	15291		
		United Kingdom	07112	Mexico	10111	Sudan	12189	Haiti	15205		
		Ghana	07106	Uruguay	10100	U.S.S.R.	12165	Peru	15196		
		Austria	07057	Israel	10064	Ecuador	12117	Greece	14236		
		Denmark	07030	Liberia	10036	Nicaragua	12096	Guatemala	14234		
		Iceland	07026	Ethiopia	10034	United States	11318	Lebanon	14212		
		West Germany	06087	Italy	09192	Spain	11284	Egypt	14152		
		Finland	06056	Libya	09069	Dominican Rep.	11195	Paraguay	14141		
		Taiwan	06039	Rumania	09060	Ceylon	11152	East Germany	14138		
		Australia	06026	Costa Rica	09058	Japan	11123	Laos	14129		
		Sweden	06020	Afghanistan	09029	Malaya	11108	Tunisia	14126		
		Ireland	05031	Canada	08084	Yugoslavia	11077	Honduras	14105		
	Netherlands	Saudi Arabia	05018	Switzerland	08042	Bulgaria	11071	Panama	14101		
	Luxembourg	New Zealand	05015	Norway	08034	Albania	11067	El Salvador	14079	Indonesia	18416

Stability ——— Instability

Source: Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, & Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns", in H.D. Graham and T.R. Gurr (eds.), Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p.512.

of the stability ratings for the three periods analysed. The first two digits in the five digit scale are the sum of the highest strife events occurring in each 6 year period. The final three digits show the summed scores for all (weighted) political events for the eighteen year period. Canada is found at scale position 3 and at rank 18. Over all, 20% of the 84 nations in this survey experienced less strife than Canada during the period 1948-1965 while almost 79% experienced more. Once again the Canadian rating was only slightly higher than the median for advanced industrialized countries which was somewhere in the upper third of group 2.[69]

While offering a valid perspective the assignment of a special weight to the highest strife event experienced by a nation has a tendency to favour nations which have experienced many political strife events but none at the most extreme level. An alternative to this approach suggested by Kirkham, Levy and Crotty involves the summing of the scores for all instability events for the 18 year period. Table 16 shows the rankings of the 84 nations on the basis of the summed scores. Most of the nations remain more or less in the same rank order but some changes are notable. One of these is that the advanced industrialized democracies have less of a tendency to be concentrated in the first quarter of the summed scores suggesting that many of these countries experienced extensive turmoil but little extreme violence. Canada's position was also adjusted by this summed ranking. It moved from 18 on grouped scores to 27th on summed scores. Utilizing this procedure 31% of the nations in this survey experienced less civil strife than Canada between 1948-1965 while 68% experienced more. Canada's ranking still remained, however, above the median for advanced industrialized countries.

Unfortunately the majority of cross national data sets do not provide conflict data beyond 1967 and it is impossible to obtain a

TABLE 16

POLITICAL INSTABILITY PROFILES FOR EIGHTY-FOUR NATIONS, SUMMED SCORES OF WEIGHTED EVENTS, 1948-1965

Nation	Score	Nation	Score
Luxembourg	12	Japan	123
New Zealand	15	Tunisia	126
Saudi Arabia	18	Laos	129
Sweden	20	East Germany	138
Netherlands	21	Paraguay	141
Iceland	26	Jordan	145
Australia	26	Ceylon	152
Afghanistan	29	Thailand	152
Denmark	30	Egypt	153
Ireland	31	Chile	156
Ethiopia	34	Belgium	162
Norway	34	U.S.S.R.	165
Liberia	36	Poland	179
Taiwan	39	Sudan	189
Switzerland	42	Turkey	189
Finland	56	Portugal	190
Austria	57	Italy	191
Costa Rica	58	Morocco	194
Rumania	60	Dominican Republic	195
Israel	64	Peru	196
Albania	67	Haiti	205
Libya	69	Brazil	208
Bulgaria	71	Lebanon	212
Cambodia	71	Burma	213
Yugoslavia	77	Pakistan	231
El Salvador	79	Guatemala	234
Canada	83	Greece	236
China	86	Iran	237
West Germany	87	Colombia	244
Nicaragua	96	Iraq	274
Czechoslovakia	100	Cuba	281
Uruguay	100	Spain	284
Panama	101	Korea	291
Honduras	105	United States	319
Philippines	105	Bolivia	323
Ghana	106	Syria	329
Malaya	108	India	360
Mexico	111	Indonesia	416
Hungary	113	South Africa	427
United Kingdom	116	Venezuela	429
Ecuador	117	France	435
Cyprus	123	Argentina	445

Source: James F. Kirkham, Sheldon G. Levy and William J. Crotty, Assassination and Political Violence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 170.

comparative perspective for the events of the last 10 years. This is all the more unfortunate due to the fact that these were some of the most violent years in decades. This was especially true of Canada. Although no country-wide statistics exist on the extent or pervasiveness of civil unrest in Canada during the late sixties and early seventies, some idea of this can be obtained from a number of disparate sources. A recent study of collective violence in Ontario and Quebec between 1968-1973 has identified 160 such incidents of collective violence in these two provinces.[70] The year 1968 also witnessed the fourth wave of FLQ terrorism. Between 1968 and 1970 there were approximately 57 incidents of separatist terrorism.[71] Although there were a few events in Ottawa the majority were in Quebec. The foremost of these incidents of terrorism were the October 1970 kidnappings of British Consul James Cross and Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte, and the subsequent assassination of Laporte. These acts resulted in the first peacetime invocation of the War Measures Act. They also proved to be the FLQ's swan song. There were numerous other manifestations of civil conflict during this period. According to Montreal Police Reports, that city experienced almost 400 non-violent demonstrations between the years 1969-1973.[72] It might also be noted that the R.C.M.P.'s Bomb Data Centre recorded 65 bombings and attempted bombings for Quebec (11) and Ontario (54) for the year 1973. In 1974 there were 26 incidents recorded for each province. Unfortunately these incidents have not been differentiated according to motive so that it is not known how many were for political reasons.

Most of the Canadian turbulence of the 1960's was centered in Canada's two core provinces Ontario and Quebec. A contemporary study of collective violence in these two provinces identified 246 cases between the years 1963 and 1973.[73] The incidence of this phenomenon, moreover, was found to be relatively similar in the two provinces with

Ontario having 125 incidents and Quebec 121. In addition to collective violence there were also during this same period 104 terrorist actions not covered by that study.[74] With the exception of 2 incidents in Ottawa, the latter study found that terrorism was exclusively a Quebec phenomenon.

Although the two provinces had a very similar incidence of collective violence the substantive aspects of the conflict (i.e. form intensity and content) were markedly dissimilar. Collective violence in Quebec was more frequently related to demonstrations (59%) than it was to strikes (33%). In Ontario on the other hand 41% of the violence was demonstration related and 40% was strike related.[75] The relatively higher incidence of demonstration violence and the lower incidence of strike related violence in Quebec as compared to Ontario can be interpreted as one indication that the grievances occasioning violence were much more politicized and pervasive in Quebec.

There was also a clearly discernible difference in the intensity of collective violence in the two provinces. Table 17 shows the eight indicators used in the measurement of this factor. Although the duration of violence was similar in both provinces collective violence in Quebec involved more police, more insurgents, more arrests, more casualties and more damage.

The differences in both pervasiveness and intensity of the conflict between the two provinces can be attributed to one principal factor; the motivation or content of the protest.[76] The difference in the issues which occasioned violence in Ontario and Quebec was quite remarkable. Much of the violence in Ontario was directed at extra-societal concerns or elements. In this province 23% of the incidents of demonstration violence were related to foreign political issues whereas only 12.8% were related to domestic or Canadian concerns.[77]

TABLE 17

COMPARISON OF CONFLICT INTENSITY[78] *

ONTARIO AND QUEBEC 1963-1973

Intensity Indicator	Ontario	Quebec
Incidents with a duration of more than ½ day	10.6% (13)	10.0% (12)
Incidents involving more than 160 Police and Security forces	5.6% (4)	19.8% (30)
Incidents involving more than 1600 insurgents	10% (17)	19.2% (24)
Incidents involving more than 10 arrests	33.2% (31)	48.6% (33)
Incidents involving more than 20 insurgent casualties	0	20.7% (6)
Incidents involving more than 10 Police casualties	0	22.7% (5)
Incidents involving more than $50,000 in material damage	0.8% (1)	22.11% (10)
Incidents involving more than 100 total casualties (Police and Insurgents)	0	9.6% (4)

*The above are all adjusted frequencies.

Moreover labour violence in Ontario was exclusively picket line oriented and directed at very narrow union considerations such as wages and contracts. Clearly, then, collective violence in Ontario was of peripheral relevance to the province at large. Moreover the salience of foreign political issues in this province may be attributed to United States cultural and especially media penetration as many of the issues had a discernibly close relationship to the government of the United States.

In Quebec, on the other hand, the content of collective violence was quite different. Both demonstration and labour violence in that province were frequently related to issues concerning the population as a whole. Forty percent of the incidents of collective violence were related to domestic concerns whereas only six percent were related to foreign issues.[79] Moreover, in most cases domestic concerns in Quebec were generally provincial considerations, and more specifically, issues surrounding the nationalist movement. Between the years 1968 and 1973 when this movement was very active, 87% of the violence over domestic issues was related to the nationalist question.[80] Typical of such violence were the numerous riots, surrounding the introduction of Bill 63 protecting the language rights of Quebec's Anglophone minority, the attempted occupation of McGill University by nationalists in 1969 and several violent St. Jean Baptiste and Victoria Days.

In further contrast to Ontario much of the strike violence in Quebec also had implications beyond the labour front. The political focus of Quebec's labour unions has frequently been attributed to the "colonial character"of Quebec's economy; i.e. its domination by English Canadian and American interests. Even contract negotiations frequently became politicized as they did for example in the Seven Up strike of 1968.[81] Furthermore, as radical separatism died out in the early 1970's labour moved into the forefront of the nationalist movement and became

the major political opposition in the province.

The differences in the character of collective violence in Ontario and Quebec are quite striking indications that in terms of focus and instrumentality conflict was a completely different phenomenon in the two provinces. In Quebec, collective violence was a part of the nature of politics: it was ideologically based and functionally relevant. In Ontario, most of the violence was either irrelevant to the larger society or relevant to only a very small segment of it.

Conclusion

In brief this chapter has concluded on two general topics. First, no discernible relationship was found between media exposure (newspaper circulation, radio receivers, television receivers and cinema attendance) and collective conflict and violence across 19 states. Since this cross-national analysis provided no indication of a causal relation between these two phenomena, it can be safely argued that the "hypodermic" thesis is probably invalid. The invalidation of this thesis led to the adoption of a less abstract analytical perspective in the second half of the chapter. In the country-specific study, Canada proved to have a history of erratic collective conflict and violence. While Canada was found to have low total violence when comparison was made on a world-wide basis, it still placed near the median among advanced industrialized states. The form and target of this violence differed greatly from Ontario to Quebec, but the two provinces experienced approximately the same level of violence for the period examined.

Collective conflict and violence of various types and foci in Ontario, Quebec and Canada continue to be an essential ingredient in our historical evolution. Knowledge of the level of this violence in Canada

may not be widespread but the media does provide considerable coverage of it. How much attention, with what intensity and with what effect is it communicated - these are subjects for the next two chapters.

Footnotes to Chapter II

[1]The various Commissions have been cited in Chapter I. Two of the most recent and most sophisticated attempts at causal modeling are Ted Robert Gurr and Raymond Duvall "Civil Conflict in the 1960's: A Reciprocal Theoretical System with Parameter Estimates" Comparative Political Studies, 6 (July 1973), pp. 135-169; and Douglas A. Hibbs, Mass Political Violence: A Cross National Causal Analysis (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1973).

[2]Relative deprivation theory postulates an essentially linear relationship between socio-economic conditions and social violence. The directness of this association is contingent upon what psychologists have termed "the frustration aggression mechanism." This mechanism, actually a psycho-biological reflex, is viewed as the primary source of the human capacity for violence. According to relative deprivation theory, frustration is produced by the perception of a discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities, that is between the conditions of life to which people believe themselves justifiably entitled and those which they are capable of attaining or maintaining given the social means available to them. The optimum environment for the outbreak of civil unrest is, thus, presumed to be a scenario where expectations based on economic status, and capabilities tied to economic conditions diverge. For a further explanation of the theoretical foundation of the relative deprivation hypothesis, see James Chowning Davies, "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, A Report submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, ed. by H. D. Graham and T. R. Gurr (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), p. 690-730; Ivo K. Feierabend, et al., "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross National Patterns," in Graham and Gurr, eds., op. cit.; Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970); and Walter Korpi, "Conflict Power and Relative Deprivation," American Political Science Review, 68 (December 1974), pp. 1569-1578.

[3]See Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966); Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1973); Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Political Modernization, ed. by C. Welch (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1967), pp. 167-187; Ted Robert Gurr, op. cit.; Douglas Hibbs, op. cit., pp. 65-81; and William Kornhauser, "Rebellion and Political Development," in Internal War, ed. by Harry Eckstein (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 142-156.

[4]For example, see Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, "Multifactor Explanations of Social Change," in World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, ed. by Russett, et al. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 321; Ivo K. Feierbend, et al., loc. cit.; William H. Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Patterns of Political Violence in Comparative Historical Perspective," Comparative Politics, 3 (October 1970), pp. 1-20; and Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11 (September 1967) pp.

264-280. See also the discussion in Douglas A. Hibbs, op. cit., pp. 21-42.

[5]See Hibbs, op. cit., pp. 81-112.

[6]Quantitative evidence of the importance of these factors can be found in Edward D. Mitchell, "Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam," World Politics, 20 (April 1968), pp. 421-438; Anthony J. Russo Jr., "Economic and Social Correlates of Government Control in South Vietnam" in Anger, Violence and Politics, ed. by Ivo K. Feierabend, et al. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 314-324; and R. Tanter and M. Midlarsky, loc. cit. A qualitative discussion of the relationship of such inequities to civil unrest can be found in Charles Tilly, The Vendee (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964), and Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[7]See Susan Welch and Alan Booth, "Crowding and Civil Disorder: An Examination of Comparative National and City Data," Comparative Political Studies, 8 (April 1975), pp.58-74; and George M. Carstairs, "Overcrowding and Human Aggression," in Graham and Gurr, eds., op cit. pp. 751-764.

[8]For example, the test model employed by Hibbs in his study Mass Political Violence initially contained 15 variables. The model was subsequently revised to include 8 variables including Government Security Sanctions, Annual Average Change in Energy Consumption per capital 1955-1965, Group Discrimination, Communist Party Membership, Total Population and a Communist Regime Dummy variable. For an explanation of this model and these variables see Douglas Hibbs, op. cit. For another example of causal modeling and the use of parameter estimation techniques see Gurr and Duvall, loc. cit.

[9]Desmond Ellis carried out a rough and ready check to determine if the number of television sets and amount of violence correlated in a cross-national setting. Using Interpol's Crime Statistics for 1965 and 1966 and the number of TV sets from World Radio and Television Handbook for 1966, he found no relation. See Desmond Ellis, "Violence and the Mass Media." Proceedings of Workshop on Violence in Canadian Society (Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, September 8-9, 1975), p.93.

[10]In a previous analysis the effect of aggression-evoking cues, such as the sight or news of violence, was discussed. However, it was felt that such "cues" were more likely to affect the form and timing rather than the occurrence of civil unrest. Moreover, this analysis did not employ any media variables. See Tedd Gurr and Charles Ruttenberg, The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Test of a Causal Model (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1967).

[11]See Andrew J. Sofranko and Robert C. Bealer, Unbalanced Modernization and Domestic Instability: A Comparative Analysis (London: Sage Publications, 1972).

[12]The data utilized in this analysis were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The data were originally collected by Charles Taylor and Michael Hudson. Neither the original source or collectors of the data nor the consortium bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here.

[13]A daily newspaper has been defined in the data set as a publication containing general news and appearing at least four times a week. In different countries the size of a daily newspaper may range from a single sheet to 50 or more pages. No adjustment for copies sold outside the country has been made as it was believed this would not affect the results significantly.

[14]The figures for radios relate to all types of receivers including those connected to a redistribution system. They relate either to the number of licences issued on sets declared, or to the estimated number of receivers in use. In many countries a licence may cover more than one receiver in the same household.

[15]The data for televisions relate to the number of licences issued, or in a few cases to the estimated number of receivers in use.

[16]These figures are based on annual attendance by paid admission to film performances whether of 35 mm. or 16 mm. and whether or not in permanent establishments possessing fixed equipment.

[17]See Chapter one, also Sofranko and Bealer, op. cit., p. 34, and Donald I. Warren, "Mass Media and Racial Crisis: A Study of the New Bethel Church Incident in Detroit," Journal of Social Issues, 28 (1972), pp. 111-131.

[18]As it is not the intention of this analysis to generalize beyond this population, the question of sampling bias would seem somewhat irrelevant. It is actually impossible to make any generalizations beyond the particular sample chosen here, as the concept media is salient to a very restricted number of countries.

[19]The concept economic development was operationalized here by using the level of Energy Consumption per capita 1960, which has also been derived from the Taylor and Hudson data.

[20]For those unfamiliar with correlational analysis, a product moment correlation coefficient is a measure of the strength of the realtionship between two variables. The coefficients associated with a perfect linear relationship would be 1.00 or -1.00. The coefficient indicating no relationship between the two variables would be 0.

[21]For a fuller description of this index, see Ralph Lowenstein, Press Independence and Critical Ability Index: Measuring World Press Freedom (Columbia: University of Missouri School of Journalism Freedom of Information Centre, 1966).

[22]According to the Taylor and Hudson Data, Canada ranked fifth in the world in terms of press freedom, preceded only by Switzerland, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden. The United States was tied for seventh place with Finland. This same data source ranked Canada fourth in the world in terms of Mass Media Penetration behind the United States, Sweden and the United Kingdom. See Charles L. Taylor and Michael Hudson, eds., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (2nd Edition; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

[23]Hibbs, op. cit., p. 149.

[24]These 19 states are undoubtedly not the most violent countries in the world, as most of the theoretical and empirical literature has shown that both the level of economic development and the level of democratization are inversely correlated with civil unrest. For example, see Stephen R. Graubard, ed., A New Europe? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964); and Clark Kerr, et al., Industrialism and Industrial Man (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). See also Fred R. von der Menden, Comparative Political Violence (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974); and Ronald Manzer, Canada: A Socio-Political Report (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1974), pp. 79-84. Despite the fact that the countries selected here have relatively lower levels of violence compared to other samples of nations there is still enough variation among the countries in this sample (range 2230 and standard deviation 685.36) to make a viable analysis.

[25]For a discussion of some of the semantic and conceptual problems entailed by the use of the term violence see chapter one, and Terry Nardin, "Conflicting Conceptions of Political Violence," Political Science Annual: An International Review, vol. 4, ed. by C. P. Cotter (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), pp. 104-125.

[26]The Conflict data was derived from the Taylor and Hudson Annual Events Data, which is one of the component data sets in the World Handbook. This set is considered to be the most comprehensive aggregate data files now in existence. See Hibbs, op. cit., p. 5.

[27]The variable assassinations was dropped from this analysis due to the fact that 15 of the 19 countries in this sample had no observations for this indicator. Its inclusion would have only added "noise" to the system - as computer specialists put it. Also excluded, for theoretical reasons, were elite actions of various kinds, such as military coups and government repression, which have often been included in analyses of domestic unrest. Not excluded however, were deaths that occurred as a resul of clashes between elites and masses in insurgent protest situations.

The description of each event variable that follows, with the exception of the pro government demonstration variable, has been taken from Hibbs, who in turn paraphrased them from "Political Indicators

Definitions" November 21, 1966 (no author listed). From the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan. See Hibbs, op. cit., pp. 8-9. A detailed description of a slightly revised version of the data can be found in Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, op. cit.

[28]The Taylor and Hudson Annual Events Data include the years 1948-1967. The period 1955-1965 was selected on the basis of the availability of media data.

[29]See Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (March 1966), pp. 41-64.

[30]G. Donald Morrison and Hugh Michael Stevenson, "Political Instability in Independent Black Africa: More Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15 (September 1971), p. 355.

[31]Hibbs, op. cit., p. 9.

[32]One of the major characteristics of factor analysis is its data reduction capability. Given a series of correlation coefficients for a set of variables, factor analytic techniques can be used to determine whether some underlying pattern of relationship exists in the data, to the extent that these variables may be reduced to a smaller set of factors or components. These components may then be used as source variables accounting for the intercorrelations in the data. For a discussion of factor analyses and some of the various data reduction techniques see Harry H. Harmon, Modern Factor Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); and Rudolph J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11 (1967), pp. 444-486. See also Morrison and Stevenson, loc. cit., p. 354.

[33]Morrison and Stevenson, loc. cit., p. 348.

[34]This transformation employed a natural log.

[35]For a discussion of the use of logarithms in this type of analysis see Forman S. Acton, Analysis of Straight Line Data (New York: Wiley, 1959); and Edward R. Tufte, Data Analysis for Politics and Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974).

[36]See Carl-Gunnar Janson, "Some Problems of Ecological Factor Analysis" in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan, eds., Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 301-342; and N. H. Chi, Scientific Explanations and the Logic of Data Analysis in Social Research (forthcoming).

[37]Tanter, loc. cit.

[38]The use of a logarithm for this index fulfills some of the basic technical requirements of regression analysis in that it normalizes the distribution. Symmetrical distributions, especially those that resemble normal distributions, fulfill statistical assumptions that form the basis of statistical significance testing in the regression model. See Tufts, op. cit.

[39]See Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, eds., op. cit., pp. 208-209.

[40]See especially Alberta E. Siegel, "Violence in the Mass Media," in Violence and the Struggle for Existence, ed. by David N. Daniels, Marshall F. Gilula, and Frank M. Ochberg (Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1970), pp. 193-240.

[41]Multiple regression analysis allows for the study of the linear relationships between a set of independent variables and a number of dependent variables while taking into account the interrelationships among the independent variables. For example, whenever multiple correlation is used for more than three variables we can correlate a partial correlation coefficient for each independent variable (in this case each media variable) these partial correlation coefficients represent the variation explained by that particular measure when all of the other variables are held constant. A multiple regression equation shows the analogous weight for each partial correlation coefficient in a multiple correlation analysis. The regression formula $y=a+b_x$ allows for one constant a for the equation and a b weight, or partial coefficient for each independent variable. The derivations from universality are handled in a regression equation by the error term which can be conceived as a residual component produced by all factors not explicitly considered in the equation. For a fuller description of this statistical technique see Hubert Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960), pp. 429-470.

[42]Specification error arises due to the omission of a relevant explanatory variable. A major assumption of regression analysis is that no important variables that correlate with both the dependent and independent variables are excluded as such exclusions create biased estimates. It is felt however that if the omitted variable is uncorrelated with the excluded explanatory variable its omission may not lead to serious consequences for least squares estimates. To preclude the possibility of specification error a number of potentially relevant explanatory variables derived from Hibbs and other sources were correlated with the four media variables. These variables included population density, Ethnic differentiation, Economic Growth Rate, Income Inequity, Internal Security Forces and Military Manpower per 1,000 working age population, % of Legislative Seats for Communists and Socialists. None of these demonstrated any significant correlation with any of the media variables offering some assurance that specifications error is not a serious problem in this study. See Jan Kamenta, Elements of Econometrics (New York: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 391-405.

[43]A similar series of regression equations were run controlling for economic development, with usually the same results, the only change

being the level of R^2. Here Newspaper Circulation accounted for 15% of the variation in the number of riots, 38% in the number of deaths, 45% in the incidence of Armed Attacks, 33% in the number of pro government demonstrations and 25% in the number of political strikes.

[44]

Legend	Country	Newspaper Circulation per 1,000 population	Logged Conflict Score
A	Venezuela	96	3.38
B	Italy	101	3.10
C	Austria	208	2.02
D	Canada	222	2.70
E	Ireland	244	1.24
F	France	257	3.34
G	Netherlands	278	.58
H	Belgium	285	2.76
I	West Germany	307	2.62
J	Switzerland	321	.99
K	United States	326	3.44
L	Denmark	353	.99
M	Australia	358	.91
N	Finland	359	1.45
O	Norway	377	.33
P	New Zealand	381	0
Q	Japan	396	2.66
R	Sweden	477	.48
S	United Kingdom	514	2.66

[45]It should be noted that certain difficulties are inherent in working with such a small sample. Theoretically, both the size and the homogeneous character of this sample may have some tendency to distort the results and make statistically significant relationships more difficult to obtain. The fact, however, that one variable (i.e. newspaper circulation) was found to be consistently significant should in this particular case allay any fears about such problems.

[46]J. M. C. Torrance, "Cultural Factors and the Response of Government to Violence" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, York University, 1975).

[47]Kenneth McNaught, "Collective Violence in Canadian History: Some Problems of Definition and Research," Proceedings of Workship on Violence in Canadian Society (Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, September 8-9, 1975), pp. 165-176.

[48]Comment about Joseph Howe by Chester Morten, as quoted in Kenneth McNaught, "Violence in Canadian History," in Character and Circumstance: Essays in Honour of Donald G. Creighton, ed. by John S. Moir (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970), p. 4.

[49]Ibid., p. 75.

[50]Stuart Jamieson, Times of Troubles, Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada 1900-1966 (Ottawa: Task Force on Labour Relations, 1968), p. 8.

[51]For an interesting look at some of these confrontations see William Perkins Bull, From the Boyne to Brampton, (Toronto: George McLeod Ltd., 1930);and J. K. Johnson, "Colonel James Fitzgibbon and the Suppression of Irish Riots in Upper Canada," Ontario History, 58 (September 1966), pp. 139-155.

[52]See Kenneth McNaught, Pelican History of Canada (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1969); and Hartwell Bowsfield, ed., Louis Riel: Rebel of the Western Frontier or Victim of Politics and Prejudice? (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969).

[53]See Michael S. Cross, "The Lumber Community of Upper Canada, 1815-1867," Ontario History, 63 (September 1971), pp. 177-190; and Michael S. Cross, "The Shiners War: Social Violence in the Ottawa Valley in the 1830's," Canadian Historical Review, 54 (March 1973), pp. 1-26.

[54]William Rutledge quoted in W. Bull, op. cit., p. 263.

[55]In the North Hastings by-election of 1856 in Ontario, the election expenses of one candidate were said to have included 6000 No. 1 hickory axe handles and 60 gallons of good Canadian whiskey. The whiskey, needless to say, was for his supporters. Ibid., p. 168. For examples of some of the election violence which nas occurred in Canadian history see Orlo Miller, The Donnellys Must Die (Toronto: Macmillan, 1962); E. C. Moulton, "Constitutional Crisis and Civil Strife in Newfoundland, February to November 1861," Canadian Historical Review, 48 (September 1967), pp. 251-272; and Brian J. Young, "The Defeat of George Etienne Cartier in Montreal East in 1872," Canadian Historical Review, 51 (December 1970), pp. 386-406.

[56]Mason Wade, The French Canadians 1760-1945 (Toronto: Macmillan 1949), p. 599.

[57]W. Bull, op. cit., p. 270.

[58]Robert J. Jackson "Crisis Management and Policy Making: An Explanation of Theory and Research," in The Dynamics of Public Policy, ed. by Richard Rose (London: Sage Publications, 1976).

[59]Daniel Latouche, "Violence, politique et crise dans la societe quebecoise," in Essays On the Left: Essays in Honour of T. C. Douglas, ed. by Laurier LaPierre, et. al. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), p. 181.

[60]Canadian labour history is full of incidents of the state being an active party to conflict rather than a neutral arbitrator. The 1930's are a monotonous recital of the use of local police and the RCMP by the state to serve the status quo and the vested interests of employers. This decade in Ontario was marked by the appearance of Hepburn's Hussars, a private regiment mobilized by Mitchell Hepburn, the Premier of Ontario,

to break the General Motors Strike in Oshawa in 1937. Some 12 years later Quebec witnessed a more forceful intimidation of labour when Premier Maurice Duplessis used the Quebec Provincial Police as a private Union Nationale Army to destroy the strike at Asbestos. See Jamieson, op. cit.; and Desmond Morton, "Aid to the Civil Power, The Canadian Militia in support of Social Order," Canadian Historical Review, 50 (December 1970), pp. 407-35.

[61]McNaught, "Violence in Canadian History", p. 99.

[62]Anthony M. Marcus, "Some Psychiatric and Sociological Aspects of Violence," International Journal of Group Tensions, 4 (June 1974), p. 254.

[63]One of the major problems which one encounters in using most cross national data on conflict is that they generally under-report intra societal levels of conflict. This is due to the fact that most data is derived from such sources as the New York Times Index, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, and Facts on File, all of which have a tendency to concentrate only on major conflict events. For example, authoritative sources have listed 380 bombings, burnings and depredations during the years 1961-1962, and 58 incidents of FLQ terrorism. This does not compare favourably with the total above. See George Woodcock, The Doukhobors (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 350; and Marc Laurendeau, Les Quebecois Violents: Un Ouvrage sur les Causes et la Rentabilite de la Violence d'Inspiration Politique ou Quebec (Montreal: Les Editions du Boreal Express, 1974), pp. 213-222.

[64]For an interesting examination of the activities of this group see Simma Holt, Terror in the Name of God: The Story of the Sons of Freedom (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964); and George Woodcock, The Doukhobors (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968).

[65]It should be understood that this table represents a very crude comparison. No attempt has been made to weight, or to differentiate between the various component measures of conflict. Thus, anti-government demonstrations, riots, armed attacks, deaths etc., are all considered equal. However, it is quite obvious that the countries with the highest Collective Conflict scores have experienced the most intense forms of conflict. For example, most of the countries ranked in the upper quarter of this table experienced a substantial number of deaths from domestic conflict. Indonesia experienced 83,036 deaths, Hungary 40,009, etc. Thus, there is a certain logic to the ranking. A more sophisticated comparison using the same 84 countries and slightly different measures can be found in Table 16.

[66]In this study Gurr defines 'Civil Strife' as all collective, non-governmental attacks on persons or property that occur within the boundaries of an autonomous or colonial political unit. Operationally, he has qualified his definition by the inclusion of symbolic attacks on political persons or policies (eg., political demonstrations) and by the exclusion of turmoil events in which less than 100 persons took part. See Ted Robert Gurr "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife," in Graham and Gurr, op. cit., pp. 572-634.

[67]In this analysis, the concept 'violence' has been defined in the broadest sense to include both overt acts of physical force and patterns of denial, or to use Galtung's term "Structural Violence." The latter is operationalized using measures of militarism, impoverishment, group discrimination, economic exploitation and dependency. Canada's ranking in this sample is based on its score for both types of violence. See Ted Robert Gurr and Vaughn F. Bishop, "Violent Nations, and Others" Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20 (March 1976), pp. 79-110.

[68]See a complete discussion of this scaling technique in James F. Kirkham, et al., Assassination and Political Violence, A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), pp. 166-169.

[69]Ronald Manzer, op. cit., p. 80.

[70]Micheal J. Kelly, "Collective Violence in Ontario and Quebec 1968-1973: A Comparative Analysis" (unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Ottawa, 1975).

[71]M. Laurendeau, op. cit., pp. 213-222.

[72]This data was obtained from Department B of the Montreal Police.

[73]Joseph A. Frank, and Micheal J. Kelly "Etude preliminaire sur la violence collective en Ontario et au Quebec 1963-1973." (forthcoming)

[74]M. Laurendeau, op. cit., pp. 213-222.

[75]The figures for Quebec and Ontario do not total 100%. 8% of the violence in Quebec and 19% of the violence in Ontario occurred as a result of random incidents. This catch all category includes such events as brawls, group vandalism, motorcycle gang rampages, etc.

[76]For a discussion of the relationship between ideology and the intensity of protest see George Simmel, The Web of Intergroup Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955).

[77]The remaining 64% of the collective violence in this province was occasioned by economic issues, and university related issues. 19% was classified as issueless.

[78]J. A. Frank and Micheal J. Kelly, loc. cit.

[79]The remaining 64% of the violence was once again distributed among economic events, events related to university issues, and events which had no discernible motivation, i.e. issueless.

[80]M. Kelly, op. cit., p. 74.

[81]The employees of this company had been trying vainly to negotiate the issue of union recognition with the United States owned firm since the summer of 1964. By 1968 the dispute had taken on political language and anti United States overtones. See Globe and Mail, February 28, 1968, p. 82. The violence during this strike erupted when 100 strikers and their 2000 sympathizers attempted to set fire to the factory. Terrorists bombs were also planted in nearby mailboxes.

Chapter III

Violence and the Print Medium in Ontario

The study of collective conflict and violence within the Canadian context has received at best a haphazard treatment. The literature abounds with historical accounts of particular rebellions or strikes, with their own pantheon of heroes and villains. For the most part these episodes of Canadian history are viewed as unique phenomena, and more as objects of curiosity than of serious academic scrutiny. No apparent attempt has been made to fully understand their etiology or to fit them within the perspective of the forces which have shaped Canadian society. Bearing in mind this substantial gap in the general Canadian literature as shown in Chapter II, we have undertaken a research project related to Canada's most populous province, Ontario.

One of the most useful methodological techniques in collective conflict and violence research is content analysis. Defined as the quantitative measurement of human communication, content analysis has broad applicability in the social sciences and humanities.[1] The sort of subconscious judgments which one naturally makes while evaluating books, newspapers and other forms of communication, are more carefully recorded and analysed to reveal trends and orientations. The two most widely utilized varieties of content analysis are events data and evaluative assertion analysis. While a simplified version of the latter was employed in the preparation of the case studies to be discussed in Chapter IV, the principal investigative technique used here is events data or events statistics.

The most convenient source of record for this purpose is the daily newspaper.[2] More than any other instrument, the newspaper systematically records a large volume of data in a readily retrievable fashion.

Each edition provides a glimpse of the vast interaction of human society, as seen through the eyes of reporters and editors. The use of newspapers in research is not without significant drawbacks however. There may be a specific metropolitan orientation or ideological bias which serves to exclude certain types of news reports. On any given day a number of idiosyncratic factors may influence the particular set of articles to be included in that edition. And, of course, the sheer volume of newsprint that is generated every year presents the researcher with a formidable obstacle.

Nonetheless, considering all other alternative sources of basic information about violence in Ontario, the daily newspaper was judged to be the most appropriate for our study. A number of important factors influenced the choice of the particular newspaper for scrutiny, as well as the time frame to be reviewed. Given the extremely laborious nature of content analysis and the limited time and resources at our disposal, it was decided to focus on one newspaper, the Toronto Globe and Mail. It was chosen for several reasons, the most important of which were its reputation as a quality newspaper and its broad orientation. Professor John Merrill of the University of Missouri's School of Journalism, in an influential book entitled The Elite Press, included the Globe and Mail among the thirty top elite press newspapers of the world.[3] While in sheer circulation figures it is dwarfed by newspapers such as the Toronto Star, it is, as John Porter suggested, "the only Canadian daily with any claims to being a national newspaper."[4] Referred to as Canada's "paper of record," it is more likely to include news reports outside of Toronto and thus provides a rich source of data on general Ontario events.[5] Its regular format and the paper's general reputation for cautious and thorough journalism were also factors favoring the selection

of the Globe and Mail.

The choice of time span was also made after serious consideration of the alternatives. The period from January 1, 1965 to December 31, 1975 was judged to be substantial enough to mediate any short term deviations but not so long as to be unmanageable. Starting in the turbulent era of the 1960's, the time frame extends to the last complete year for which microfilm is available.

The content analysis of the eleven calendar years of the Globe and Mail involved the scanning by researchers of approximately 150,000 pages of newsprint.[6] Unlike the New York Times, the Globe and Mail does not have an index, thus necessitating the laborious task of reviewing each day's edition. This research technique provided a substantial body of original, useable data which could be prepared for computer analysis. There were two principal objectives in scanning the Globe and Mail for the period. The first objective was to identify the universe of acts of collective violence and individual political violence in Ontario. The second was to evaluate the character of the media coverage accorded those acts. As a result, two separate coding sheets were developed and filled out for every identifiable incident. As a form of cross-check on this scanning process, a third coding sheet was developed to evaluate a random sample of front pages. The purpose of the random sample was to provide a broad overview of the period by estimating the degree of attention given to stories of violence on the prime news page. While the definitional criterion was less rigorous than that employed in the main portion of the content analysis which follows directly after this part, the random sample provided some valuable insights. Each article appearing on the front page was evaluated as to its theme and volume. Those articles dealing with a generalized conception of violence were also examined as to location on the page.

As in all such research, the slotting of each article into a limited number of categories required some arbitrary decisions by the coders.[7] Before beginning the task, a sample of articles was utilized to test and refine the category scheme. A subsequent test of inter-coder reliability based on six editions of the Globe and Mail produced agreement on 71 of 77 articles, thus a correlation coefficient of .92. From the Globe and Mail for the period, a sample of 209 was drawn employing a table of random numbers. According to Jones, a sample of this size carries only a 2% risk of not being within 8% accuracy.[8] The random sample of front pages yielded the results found in Table 18. Of the 2159 articles which appeared on the front pages, 138 or 6.38% dealt with political violence. Of the 377 photographs during the period, 32 or 8.48% were related to stories of political violence. There was an average of 10.33 front page articles per issue.

When the category "other," which includes the Morning Smile, Index, and other special announcements is subtracted from total articles, the actual proportion devoted to political violence increases to 7.94%. If the category "other" is correspondingly subtracted from total photos, the proportion devoted to violence increases to 8.67%. The number of articles devoted to political violence exceeds that of the categories of defence news, popular amusement, and education and arts. The number of articles depicting political violence ranks only slightly behind the categories of accident and disaster, and crime news.

The nearly 2300 articles and photographs which were slotted into the category scheme were also carefully evaluated as to volume in square inches.

TABLE 18

THEME FREQUENCY OF FRONT PAGE ARTICLES

(random sample)

Political Violence		Articles		Photographs	
	Ontario	10	0.46%	8	2.12%
(except Ontario)	Canada	16	0.74%	2	0.53%
(except Canada)	International	112	5.18%	22	5.83%
	Sub total	138	6.38%	32	8.48%
War and Defence News		135	6.25%	14	3.71%
Crime News		151	6.99%	21	5.57%
Accident & Disaster		145	6.71%	32	8.48%
Popular Amusement		23	1.06%	40	10.61%
Human Interest		260	12.04%	129	34.21%
Economic Activity		368	17.04%	24	6.36%
Politics & Government		489	22.64%	75	19.89%
Education & Arts		29	1.34%	2	0.53%
Other		421	19.49%	8	2.12%

TABLE 19

VOLUME ANALYSIS OF FRONT PAGE ARTICLES*

(random sample)

Political Violence				Average coverage per item
	Ontario	733	1.12%	73.3
(except Ontario)	Canada	698	1.06%	43.6
(except Canada)	International	3350	5.43%	32.2
	Sub total		7.61%	
War and Defence News		4127	6.31%	
Crime News		4141	6.33%	
Accident & Disaster		4442	6.79%	
Popular Amusement		2804	4.28%	
Human Interest		12931	19.78%	
Economic Activity		10526	16.10%	
Politics & Government		16712	25.56%	
Education & Arts		791	1.21%	
Other		3916	5.99%	
	Total	65371		

Measurement error = 0.24

*All figures in square inches.

In terms of volume, articles depicting political violence accounted for 7.65% of the total volume of front pages for the period. The total volume of articles relating to violence exceeded that of the categories of war and defence news, crime news, accident and disaster, popular amusement, and education and arts. When the volume for the category "other" is subtracted from the total, the proportion devoted to violence increases to 8.10%. Of the articles on violence in Ontario, the average volume per item was 73.3 square inches which far surpassed the average coverage devoted to Canadian and international violence stories. Perhaps not surprisingly, stories of violence closer to home are accorded substantially more coverage and detail.

In terms of placement on the front page, articles describing Ontario, Canadian, and international violence were also noted as to quadrant. The top half of the Globe and Mail was used proportionately more for Ontario violence than for other Canadian violence. While there was considerable reportage of international violence, it was given even less prominence by being placed more often below the fold than above.

From the results of the random sample inquiry it is evident that stories of political violence form approximately 8% of the front page volume of the Globe and Mail. While this percentage is not excessive, when added to the categories of war and defence and crime news, both of which also involve a degree of violence, the total percentage is approximately 20.2%. It is evident that from the point of view of any regular newspaper reader, violence is a persistent feature of the front page of the Globe and Mail.[9]

The main body of the content analysis of the Globe and Mail was more extensive in scope and more definitive in terms of results. The development of the two principal coding sheets necessitated a number of

TABLE 20

PLACEMENT ON FRONT PAGE OF INTERNATIONAL, CANADIAN, & ONTARIO VIOLENCE ARTICLES BY QUADRANT

(random sample)

ONTARIO
(10)

5	3
2	0

(except Ontario)
CANADA
(16)

5	4
5	2

(except Canada)
INTERNATIONAL
(112)

20	30
38	24

difficult conceptual decisions. Collective conflict events were dropped from the analysis and only violent events were studied. Unfortunately there exists no single all-encompassing operational definition of violence. Incidents of violence were judged to have occurred when there had been a clearcut use of physical force against persons or property. For this reason peaceful strikes or demonstrations against particular policies or issues were now excluded from the lists of incidents. Another range of activity not included in our analysis was the whole area of criminal behaviour: reports of murders or robberies, however sensational, were not judged to be germane to our study. The incidence of violence in sports or in prison related events was also excluded, as it was judged that they had occurred in an environmental context incomparable with that of general society. In evaluating the thousands of articles which appeared in the Globe and Mail over the period, the focus was on two broad categories of events: collective violence and individual political violence.

Under the rubric of "individual political violence" are subsumed those acts of violence by lone individuals or small groups against political targets, or in the furtherance of a clearly evident political cause. Our review of the Globe and Mail identified nine such acts during the period. Of these, seven were bombings or attempted bombings of government property or foreign embassies. The two cases of attempted bombings were included due to the clear destructive intention of the perpetrators, and the substantial press coverage that ensued. Besides the bombing cases, the press reported one instance of aircraft hijacking in Ontario during the period. Hijacked aircraft landing at Ontario airports for the purposes of refueling only, were not included in the listing. The assault on Premier Alexei Kosygin of the U.S.S.R. on Parliament Hill in 1971 was the only notable threat against a major

political personality in Ontario during the period.

The exceedingly small number of such cases renders the use of most statistical techniques inappropriate. There are however a few general observations that can be made about the extent of media coverage accorded these acts. All nine incidents were reported within the prime news section (first five pages) of their respective editions of the Globe and Mail.[10] Seven were reported on the first page of the initial reporting day and eight had subsequent follow-up coverage. (See Appendix for complete list). The average volume of a first report of an act of individual political violence was 97 square inches. The range was from 8 to 249 square inches. The average extent of photo coverage per report was 45 square inches.

The central focus of the content analysis of the Globe and Mail was on acts of what is referred to as "collective violence." The term requires elaboration. For operational purposes "violence" was defined in terms of injuries and property damage. While there has been an effort recently in some literature to extend the definition to include psychological injuries or obstacles in the path of human fulfillment, there is virtually no way by which precise measurement can be introduced on this topic.

The choice of 50 participants as the criterion for "collective" is also a matter of some controversy. It should be noted, however, that all rigorous empirically based studies of collective violence have utilized a more or less arbitrary cutoff figure, usually 100 or more.[11] The obvious purpose of such a cutoff point is to exclude from the data set, acts of simple criminality or juvenile delinquency. Unlike the individual acts of violence which had to fulfill the criterion of being explicitly political to warrant inclusion, in the analysis we recognized five general types of issues motivating collective violence: economic,

domestic political, foreign political, university-related, and issueless. The five general categories of issues which formed the basis of incidents of collective violence were defined in the following manner.[12] Economic issues included questions related to living and working conditions, such as inflation and union contracts. Domestic political issues arose from problems and policies related specifically to Canadian government or society. Controversies related to all three levels of the federal system were included, as well as disputes arising from the Canadian social fabric. Foreign political issues were those arising from the actions of a foreign government, or in response to problems related to a foreign society. Protests over the war in Vietnam accounted for many of the incidents in the foreign political category. University-related incidents were those arising from administrative policies, or from disputes specific to a university community. Issueless or random incidents included such activities as group vandalism, brawls or motorcycle gang rampages.

A careful review of the Globe and Mail identified 129 incidents of collective violence in Ontario from 1965 to 1973.[13] While this data set is limited, it does provide some important preliminary findings on a topic that has not up to now received adequate treatment in Canada, and allows for an examination of the extent and variety of newspaper coverage of those events.

From the list of 129 incidents of collective violence, it is possible to make some general geographical observations. Twenty-seven cities in Ontario, varying in size from Toronto to Seaforth, experienced some form of collective violence during the period 1965-1975. Seventy-four incidents, or 57% of all acts of collective violence occurred in the Metropolitan Toronto area. Nine incidents, or 7%, took place in Ottawa. The remaining 46 incidents were randomly distributed throughout the province.

Based on the standard interval measurement scale for duration, 93% of all incidents of collective violence lasted less than ½ day.[14] Most newspaper accounts gave no clear indication of whether a confrontation took place over a few seconds or several hours, thus necessitating an interval scale. The total duration (i.e. the sum of the duration of all conflict events) of collective violence during this period was 77 days. Figure 3 plots the number of incidents on a year by year basis. The largest number of incidents took place in 1971, due to a series of bitter labor disputes that year. Taking 12 incidents per year as an average, and excluding the unusual case of 1971, the graph for the period shows only minor fluctuations.

Incidents of collective violence in Ontario took three general forms. Forty five percent of the events were related to demonstrations, while thirty-six percent were strike associated and nineteen percent were the result of random incidents (eg. brawls). Demonstrations often attract a large number of participants with a wide spectrum of views. Demonstrations were defined as a public display of opposition to any one of a variety of general political issues or policies. As a form of violence, strikes were defined as a range of activity related to the stoppage of work or the withholding of an employee's services. Strike related violence proved to be the most homogeneous in terms of the precipitating incidents. Eighty-five percent of strike related collective violence occurred as a result of scabs or non-striking workers attempting to cross picket lines. Thirty percent of all violence in Ontario was occasioned by such activity. Issueless or the catch-all category random incidents were defined as those related to ad hoc confrontations or as the result of generalized frustration. Random incidents attracted a relatively large average participation and a substantial overall total.

The following Table 21 indicates the number of participants by

FIGURE 3

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN ONTARIO, 1965-1975

(graph of incidents per year)
(N=129)



TABLE 21

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS ACCORDING TO FORM OF VIOLENCE*[15]

	Total	Average Per Incident
Demonstration	73,800	1300
Strike	30,100	700
Random	20,700	800

*All figures rounded to nearest 100

the form of violence. The two volatile issues of civil rights and the Vietnam war seemed to account for much of the foreign political violence during the period. The greater salience of foreign over domestic political issues in providing the impetus for violence in Ontario is an interesting finding. It is in sharp contrast with the situation in Quebec, where, as shown in Chapter II, violence resulted primarily from Quebec related problems. The apparent reason for the imbalance in Ontario is the extensive American media penetration of the province. The average Ontario news producer must assume that his readers are more attuned to American political issues than they are to those of his own province.[16] The following graph (Figure 4) plots the incidence of collective violence on a year by year basis according to the three principal motivating issues. In this graph, 1971 clearly stands out as the highwater mark of labour unrest. The profile of domestic political violence is remarkably stable for the period. The peak of foreign political violence in 1970 is probably due to the extensive number of anti-Vietnam War demonstrations of that year, revolving around the Cambodian invasion and the killings at Kent State University.

According to our calculations of the estimates contained in the Globe and Mail, approximately 132,000 people were involved in collective violence during the 11 year period. This, however, must be taken as a very rough estimate, as in most cases it was impossible to determine the actual number of people directly involved in the violence because only very general crowd estimates were reported. Based on the above figure an intensity measure of 69,000 man days, or 189 man years can be derived for this period.[17]

During the eleven years some 6000 police and security forces were reported to have been mobilized for, or participated in, incidents of collective violence. It should be noted however that 38% of all press

FIGURE 4

TIME PROFILE OF THE THREE LEADING ISSUES

MOTIVATING COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN ONTARIO, 1965-1975

(N=97)



reports contained no estimate of the number of coercive forces involved or on stand-by.

The estimated property damage from all incidents of collective violence was reported to be only $109,000. Unfortunately most of the newspaper accounts did not include a dollar figure for property damage, and there exists no satisfactory procedure for obtaining such estimates. Some 170 casualties were reported for the period, but there were no directly related fatalities. Approximately 1100 arrests were made for various offences related to incidents of collective violence.

Of the 129 incidents of collective violence, 57% were directed at human targets, 16% at property targets, and 26% involved both. Police and security forces were the most frequent single target of collective violence in the province. Thirty-two percent of all incidents involved the security force as targets. Property does have a special status in Western society, but attacks on human targets are generally considered to connote greater intensity.

In terms of the general cause or issue which gave impetus to the violence, five categories were identified. Forty-one percent of all collective violence during the period was related to economic issues. Twenty-one percent was associated with foreign-political issues (eg. Vietnam) and sixteen percent arose from domestic political issues. In addition, seven percent of the incidents were judged to be issueless.

The following Table 22 indicates the number of participants involved in the five major issue-types of collective violence.[18] Incidents motivated by foreign political issues attracted by far the largest number of participants per event and as an overall total. While the average number participating in incidents motivated by economic issues was relatively low, the overall total was substantial indicating a large number of such events. From the data it was found that demonstrations over

TABLE 22

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS BY ISSUE

	Total	Average Per Incident
Economic Issues	35,200	700
Domestic Political Issues	22,700	1,100
Foreign Political Issues	44,500	1,600
Issueless Incidents	9,800	500
University-Related	400	100

domestic political issues attracted a high average number of participants but only half the overall total for incidents motivated by foreign political issues.

The second major portion of the content analysis of the Globe and Mail dealt with an evaluation of the nature of the journalistic coverage accorded the incidents of collective violence. Inspired by Richard Budd's concept of "Attention Score," a specially designed coding scheme was devised to fit the idiosyncracies of the Globe and Mail.[19] Every report of an incident of collective violence was evaluated as to the prominence of its placement in the particular edition, its use of accompanying photographs and the total volume of each item in square inches. After the initial report of an incident, the follow-up coverage of the event was examined for seven subsequent publishing days. An effort was made to extract as much information as possible about the character of coverage as a means of providing some insights into the particular orientations journalists have in covering various types and forms of collective violence. For example, each accompanying photograph was evaluated as to whether it pictured the actual violence of the event or was merely used for general background purposes. As well, the news source of every item was noted, along with whether there were any editorials or political cartoons related to the story.

The systematic format of the Globe and Mail greatly facilitated the task. In designing the coding scheme a typical edition was divided into several portions based on the concept of prominence. The "news section" or prime reporting area was considered to be the five pages before the editorial page. Placement of an article on the first page is indicative of the highest degree of prominence. Front page articles were divided into three categories: headline articles above the fold, non-headline articles above the fold, and articles placed below the fold.

After sampling a number of editions it was decided that the rules of the coding scheme would allow for only one headline story per edition, and that this determination would be based on the size of the headline type and the total volume of the story. A "headline" refers exclusively to the upper portion of the first page. Thus, non-headline articles above the fold and all stories appearing below the fold were judged to be of somewhat lesser prominence. It was considered problematical to establish a weighting scheme for other positions of the paper. Articles appearing within the first section of the newspaper but after the editorial page and those reports placed in other portions of the edition were noted but not assigned a particular prominence value.

A similar coding scheme was developed for photographs with the highest scores going to those actually picturing the action of the incident and accompanying a headline article.[20] Background photographs and all those appearing elsewhere in the edition were accordingly judged of lesser prominence. The volume of each article, photograph and editorial was carefully computed and aggregated for each incident on its first reporting day and for a maximum of seven subsequent publishing days. As a result, a substantial body of descriptive statistics was obtained regarding the Globe and Mail's coverage of acts of collective violence during the past decade. The prominence-volume scores were then correlated with the actual events and a number of useful and instructive patterns emerged.

Over the eleven year period under examination, seventy-six percent of all incidents of collective violence were reported in the prime news section of the Globe and Mail (i.e. the five pages before the editorial page). Thirty-six percent of the incidents were reported on the first page. Twenty-five incidents of violence (nineteen percent of all incidents) were reported in the upper half of the first page.

Ten percent of the incidents (13) received headline coverage. Forty-seven percent of all reports had at least one accompanying photograph. Only 2% (3) of all first reports were accompanied by an editorial.

Follow-up stories are those which appear on subsequent days and clarify and elaborate on the initial report of an event. Forty percent of all incidents received follow-up coverage. The average follow-up was one article. One case, however, did have as many as 15 subsequent articles within seven reporting days. Fourteen percent of the incidents had a first page follow-up article. Sixteen percent of the follow-up articles were accompanied by photographs. Twelve percent of the incidents merited editorials in their follow-up coverage. There were 21 subsequent editorials in all.

The average volume of a first report was 36 square inches, which was considerably less than that accorded an average first report of an act of individual political violence (97 square inches). The range was from 5 to 222 square inches. The average photo sizes were also 36 square inches. The average first report occupied 3% of the total news section.

Sixty-two percent of all articles were general Globe and Mail stories; that is, were unsigned. Thirty percent carried the byline of a particular Globe and Mail reporter. Eight percent of the stories were wire service items, all from the Canadian Press.

There is no correlation between the number of people participating in an act of collective violence and the newspaper coverage which it received. In terms of first reports the news volume devoted to an incident correlates only .11 with the number of insurgents involved. A correlation of .14 was found between the volume in the news section of the first report and the number of insurgents. With regard to total coverage, that is, the volume of all photos and news stories in both the

first and subsequent reports, the correlation was .10. Thus it can be stated categorically that these data indicate no relation between the magnitude of the incidents and how the press chooses to handle them.

The evaluation of coverage by issue led to some other interesting findings. When incidents of collective violence over foreign political issues were reported, 89% of the articles were placed in the prime news section. This compares with 80% of the incidents over domestic political issues and 68% of those related to economic issues. In terms of first page coverage, 63% of the incidents occasioned by foreign political issues received first page coverage, as compared to 40% of the domestic political and 18% of the economic incidents. Headline coverage was relatively equal among these three leading categories with 12% of the economic, 11% of the foreign political, and 10% of the domestic political receiving top-priority treatment.

Regarding the three most significant forms of collective violence, 88% of the demonstration related incidents were reported in the first five pages of the newspaper. This compares with 65% of the strike related incidents and 68% of the random incidents. In terms of numbers of participants as well as extent of prime news reporting, demonstrations were the most prominent form of collective violence in Ontario. This pattern was also evident on the front page. Fifty-three percent of demonstration related incidents as opposed to 36% of random incidents and 17% of strike related incidents received first page coverage. While strike incidents tend to be the most intense in terms of numbers of casualties and property damage as a form of collective violence they are relatively downplayed in journalistic coverage.

The emphasis placed on coverage of demonstrations as opposed to other forms of collective violence, is also evident with regard to photographs. Of the demonstration related incidents 66% were reported

with at least one accompanying action photograph, compared to 24% of the strike reports and 12% of the random incident reports. Moreover, 47% of the demonstration reports also contained at least one background photograph. Twenty-four percent of the random incident reports and 16% of the strike reports were also accompanied by a background photograph.

Follow-up, or extended coverage of particular events beyond the first reporting day, is vital in informing the public about complex stories. This task is one of the most important responsibilities of any newspaper. The Globe and Mail does evidence a relatively high degree of follow-up reporting.

With reference to the three leading issues which motivated collective violence during the period, 55% of the domestic political incidents received some coverage beyond the first report. Forty-one percent of the foreign political and 34% of the economic incidents received follow-up coverage.

Most follow-up coverage was found in the so-called news section. Seventy-four percent of the follow-up coverage for economic incidents, 73% of the coverage for domestic political incidents, and 70% of the follow-up for foreign political incidents was found in the first five pages. In addition to the question of placement within a particular edition, each article was carefully measured as to its volume in square inches.

The following Table 23 indicates the total news volume accorded to reports of the five principal types of incidents on the first publication day. The highest average volume for a first report is for university related incidents which were among the most trivial. Economic incidents generated relatively low volume per report but were the most significant in terms of total volume. When the volume of photographs

TABLE 23

VOLUME OF FIRST REPORT ACCORDING TO ISSUE*

(Articles Only)

	Total		Average
Economic Issues	1876	34.1%	38
Domestic Political Issues	1226	22.3%	61
Foreign Political Issues	1619	29.4%	60
Issueless Incidents	480	08.7%	27
**University-Related	289	05.2%	72

*All figures in square inches

**Only 4 incidents

of first report are added, the following Table 24 emerges. Reports of collective violence motivated by foreign political issues received the greatest average volume as well as the greatest total volume on the first reporting day. This statistic again suggests a strong media penetration by the United States and other countries, in that violent Ontario incidents related to essentially foreign issues received the most significant coverage of all categories.

The following Table 25 indicates the volume directed to follow-up reports of the five principal types of incidents. Incidents related to domestic political issues generated the most significant average volume for follow-up as well as the overall total for such coverage. While reports of incidents motivated by economic and foreign political issues received more substantial initial coverage, follow-up reports lagged considerably behind. A stronger emphasis on domestic political issues is the more normal pattern and is only clearly evident with regard to follow-up coverage. When the volume for follow-up photographs is added, the same general pattern remains.

The following Table 27 aggregates the volume scores for all initial and follow-up articles and photographs. In this final summary table, collective violence motivated by domestic political issues again emerges as having generated the highest overall volume of news reporting for the period. However, as a category its volume was only marginally greater than that generated by foreign political and economic issues.

Conclusion

The eleven year content analysis of the Globe and Mail produced some interesting and important findings. There were in fact four separate content analysis projects, each one providing a different vantage point for the evaluation of violence in Ontario as reported by

TABLE 24

VOLUME OF FIRST REPORT ACCORDING TO ISSUE*
(Articles + Photographs)

	Total		Average
Economic Issues	3564	32.3%	71
Domestic Political Issues	2540	23.0%	127
Foreign Political Issues	3758	34.1%	139
Issueless Incidents	718	06.5%	40
University-Related	439	03.9%	110

*All figures in square inches

TABLE 25

VOLUME OF FOLLOW-UP COVERAGE ACCORDING TO ISSUE*

(Articles Only)

	Total		Average**
Economic Issues	1024	21.1%	60
Domestic Political Issues	2151	44.4%	196
Foreign Political Issues	929	19.1%	84
Issueless Incidents	256	05.2%	64
University-Related	483	09.9%	120

*All figures in square inches

**Average is based on the number of incidents receiving follow-up coverage.

TABLE 26

VOLUME OF FOLLOW-UP COVERAGE ACCORDING TO ISSUE*

(Articles + Photographs)

	Total		Average**
Economic Issues	1356	20.6%	80
Domestic Political Issues	2764	42.0%	251
Foreign Political Issues	1474	22.4%	134
Issueless Incidents	256	03.8%	64
University-Related	718	10.9%	180

*All figures in square inches

**Based on the number of incidents which received follow-up coverage.

TABLE 27

VOLUME OF FIRST REPORT + FOLLOW-UP COVERAGE
ACCORDING TO ISSUE*
(Articles + Photographs)

	Total		Average
Economic Issues	4920	27.9%	98
Domestic Political Issues	5304	30.1%	265
Foreign Political Issues	5232	29.7%	194
Issueless Incidents	974	05.5%	54
University-Related	1157	06.5%	289

*All figures in square inches

the Globe and Mail. The first project, the random sample of front pages, indicated that the volume devoted to political violence is approximately 8%. While this figure is not unduly high, when added to that devoted to war and defence and crime news, the combined percentage is approximately 20%. It is quite likely that most readers do not make a clear distinction between the three violence-related categories. Thus, they are confronted on a day-by-day basis with a significant degree of violence reporting on the first page of their newspaper. This statistic is not meant as a criticism of the Globe and Mail and its editorial policies, as its correspondents do have a responsibility to report the realities of the world as they see it. The point is that from the perspective of the reader, the Globe and Mail contains a substantial degree of coverage of violent events.

The second content analysis project identified the nine incidents of individual or small group political violence in Ontario for the period. The average initial coverage of each incident was nearly three times as extensive as that of collective violence events. While each incident resulted from a wide range of motivations, the coverage of each was extensive and dramatic.

The third content analysis project identified 129 incidents of collective violence in Ontario from 1965 to 1975. Except for an unusual number of serious labour disputes in 1971, the graph of incidents per year was relatively stable. As a form of violence, demonstrations attracted the largest number of participants. In terms of issues, those incidents relating to foreign political questions attracted the largest number of participants per event and as an overall total. This statistic suggests a strong American media penetration in Ontario. As stated in Chapter II, the situation in Quebec is quite different, as the incidents there attracting the largest number of

participants are those related to domestic political issues. Another significant finding of the third content analysis project is that most collective violence is aimed at human targets rather than property. The most common scenario was of picket line confrontations erupting into fist fights. While the number of participants per event was relatively low, the sheer number of such incidents was extensive.

The fourth content analysis project examined the extent and variety of coverage the Globe and Mail accorded to the 129 incidents of collective violence. Articles and photographs related to the incident were evaluated utilizing a prominence index. From the resulting data there appeared no discernible relationship between the magnitude of the incidents and the type of coverage they were accorded. In terms of the three principal forms of collective violence, demonstrations were far more prominent than strikes or random incidents. As far as initial coverage of incidents was concerned, disputes over foreign political issues generated more volume of newspaper coverage than did domestic political issues. However, domestic political issues produced more follow-up volume and slightly more overall coverage. The most obvious conclusion is that Ontario is strongly influenced by American media. Future studies of violence in Canada must take into account the degree to which essentially foreign issues form the basis of unrest in this country.

Footnotes to Chapter III

[1]For an excellent discussion of content analysis as a research technique see Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969); and Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp, and Lewis Donohew, Content Analysis of Communication (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1967).

[2]See Charles Tilly, "Collective Violence in European Perspective," in Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. A Report submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, ed. by H. D. Graham and T. R. Gurr (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), p. 45.

[3]John C. Merrill, The Elite Press: Great Newspapers of the World (New York: Pitman, 1968).

[4]John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 486.

[5]Merrill, op. cit., pp. 121-124.

[6]It should be noted that the Globe and Mail publishes several editions of each day's newspaper, depending on whether it's meant for national, provincial, or metro Toronto circulation. The national edition of the Globe and Mail was used for the purposes of this study.

[7]The category scheme used in the random sample was adapted from that used in an article by Guido H. Stempel, III, "Content Patterns of Small and Metropolitan Dailies," Journalism Quarterly, 39 (Winter 1962), pp. 88-90.

[8]E. Terrance Jones, Conducting Political Research (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 64. For a description of randomization techniques see H. W. Smith, Strategies of Social Research: The Methodological Imagination (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1975), pp. 118-124.

[9]Results from similar American studies measuring volume devoted to "violence" are somewhat contradictory, varying from 2% to 34% in the 1960's. See Chap. I, p. 12.

[10]For a more complete discussion of the coding scheme used throughout this study see pages 100-102 of this chapter.

[11]The precise cutoff point for "collective" varies considerably in the empirical literature. The figure "20" is used by Michael Stohl in "War and Domestic Political Violence: the Case of the United States, 1890-1970," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 19 (September 1975), p. 387. The number "50" is used by Yoshio Sugimoto in "Surplus Value, Unemployment

and Industrial Turbulence: A Statistical Application of the Marxian Model to Post-War Japan," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 19 (March 1975), p. 28. "50" participants or more is also employed in the work of Charles Tilly, "Collective Violence in European Perspective," in Graham and Gurr, eds. op. cit., p. 45, while Ted R. Gurr utilizes "100" in "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife - Appendix 1, Procedures Used in Collecting and Summarizing Civil Strife Data," in Graham and Gurr, eds. op. cit., p. 626. It would seem that any specification which is defensible is acceptable as they are all somewhat arbitrary.

[12]Micheal J. Kelly, "Collective Violence in Ontario and Quebec, 1968-1973: A Comparative Analysis," (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Ottawa, 1975), p. 22.

[13]The Ontario collective violence data for the years 1965-1973 was developed by Joseph A. Frank and Micheal J. Kelly. We wish to express our appreciation to Professor Frank for providing us with his data and codebooks for the period.

[14]Ted R. Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," American Political Science Review, 62 (December 1968), p. 1108.

[15]It should be noted that the results were rounded-off for the purpose of convenience, and that participant figures from incidents which did not clearly fit the category scheme were excluded.

[16]The highly controversial nature of the Vietnam war may have strongly contributed to this imbalance. There does not exist however, any substantial data on other periods of Canadian history with which to verify this finding. Further research studies examining the salience of foreign political issues in prompting violence in Canada are needed.

[17] The term "man days" refers to an aggregate measure of the number of participants in each event times the duration of each event.

[18]It should be noted that the results were rounded-off for the purpose of convenience, and that figures from incidents motivated by a combination of issues were not included.

[19]Richard W. Budd, "Attention Score: A Device for Measuring News 'Play,'" Journalism Quarterly, 41 (Spring 1964), pp. 259-262.

[20]The peculiar placement of article headings and photographs on the newspage can suggest some misleading implications. The front page of the Globe and Mail for September 10, 1973 features a headline stating "Dissident Railroaders Charged." Directly below this headline is a photograph of a spectacular blaze at the Canadian National Railway freight shed in Toronto. While the dateline of the railroad story is Vancouver and deals with the violation of an injunction order, an entirely misleading interpretation is possible if one assumes the headline and photograph refer to the same story. The casual reader of the newspaper would be left with the clear impression that the railway workers were responsible for arson in Toronto.

Chapter IV

Cases and Illustrations

The content analysis projects presented in Chapter III indicate that violence occupied a significant portion of one of Canada's leading newspapers. From the random sample inquiry it was learned that articles in three violence-related categories together formed approximately 20% of the front page volume of the Globe and Mail over the period from 1965-1975. The other content analysis projects identified 129 incidents of collective violence and 9 of individual political violence in Ontario. In addition there are many questions about the reporting of collective conflict and violence which no form of content analysis, however rigorous, can explore. These are for the most part logistical problems such as those sometimes encountered by journalists in the pursuit of their profession, or questions about the relations between media personnel, participants and police at the scene of a violent confrontation.

As a means of deriving additional insights about news reporting of violence and some of the problems newsmen both engender and encounter, a case study approach was adopted. This method of research opened up a number of new avenues of inquiry.

An incident of collective violence is a complex and dynamic phenomenon. The case study method seeks to explore the "how" and "why" aspects of such situations in virtually the only way that such questions can be answered. While no claim is made here of scientific validity, nonetheless an attempt has been made to explore a wide variety of cases with apparent clinical potential. The particular advantage of the case study is that it allows observation in great depth and from a variety of perspectives. The case study method is not without its limitations and drawbacks, but was judged to be of value given the particular

interests of this study.

A selection of six case studies was made from the list of collective violence events in Ontario from 1965-1975. A seventh case study, an instance of individual political violence, was added as it was closely related to one of the collective cases and provided a somewhat different perspective. The seven case studies selected were the following: an anti-Nazi demonstration in Toronto in 1965; a hippie protest in the Yorkville section of Toronto in 1967; an anti-Vietnam demonstration in front of the American Consulate in Toronto in 1970; a labour strike at the Texpack plant in Brantford during the late summer of 1971; a personal assault on Premier Kosygin of the USSR during his tour of Parliament Hill in Ottawa in 1971; an anti-Soviet demonstration protesting Premier Kosygin's visit to Toronto in 1971; and the clash between Indians and RCMP on Parliament Hill in 1974.

The seven were chosen because of the extensive media coverage which they received and also because they seemed to be reasonably representative of the data set as a whole in terms of form, issue, and location. Five of the incidents were demonstrations, one was a strike, and one was an act of individual political violence. Three of the cases involved foreign political issues, three were occasioned by domestic political issues and one was labour related. Four of the incidents took place in Toronto, two in Ottawa, and one occurred in Brantford.

At the outset each case study was meticulously researched from newspapers and other available sources. For example, the anti-Kosygin demonstration in Toronto had resulted in an Ontario Royal Commission Investigation (the Vaninni Report), while the Yorkville case had been captured in two National Film Board features: "Flowers on a One Way Street" and "Christopher's Movie Matinee." A number of briefs were also collected from such organizations as the Canadian Federation of

Civil Liberties, the Canadian Association of Broadcasters, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and other news sources. As a means of providing an additional body of data with which to evaluate the case studies an extensive interviewing project was undertaken. A master list of all individuals mentioned in the Globe and Mail's coverage of each case was developed. The list for each incident was broken down into three broad categories: "participants," "authorities," and media.[1] The term "participants" refers to those who were spokesmen for particular organizations or who were bystanders in a position to make some meaningful observations. It should be clearly stated that the term "participants" is in no way meant to imply that the individual was directly involved in an act of violence. The term "authorities" refers to those members of the various police forces who were responsible for security at the site of the respective incidents of collective violence. "Media" were those reporters and photographers who were actually on the scene covering the events. A questionnaire specially designed for each of these three general categories was developed, from which a considerable body of interview testimony was generated.[2]

The questionnaire sought to focus on a number of the major controversies regarding the rights and responsibilities of these three general groups. Of particular interest was the nature of the relationship between police and media. As a means of providing the reader with a degree of perspective regarding the seven case studies, there follows a series of brief narratives describing the chronology and major features of each. Following this section is a report of the results of a project designed to sample the internal content of the first articles carried by three different newspapers about each case. Once this background material has been presented this chapter concentrates on an examination of the opinions of participants, media and police with respect to the impact

of the media on the violence which occurred in these seven cases.

Reported Case Study Narratives[3]

Anti-Nazi Rally

On Sunday afternoon May 30th, 1965 about 5000 people, most of them middle-aged, and many of them Eastern European or members of various Jewish organizations, gathered to protest against the holding of a Nazi rally at Allan Gardens. Many of these people had been brought out by the continuous and inaccurate publicity (it was reported that the Nazis had a permit when in fact they did not) which the media had given this event during the preceding week. The protest developed into a near riot when a mob of about 500 people, many carrying sticks and clubs, made several attacks on youths believed to be members of a Toronto Nazi Group. The mob which was described by news sources as being in a hysterical frenzy screamed "Kill! "Kill! "Kill!" as they chased and clubbed the eight victims, all but one of whom were later reported to be innocent passersby, to the ground where they were beaten with fists and battered with hunks of wood and tree branches. The incident was broken up within 15 minutes when an estimated 50 police on foot, motorcycle, and horseback fought their way into the mob and dispersed it. Eight members of the crowd and William J. Beattie, self-styled Toronto Nazi leader, were arrested.

Yorkville Demonstration

Yorkville, the then coffee house (and discothèque) district of Toronto, erupted into violence on the evening of August 20, 1967 during what various reports characterized as the worst outbreak of rowdyism in the village's history. A series of skirmishes began when an estimated crowd of between 3000-5000 "hippies" congregated in a one block section of Yorkville Avenue and attempted to hold a sit-in to protest the city's

failure to close the street to traffic as they had requested. Police, in an attempt to break up the sit-in, waded into the crowd and were reported to have "slapped","kicked", "punched" and "clubbed" the protestors. There were 50 arrests as a result of this incident and several reported injuries including a number of broken bones. A few days subsequent to this event a serious controversy arose concerning the participation of a National Film Board crew in some of the incidents, including an individual who had trained the hippies in passive resistance. Some Film Board officials were also reported to have admitted that they had helped manoeuvre some of the Yorkville events previous to the sit-in.

Demonstration at United States Consulate

On Saturday May 9, 1970, 8 days after the American Invasion of Cambodia and 5 days after the killing of four students at Kent State University in Ohio, a protest in front of the American Consulate General in Toronto erupted into what was described as one of the most violent demonstrations in that city since the protests of the unemployed at Queens Park in the 1930's. This protest at the consulate had been preceded during the week by two smaller demonstrations in which about a dozen demonstrators were reported to have been arrested. At this Saturday protest about 5000 people variously affiliated with the Vietnam Mobilization Committee, The Canadian Party of Labour, and the May 4th Movement were directly in front of the Consulate. The protest escalated to violence when mounted police rode into the crowd in an attempt to disperse it. At this point fights broke out and earth from flower beds, bricks, stones and firecrackers rained down on the 250 police officers. After the mounted police charge forced demonstrators away from the consulate several hundred people streamed through downtown Toronto

smashing windows of several department stores and causing about $7000 worth of damage. Ninety-one arrests resulted from this incident and several injuries were reported - including 6 police casualties.

Texpack Strike

A lengthy strike by workers of the Texpack plant at Brantford led to a series of five episodes of collective violence in the late summer of 1971. The strike at Texpack, a manufacturer of hospital bandages, began following a walkout on July 16. On August 12, the Ontario Supreme Court issued an injunction limiting the number of pickets to seven. Efforts by Texpack officials to replace striking workers with scabs bused in from Hamilton and other nearby communities, led to an angry confrontation on August 25. Police and firemen were attacked by strikers and a considerable degree of vandalism ensued. In September the Texpack strikers were joined by representatives of other unions and by members of the Waffle Group of the New Democratic Party. During the course of the dispute an attempt was made to relocate the Texpack operation in Rexdale. While the immediate issue of the strike was a demand for a wage increase of 65 cents per hour, the tactics of the American-based company generated substantial support for the strikers. On September 14th two York University professors were injured by a bus carrying a large number of non-union workers. The tension at the Texpack plant continued until October 18th when a compromise was reached between union and management negotiation which granted a 44 cent increase over a two year contract. During the prolonged strike 65 people were arrested on some 100 charges.

Incidents Related to the Kosygin Visit

On October 18, 1971, a lone attacker broke through the rear of a crowd and attacked Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin as he walked with

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau just outside the East Block of Parliament. Geza Matrai, 27 year old Hungarian refugee, Toronto member of the Edmund Burke Society, and provincial Social Credit candidate, burst out of a crowd of 200 to 300 Jewish and Latvian demonstrators, leaped a wooden barricade and butted through reporters, cameramen, and plain-clothes security police. Shouting "freedom for Hungary!" Matrai jumped on Kosygin's back and got a forearm around his neck almost dragging him to the ground. He was torn away and pinned to the ground by half a dozen R.C.M.P. officers. Kosygin was shaken but unhurt and Matrai was carried away and charged with common assault.

Eight days after the incident in Ottawa Soviet Premier Kosygin was the object of another violent protest in Toronto. On the evening of October 25, 1971 an estimated 14,000 demonstrators were protesting in the vicinity of the Ontario Science Centre where the Soviet Premier was attending a dinner given by the Canadian Manufacturers Association. Directly across from the Centre were about 3000-6000 people, members of various Ukranian, Bulgarian, Lithuanian and Latvian groups. There were also reported to be a number of members of the Edmund Burke Society in the crowd. As demonstrators began pressing against police security lines some in the crowd began to hurl debris at police. After a short time mounted policemen charged into the chanting crowd to restrain them. This manoeuvre was repeated several times with a full scale confrontation ensuing as police began to beat protestors with clubs and riding crops. The confrontation lasted about 20 minutes and resulted in 20 arrests and 11 casualties including 5 policemen. A Royal Commission Investigation was initiated to clarify the conduct of the public, and tactics used by the police in dispersing the crowd.

Indian Demonstration

On September 30, 1974 in an incident designated by the media as the "Battle of Parliament Hill," the R.C.M.P. put down attempts by several hundred Indians to enter the Centre Block of Parliament. The Indians, most of whom were members of the Native Peoples Caravan, coming from as far away as Vancouver, had assembled on the Hill to demonstrate for improved social and medical services and the settlement of territorial claims. They were joined on the Hill by several members of the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist). There they were confronted by unarmed Mounties and a 100-man Canadian Forces Honour Guard, present for the opening ceremonies of the 30th Parliament. As the Indians marched toward the Centre Block about 200 of them charged the police barricade and began scuffling with the R.C.M.P. Others in the crowd were reportedly flinging heavy stones, sticks, and broken bottles and setting fire to the shrubbery below the steps of the Centre Block. Busloads of R.C.M.P. reserves including a riot squad with helmets, shields and clubs were called in as reinforcements and forced the demonstrators back to the main lawn in front of the Parliament Buildings. In the 'battle' that continued sporadically for three hours 15 people were arrested and 20 injured, including 10 members of the R.C.M.P.

Comparison of Three Newspaper Styles

While the four content analysis projects described in Chapter III produced a substantial body of empirical data regarding the Globe and Mail's reporting of violence, an important element of news coverage was not explored. Content analysis was utilized to collect events data, which essentially dealt with the basic question "Who did what to whom?" Attention was paid to the extent and variety of coverage accorded certain

types of collective violence. The degree of prominence a story received was judged on the basis of its placement within the particular edition, whether it had accompanying photographs, and its total volume in square inches. Such measurement techniques are unquestionably valid and do provide important insights, but one should not completely overlook another type of content analysis. A second broad application of this technique is generally referred to as "evaluative assertion analysis" and was pioneered by the work of Charles Osgood, et al.[4] This type of content analysis seeks to explore the internal logic of a particular piece of written or spoken communication. Its purpose is to detect subtle implications suggested by the choice of certain words or the placement of particular phrases within the text. While an appreciation of the tone and emphasis of particular articles is vital to an overall understanding of the news event, the precise measurement of such variations is often problematical. As a means of introducing some degree of methodological rigor to this difficult measurement problem, Osgood has introduced the "semantic differential scale" to weigh words on a positive to negative continuum. Specialized "dictionaries" are developed based on the evaluations of a panel of judges regarding the particular meanings of certain words. Thus a sample of communication can be broken down to its basic elements and subjected to precise measurement.

While this form of content analysis does provide interesting insights into the structure of the thought patterns of the speaker/writer, it was not considered to be appropriate for this project. Instead, a modified version of this form of internal content analysis was developed to provide an evaluation of the overall impact of a selected sample of articles. This form of analysis makes little claim to being scientific but rests instead on a series of informed, but impressionistic observations.

For the purposes of this analysis, each article in the sample was subjected to a series of evaluations regarding the degree to which it was informative and reasonably balanced. Our observations were based on a limited sample, and thus are not meant to generalize about any particular newspaper's credibility or journalistic practices. The principal concern was to compare the coverage accorded by three leading Ontario newspapers to the seven selected incidents of violence. From this side by side evaluation a number of observations can be made regarding the extent and variety of journalistic treatment of identical events.

For the seven incidents which form the case studies explored in this chapter, a special chart was developed to take note of such considerations as article placement, use of accompanying photographs, and the degree to which the issue prompting the incident was thoroughly explained.

The sample of newspaper articles was derived in the following manner. The first major article reporting the actual confrontation was examined from three newspapers: the Globe and Mail, the Ottawa Citizen, and the Toronto Star.[5] The three articles relating to each incident were evaluated on a variety of criteria with particular emphasis on the general tone of the piece as well as whether the grievances underlying the event were discussed. With each article the analyst sought to determine whether or not the general public would have been adequately informed about the particular incident. From our review of the articles on the seven incidents, significant differences in coverage were observed.

The first set of articles reviewed dealt with the anti-Nazi demonstration in Toronto in May, 1965. All three newspapers, especially the Star, stressed the hostile and perhaps even "animalistic" nature of the crowd. The Star had the largest volume devoted to this story

TABLE 28

ANTI-NAZI DEMONSTRATION - MAY 31, 1965[6]

	Front Page Story?	Head-line	Article Heading Inform-ative	Photographs on front page	Descrip-tion of Photo-graphs	Issue with-in first 3 para-graphs	Issue within total article
Globe and Mail	yes	yes	yes-to the point, although slightly dramatic	1	Action	yes	yes
Ottawa Citizen	yes	no	not all information given	1	Action	yes	yes
Toronto Star	yes	yes	yes-but dramatic-consistent with tone of article	3	Action	no	more emphasis on what happened than 'why' it happened

and the largest number of photographs. The Star coverage dwelt on the actions of the crowd and a thorough description of the violence. The Citizen, using Canadian Press copy, makes no mention of the issuing of a demonstration permit to the Nazis which was a key element in the story. The Globe and Mail specifically mentioned the radio promotion for the Nazi rally as a major cause of the disturbance. The Star reported this key fact only in an incidental fashion. The tone of all three articles was dramatic.

The second set of articles dealt with the violent clash between police and hippies in Yorkville in August 1967. In neither of the Toronto papers was there an adequate explanation of the issue at stake in the first report of the incident. The Citizen, once again using Canadian Press copy, mentioned the issue very succinctly. The Globe and Mail appeared to be sympathetic to the demonstrators, whose treatment by police was described in considerable detail. The issue prompting the confrontation, however, was discussed in only one paragraph. The Star took a sarcastic tone with reference to the hippie movement. The thrust of the Star's coverage seemed to be obsessed with the mystique of this phenomenon. For the Globe and Mail and Star, Yorkville was a front page item, while the Citizen relegated its article to page 10. This is a clear indication of the impact of distance as a variable in prominence given to certain news.

The third set of articles examined dealt with a major anti-Vietnam demonstration in Toronto following the shootings at Kent State University in May, 1970. This demonstration was given substantial front page coverage in all three newspapers. The Globe and Mail paid considerable attention to a detailed description of the sequence of

TABLE 29

YORKVILLE DEMONSTRATION - AUGUST 21, 1967

	Front Page Story?	Head-line	Article Heading Inform-ative	Photographs on front page	Descrip-tion of Photo-graphs	Issue with-in first 3 para-graphs	Issue within total article
Globe and Mail	yes	yes	yes-main in-formation given but somewhat dramatic	1	Action	yes	yes-but not in depth
Ottawa Citizen	no p. 10	-	to the point but along with photo-graphs gives a biased impression	1	Action	no	yes
Toronto Star	yes		yes-but may be misleading	1	Action	no	yes-but mentioned incident-ally

TABLE 30

ANTI-VIETNAM DEMONSTRATION - MAY 11, 1970

	Front Page Story	Head-line	Article Heading Inform-ative	Photographs on front page	Descrip-tion of Photo-graphs	Issue with-in first 3 para-graphs	Issue within total article
Globe and Mail	yes	yes	dramatic-"shatter windows during chase"-but explanatory	1	Action	yes	-
Ottawa Citizen	yes	yes	dramatic-"downtown rampage"-"riot shocks Toronto"	1	Action	yes	-
Toronto Star	yes	yes	explana-tory-but not very illuminating	3 2 on 2nd page	First page photograph only re-lated to incident p.2 photo-graphs action	no	yes

events. In tone their article appeared to be sympathetic to the demonstrators, although both sides of the dispute were presented. The Citizen's account was concise but informative with regard to the major elements of the story. Their headline was quite emotional, while the content of the article itself was reasonably dispassionate. The Star's coverage put prime emphasis on the question of outside agitators and a detailed description of the route the demonstration took when leaving the consulate. The Star also condemned the demonstrators for inciting violence. The issue which prompted the demonstration was mentioned in one small paragraph.

The fourth set of articles dealt with the strike at Texpack Ltd. in Brantford. Although this labour dispute stretched over three months and involved at least five major incidents of collective violence, the coverage here relates only to the first confrontation with police in Brantford in late August, 1971. All three papers convey the impression of a menacing and almost animalistic "mob." The Globe and Mail's article, the only front page coverage given to this event, dealt with all aspects of the story. The sequence of events, the violence of the demonstration and the issue at stake were all mentioned in the Globe and Mail's first report. The Citizen carried a brief Canadian Press story relating the basic elements of the incident but provided no explanation of why the strike occurred originally or why the violence erupted. The Star's article focused strongly on the actions of the demonstrators, while making no mention of the issues related to the strike.

The fifth series of articles dealt with the personal assault on Premier Alexei Kosygin of the USSR while he toured Parliament Hill in October 1971. The attack on Premier Kosygin was the only example of individual political violence chosen for close scrutiny. Unlike

TABLE 31

TEXPACK - AUGUST 26, 1971

	Front Page Story	Head-line	Article Heading Inform-ative?	Photographs on front page	Descrip-tion of Photo-graphs	Issue with-in first 3 para-graphs	Issue within total article
Globe and Mail	yes	no	yes-to the point-main information given	no	-	no	yes
Ottawa Citizen	no p.53	no	not at all-violence in-ferred but why or where not clear	no	-	no	no
Toronto Star	no p.48	no	dramatic-far from explana-tory	no	-	no	no

TABLE 32

KOSYGIN ATTACK - OCTOBER 18, 1971

	Front Page Story	Head-line	Heading Informa-tive	Photographs on first page	Descrip-tion of Photo-graphs	Issue with-in first 3 para-graphs	Issue within total article
Globe and Mail	yes	yes	yes-to the point	2	Action	NA	NA
Ottawa Citizen	yes	yes	yes-to the point	1	Action	NA	NA
Toronto Star	yes	yes	yes-but not completely clear	no	-	NA	NA

the cases of collective violence the criterion of "issues" is not entirely relevant. All three newspapers stressed the national disgrace of the attack and the fallibility of the security forces. The Globe and Mail and Star stressed the grave implications of this incident, while the Citizen displayed a matter of fact tone. The Globe and Mail and Citizen both presented considerable detail about the logistics of the attack. The Citizen, publishing an afternoon edition, carried the story on the same day it occurred. The headlines of all three articles were somewhat emotional, perhaps justifiably.

The sixth group of articles dealt with major anti-Soviet demonstration which occurred during Premier Kosygin's visit to the Ontario Science Centre in Toronto in October 1971.

All three newspapers chose to deal with the issues prompting the demonstration only indirectly, by reporting some of the placards carried by the protestors. None of the papers featured the incident as the headline story of the day. Moreover, the Star did not carry a picture of the violence to accompany its first report of the incident. In describing the event all three newspapers emphasized the unravelling of the demonstration and the traffic jams that ensued. However, each newspaper was quick to point out the innocence of the crowd in the violent clash that developed. Only the Star printed comments from some of the demonstrators regarding their perceptions of police brutality. The Citizen appeared to be considerably downplaying the incident by placing it on page 19 and inserting an exceedingly mild article heading. Again perhaps, the factor of distance was responsible for the marked differences in coverage.[7]

The last set of articles dealt with a confrontation between native Indians and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police on Parliament Hill

TABLE 33

KOSYGIN DEMONSTRATION - OCTOBER 26, 1971

	Front Page Story	Head-line	Heading Informa-tive	Photographs on first page	Descrip-tion of Photo-graphs	Issue within first 3 para-graphs	Issue within total article
Globe and Mail	yes	no	yes-but no mention of what pro-test is against	1	Action	no	indirectly
Ottawa Citizen	no	no	not at all-completely misleading as to nature of story	1	Action	no	indirectly
Toronto Star	yes	no	vaguely-highlights of the most dramatic instance of the story	no	-	indirectly	indirectly

TABLE 34

INDIAN DEMONSTRATION - OCTOBER 1, 1974

	Front Page Story	Head-line	Article Heading Informa-tive	Photographs on first page	Descrip-tion of Photo-graphs	Issue with-in first 3 para-graphs	Issue within total article
Globe and Mail	yes	no	yes-leaves impression of "cowboy vs. Indian" story	1	Action	no	yes
Ottawa Citizen	yes	yes	highly sen-sational and not at all informa-tive	3	Action	no	no
Toronto Star	yes	no	not very informative, but along with photo-graphs gives a clearer picture	3 (2 on 2nd page)	Action	no	yes

on September 30, 1974.

The article in the Globe and Mail portrayed the clash on the Hill as a stock "Indian vs. White Man" movie plot, with the White Man as hero and the Indians as the instigators of the violence. Statements from both sides were presented although the issues prompting the incident were not clearly stated. The Citizen coverage featured a sensational banner headline across the entire top of the front page. The tone of the article follows from the headline and is shocking. The Star's coverage was more dispassionate, centering mainly on impressions of Trudeau, the Indians, and the authorities. There was, however, no clear indication of what the Indian demands were. In fact, none of the three papers offered an adequate explanation for why the Indians wanted to gain entrance to Parliament.

While this language-sampling exercise is admittedly impressionistic, it has yielded a number of interesting results. First of all there was a substantial difference in the degree of prominence and general tone of accounts of the particular events. From this limited sample it was clear that most coverage was focused on "what" happened rather than "why." Only the most meticulous reader would have been able to determine exactly what had prompted a particular incident of violence. On the other hand, he was given a clear idea of the editorial opinion of the particular newspaper by the intensity with which it condemned the use of violence in each case. From this limited exercise it is obvious that the same event can generate substantially different coverage. We shall now proceed to explore through interview testimony some of the practical problems which may influence the sort of coverage particular stories may receive.

Case Study Testimony

While this study has not uncovered any evidence of a relationship between the media, collective conflict and violence in terms of a direct causal sequence, there nevertheless remains a number of other ways in which the media has been seen to affect civil unrest. As illustrated in Chapter 1, the Eisenhower and Kerner Commissions as well as the Surgeon General's report all offer some evidence that although the media may not actually cause violence in an etiological sense, they might in some instances aggravate or exacerbate certain aspects of conflict. For example, it was suggested that the very presence of the media at the scene of a demonstration or strike could become a factor in the dynamics of the conflict situation. The presence of large numbers of media representatives, in particular, camera crews with their lights, cables and other equipment, in a crowd of protestors, has frequently been found to complicate crowd control, and sometimes add to the general confusion and chaos. Evidence uncovered by the Royal Commission of Inquiry In Relation to the Conduct of the Public and the Metro Toronto Police in the Kosygin affair relates directly to this problem. In the opinion of the author, the media, especially television crews, stimulated and added to some of the turmoil and confusion during the riot in front of the Ontario Science Centre.[8]

In another, yet related, sense it has also been proposed that the presence of the media may have a tendency to transform the character of an incident because strikers and demonstrators attempt to manipulate the press to obtain headlines. The event becomes a sort of stage drama with the protestors playing to the cameras.

Possibly a much more polemical and problematical aspect of the media - civil unrest relationship begs the question of what news is. A fundamental question arises as to whether the newsworthiness of an

incident of conflict is based exclusively on the occurrence of violence or whether the media have a further obligation to inform the public by conveying the message that the protestors or even the authorities, are attempting to present? More directly - can the form that a protest takes be isolated from the content of the protest? Understandably this is a very contentious issue. It would appear, however, that the tendency of media to give prominence to the violent aspects of a dispute while at the same time providing inadequate discussion of the issues can essentially lead beyond the reporting of news to the actual creation of news. This can both misrepresent the event and mislead the public. While the concept of censorship is anathema to most journalists, this pre-selection of news may in itself be seen as constituting a form of censorship. To the extent that demonstrations and other forms of protest are generally directed at the public via the media, the societal implications of this practice are profound.

An attempt to examine these various controversies was made through a series of interviews based on the seven case studies. A general list of names was compiled from various newspaper reports of the incidents. Several additional names were obtained in the course of some of the initial contacts.

The sample of interviewees was divided into three groups, "participants","media representatives" and "authorities." All individuals interviewed in each of the three categories were either involved in one of the events or were in a position to make informed observations.

A specific questionnaire, with some overlap, was administered to each group. The three questionnaires consisted of several general media-violence questions, and a series of questions relating to the particular incident with which the respondent was associated. (See Appendix F). Generally, each of these interviews attempted to focus on

some of the controversies outlined above, or discussed in earlier chapters. Particular emphasis was placed on questions of police-press and participant-press interaction at the scene of a disturbance, and also on the form-content or the violence vs. issue dispute. The following pages, therefore, make no attempt to seek an objective appraisal of the events themselves but constitute a survey of opinions on media-violence relations.

Participants

Interviews were conducted with 17 individuals who had participated in one of the seven incidents either directly or as unofficial observers. At least one participant was interviewed for each of the case studies with the single exception of the Kosygin assault incident in Ottawa. Unfortunately none of the principals involved in this particular incident was accessible. The interviews conducted with the "participants" attempted to focus on several general topics, including their perception of the function of demonstrations and the tactical uses of violence, confrontation, and escalation with respect to media coverage. Consideration was also given to whether the media coverage of the incident gave undue prominence to its violent aspects.

With respect to the function of demonstrations most of the participants interviewed considered their protest activity to have been a conscious exercise in media manipulation. Their ultimate objective was not only to manifest discontent but, according to most of the respondents, to gain recognition, sympathy and a wider audience.

* *

> "In any demonstration there's no purpose in being out demonstrating if you're not going to get media coverage. ...If you have a demonstration and no one [the media] shows up it's not worth having....If there's no media coverage there's no effect from it. I've been involved in demonstrations in the prisons recently, over the last two summers, and what we've found is that for instance, at Millhaven and the B.C. Pen a year and a

bit ago when they had a hunger strike nationwide, and a reasonably effective one, there was no media coverage of it, and it put no pressure on the administration. This year's [strikes] received a little bit better media coverage. We're a little bit better at manipulating the media in relation to the demonstrations, and it put a little more pressure on the administration, brought a few more approving editorial comments. That to me is what demonstrating is all about; its just solely an exercise in manipulating the media."

* *

"It is only after something happens that the media is responsive and then only to a degree."

* *

"That [to get media access] was the entire purpose of this thing [the Kosygin Demonstration]."

* *

While there may have been a consensus among most participants and observers concerning the generalities of the demonstration - media exposure strategy, the idea that violence was an integral part of this strategy was not accepted by the majority of those interviewed. It was the observation of a prominent civil libertarian, as well as several of the demonstrators that there were no deliberate attempts to incite violence to get media attention. Nor did these individuals perceive any attempt on the part of the demonstrators to play to the media. Nevertheless, there were a few individuals who did view confrontation politics as a useful tactic in gaining publicity. One respondent even considered it more a necessary than a useful tactic because of what he considered to be the media's ever changing threshold of what constitutes news.

* *

"My general impression is that [playing to the media] isn't the way it happens. Undoubtedly there are situations where that does happen but I haven't been in any situation so far where I've seen someone deliberately try to engage in a violent act in order to get coverage."

* *

* *

"It's hard to say - probably not. If a person was getting hassled by a cop, and the cop was beating him up, then the person wouldn't have time to notice a cameraman in the midst, because he would be too worried about himself to put on an act for the camera."

* *

"....nobody was there to make a scene for the media. At least nobody that I know."

* *

"Create a confrontation and create an incident. What you say doesn't matter, you create the confrontation and get the publicity. It's an interesting trick. The press falls for it everytime."

* *

"In my opinion what happened was that to get the same media coverage you had to put on a bigger extravaganza each time....you had to keep escalating your mode of demonstration to get the same media coverage. As I said there's no purpose in having a demonstration unless you manage to communicate to people who aren't there that there are a significant number of people taking a particular position."

* *

Conversely, there were several participants who offered the opinion that the media frequently played an active and even sinister role in the occurrence of violent conflict. This was seen to happen indirectly through the publicity and the projections of confrontation and violence which often emanate from the news media prior to an event. In a more direct sense it has also been alleged that the media has indulged in the actual manipulation of the demonstrators, and the orchestration of the scenario, as was charged in the Yorkville incident.

* *

"It [Allan Gardens] became a major event. It was somewhat media created by pre-publicity....all the curiosity seekers came. Radio reports that morning did build the crowd."

* *

* *

"Starting two days prior, the media, and specifically in this case the radio stations, were putting on blurbs every 15 minutes about going to Allan Gardens."

* *

"I think it's very frustrating for a TV crew when they come out to a demonstration and everything is quiet. They call on people to arrange themselves in certain ways to make a more dramatic shot and this can spill over into creating news. This may or may not interfere with the public's right to protest and to make its protest heard but it certainly interferes with the public's right to get an honest news story."

* *

Despite these very different impressions about the relationship between the use of violence and media interest, the majority of those interviewed expressed considerable consternation at the way the news media covered their protest. Most of this displeasure centered around the perceived tendency of the media to concentrate exclusively on the dramatic and violent aspects of the incident at the expense of the issues and grievances which motivated the protest.

* *

"I think they [the media] did emphasize these confrontations at the corner and the fact that there was an injunction. The media tried to portray the people who were supporting it as violent types who were interested in stirring up trouble. It wasn't so much that they were concerned about justice for the women at the plant."

* *

"Generally the press isn't interested in why it happened, just what happened. Allan Gardens was a one day wonder ...the issues weren't discussed. They were totally down-graded in the report of violence."

* *

"They [The Capitalist Press] have generally used violence or focused on violence to avoid looking at real issues. They have generally avoided looking at the substance of why people are demonstrating. I think that's been a real failure of all the media here, certainly the news-papers."

* *

* *

"If an incident lasts for two hours and there are 1½ minutes of yelling, screaming and pushing, that's what gets on TV of course. The 98 minutes when nothing is happening does not get on."

* *

"The real purpose of the demonstration was lost in the shuffle. The concentration was on the dramatic ...there was more interest in trying to paint the people who had come there as violent than in trying to find out why they were there....In my opinion it was a question of selling newspapers."

* *

"I think the press and the media dwell on the violent aspects. Of course sensationalism sells papers better than a cold recounting of issues or a reasoned discourse; this doesn't appeal to the reading public. But a lurid description of violence, and if you can get some pictures, that makes it easier to get readers to buy the paper. I think they do exploit violence unnecessarily for commercial gain."

* *

"Sure [the media focused on the violence] that's all the media wants. They don't want anything that is even semi-intelligent. That doesn't sell newspapers ....most radio and TV shows assume that everyone in the country is an idiot and that the only thing they are interested in is somebody getting whacked on the head, somebody getting murdered, and all the details on how somebody chopped somebody up and so on. They figure this is what sells newspapers."

* *

"There was no discussion of issues. The Canadian public is not too issue oriented except when it comes to hockey games....the issues in this case were genuine but they were overlooked completely."

* *

"The content of the protest tended to get swallowed in the press coverage."

* *

Moreover, in two specific instances individuals insisted that the news media focused intentionally and exclusively on the dramatic and

sensational aspects of an incident, while evidencing little or no concern about why the discontent was expressed. Furthermore, in one of these cases, it was also suggested that the press consciously misrepresented the protest and the elements involved.

* *

> "Any time the Jewish Defense League came out with a statement it was all over the front page. Any time the Canadian Jewish Congress said something it was either not printed, or any time we sent them something it emerged in an obscure part of the paper. And what the J.D.L. said at that time was in every case threatening violence. Even though the J.D.L. represents an infinitesimally small segment of the Jewish population here....The J.D.L. was given total attention. The impression was because some obscure group representing nobody makes a cockeyed threat that Kosygin will not leave Canada alive that Jews were out to kill Kosygin. This fanned the fire....the Jewish protest lost out in the face of violence. The press was only interested in the threats of the J.D.L. and the riots at the Science Centre."

* *

> "There was the drama of two professors injured in the strike. But the press never interviewed me. They never tried to find out what happened....I was very embarrassed that I should have got the publicity that distracted attention from the way the women pickets were being treated because not only were they suffering economically but, as always happens, people on the picket lines were being roughed up at the very least."

* *

Evidently most of those interviewed attributed the media's emphasis of the violent aspects of conflict to the intensity of the competition among the various media. There were several others, however, who attributed more insidious motives to the news media. A number contended that the practice of focusing on the violence is undoubtedly intended to discredit the validity of the issues and the legitimacy of the protest groups.

* *

* *

"Some of the media would concentrate on, or emphasize, violence as a means of discrediting the objective of the student movement in the sixties. If you portray the actions and outlook of a small percentage as being characteristic of the whole movement you may convince people that the whole thing is rotten."

* *

"Nobody in this country has really been accepted except the Anglos. This is where it starts. If you're not an Anglo you're not accepted....any time that any ethno-cultural group or anyone who is not Canadian (and Canadian means Anglo Saxon 100%) raises his head in any issue, whether it be a change in the educational system, electing a member of parliament, or he makes some kind of specific political demands - even though in almost all instances it is for the good of the whole country - it is looked upon as being un-Canadian, and in this country protesting on the whole is looked upon as non-Canadian. But if it's done by a "non-Canadian group" even though you're born here, that's looked upon as un-Canadian, as meddling into some-one else's business, etc. etc."

* *

"When there is this editorial line [re demonstrations due to long-haired American Draft Dodgers] the indi-vidual reporter is on notice that this is the way to get space. This slants stories. A large percentage of reporters are influenced by the editorial tone....The manner in which the press responded to the police action on this and other occasions was not a question of the time available for reflection but a question of not looking with honest eyes at what they saw. This was based on the knowledge of what would be acceptable to editors....that introduces an element of prior slanting on the part of reporters."

* *

Authorities

Seven interviews were conducted with representatives of various police forces in Ontario. These included one senior police officer in Brantford, five senior police officers in Toronto, and a representative of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Ottawa. These interviews focused on such concerns as how the media obtains information about violent events, police guidelines governing the dissemination of

information, and the potential role of the media in stimulating and encouraging violence by its conduct on the scene. An examination was also made with respect to the suggestion of the Vaninni Royal Commission Report, that some types of media equipment may exacerbate and complicate conflict situations.

In probing media coverage of violent demonstrations and strikes, the source of some of the basic information in the press is not always entirely clear. Most of the police officials interviewed maintained that there is an attempt to cooperate with the press and co-ordinate information. Some police forces have media relations officers, but in general any co-operation was contingent on the senior officer at the scene of the event. This individual is usually the sole person empowered to talk to reporters. It may be interesting to note, however, that some of the police officials contended that in the final analysis, the newsman usually makes his own estimates.

* *

"We have a media relations officer, first of all. He is usually kept aware of what is transpiring in a major operation. In addition to this, the commander of the major operation, who is usually a commissioned officer, is authorized to give certain general information to the media."

* *

"If they approach the senior officer who is in charge at the scene, and if it's convenient, that officer usually provides whatever information is necessary or required."

* *

"[They] ask officers in charge with respect to numbers involved but will strictly take their own numbers in the end anyway....The arrest figures - come out of the station wherever arrests are processed."

* *

"There's a limit to what we can give them at the time, we have to do our job - usually the commanding officer on the scene is empowered to release whatever information

> is available. They'll want to know estimates of the crowd, what the problems are - generally we do tell them."

* *

> "We had tried, although not in a concentrated effort, to have information officers. Unfortunately they have the idea then that we're watering it down, and we're not giving them [the truth]. So they want to go in and get their own facts."

* *

Apart from this co-operation there apparently exists no official structure or even a set of guidelines to govern the sharing of information between police and news reporters in Ontario. No indication about the existence of facilities providing direct access to police officials appeared in our interviews. Official police-press contacts are usually limited to pro forma exchanges of information, such as crime occurrence sheets and prepared releases.

* *

> "We make available, to all members of the media, information on crime that occurs daily in the metropolis. We prepare a 24 hour crime occurrence sheet."

* *

> "Yes, as I understand it the press have a - what should I say - some facilities provided for them at Police Headquarters. Most information that comes to hand - where they might be interested - is provided generally through the facilities of the Inspector on duty at Police Headquarters. He, in fact, distributes the various information periodically throughout the day to all the media."

* *

> "There's an open line at headquarters thats under the control of the deputy Police Chief of the CID, who looks after that end of it. Anything at all that comes through is given out to the press."

* *

There appears to be an inherent distrust and animosity regarding the quantity and quality of press releases. The impression is given

that the police, at their discretion, make available to the press only the most basic items of information. Obviously, the press for its part attempts to obtain whatever information it can and then reserves the right to decide which items should be made public knowledge. One police official pointed out that because of this stance the media, as the guardian of the public's right to know, does not have a great deal of credibility in police circles.

* *

> "Their [reporters] apparent feeling is that they have a sacred duty to let the public know what's going on - unfortunately they are not as objective as they might be in this regard."

* *

As noted previously, one of the major controversies of police-press relations centers on whether the presence of media representatives at the scene of a confrontation makes the work of the police more difficult. A number of police officials suggested that newsmen sometimes interfere with policemen doing their duty, and frequently add to the confusion which often pervades the scene of a disturbance.

* *

> "Generally you find most of them are very good in this regard. We had a fairly good working relationship with them. But again we have people who want to become No. 1 - want to be a little more aggressive et cetera."

* *

> "If a reporter gets over-exuberant and becomes part of the crowd, he will be treated as one of them."

* *

> "The police have the problem naturally of where, with all respect to them, quite frequently they [reporters] get in your way rather than be a help to you. When I use that term "get in your way" I mean they will insist on getting into the thick of it; and possibly you've got a problem you're trying to get squared away and they're on your tail. It's not always convenient."

* *

* *

"Suppose there is an arrest being made - the photographers will flood to that area to try and photograph the arrest being made - each with his own interest in mind. Each wants to obtain the best possible photograph for his newspaper or television station - whatever the case may be. So they do interfere, to a certain extent, with police officers."

* *

The presence of cumbersome media equipment was specifically pointed out as a difficulty facing the police. A number of those interviewed expressed the opinion that such equipment on the scene unnecessarily complicates and exacerbates the problems of crowd control. Television cameramen and still photographers were especially cited by policemen in this regard.

* *

"Yes, to a certain degree it is a problem. They have for the most part two men that operate a television camera - one carrying the sound and battery equipment and the other one carrying the actual camera. Just the fact of having two men moving through a crowd or moving through police lines with this type of cumbersome equipment is awkward for us."

* *

"It is as you might expect. When you've got a confrontation going on you're dealing with four, five, six hundred, a thousand, two thousand people and their cables and equipment sometimes can get in the way."

* *

"No, I never had a problem of a hindrance. There have been occasions where the people of the media has been bowled over, knocked down in melees - because they want to get where the action is."

* *

It was also alleged that the presence of the media on the scene adds yet another element to the dynamics of the confrontation. Most of the police officials seemed generally aware of the interrelationship between public protest and the media. Yet many apparently

feel that the presence of the media, albeit unavoidably, serves as a catalyst provoking the protestors to escalate their tactics to hold media interest.

* *

"An inactive crowd notices presence of camera - 'Hey - here comes a camera, let's do something.' I've personally seen that."

* *

"I couldn't give you a percentage, but it's quite apparent that some people will act up when they see the media there and they will act up when they see cameras focused on them. It's not a general thing but it does happen."

* *

"Some of them do [play to the media] some of them don't. This will happen on occasion - more with the younger people. Particularly with the anti-Vietnam war demonstration."

* *

"Oh there's no question about the demonstrators playing to the media, that Kent State deal that you're referring to now - we know definitely - without any shadow of a doubt - that they notified the media. They were going to be there to get as much publicity as they possibly could and then went one step further. As soon as they had the media there - making use of the media to further their own ends - they conducted a show disturbance in order to be picked up by the police and put into a wagon - or put into a police car. They made sure the media was there to get the pictures - the media was all over - "Look that's what the law enforcement agencies are doing to us." Now we know for a fact that happened down there on that instance - we know it definitely."

* *

"That is the whole purpose of a demonstration. Why do you think that people in Canada demonstrated against the Vietnam war? Just for the purpose of walking down in front of the consulate? No, they wanted media coverage - Canada wasn't at war with Vietnam, had nothing to do with Vietnam. Now what purpose would it serve for a person or a number of persons to take placards and walk up and down - if they don't get their message out."

* *

* *

"Demonstrators always made a point to notify the media. We had suspicions that there was collusion beyond that point, very strong suspicions in some instances...."

* *

Not only did most police officials suggest that the media can stimulate violence, but like the participants interviewed, several of them sensed a tendency on the part of the media to exploit this aspect of the protest. Once again the media's focus on violence was attributed to the competitiveness of the profession. Many police officials expressed displeasure at being pawns in this game and felt that they were being manipulated by the media for their own ends.

* *

"The print medium more than anything else - are so dependent on circulation that the purpose of their paper is to attract and sell. My experience with them, and I have had a fair bit of experience, has been that you never can get to the individual who has the responsibility for the item that appeared in the paper. I am talking to you as a reporter - by the time what I have said to you reaches the media or the printed word and is out on the street it is distorted, taken out of context, it is changed so that the headline will attract."

* *

"Spectacular news sells newspapers. Ordinary routine news doesn't. I would assume the more spectacular the article the better - the more forcible it is for the newspaper."

* *

"It appeared that that's [violence] what they were there to cover. They didn't miss anything. They had lots of coverage. Many cameras, photographers there. I thought [in the Yorkville case] they were more interested in what might happen in the way of confrontation."

* *

"They are inclined at times to exaggerate. In other words, you help an old lady across the street - that's

> not news but if you lock somebody up it is. So they dwell on that part of it [violence], and I am inclined to think at times - to glamorize it to the point of exaggerating a situation."

* *

From the perspective of the police, their relationship with the media is at best awkward and difficult. The police resent what they consider to be press interference in the performance of their duties. They also seem concerned about the media's tendency to exploit a confrontation for their own advantage, rather than give the public a reasoned and objective account. Above all, however, a great deal of resentment appears to be based on the fact that the public's perception of the police can be determined by a source which is not necessarily free of bias.

* *

> "The media should respect the police and let them do their job, before the reporter does his. Reporters should not get in the way."

* *

> "I am not adverse to an investigating or inquiring press but I am adverse to one that will manipulate for its own designs and will not give the facts or give you the opportunity. We have no opportunity to tell the true story because we have to use their vehicle."

* *

> "You are [a policeman] not writing the scenario. You had nothing to do with the script, yet you have to direct it. Try it some time. It's a fine line between a hero and a bum in these situations. If things go right you come out as a hero, but let one thing go wrong - that's the price of glory isn't it?"

* *

The Media

Ten interviews were conducted with representatives of the media. These included six newspaper reporters, one television reporter, two

newspaper photographers and a film director with the National Film Board. These interviews focused on such diverse concerns as newsmen's perceptions of consumer preferences for violence, and the guidelines and problems relating to the conduct of media personnel at the scene of a disturbance. Particular attention was devoted to exploring the journalist's view of press-police relations and the "violence versus issue" controversy.

One of the fundamental controversies underlying the question of violence in the media relates to the quandary over whether the consumer is presented with violence because he has an appetite for it, or whether the individual consumer has little interest in news alternatives and accepts what he is offered. If the newsmen interviewed here are representative of the journalistic profession as a whole, it would appear that the reader is given violence because that's what journalists think he desires and demands.

* *

> "I suppose to a certain type of reader stories of violence do have a certain excitement for them, perhaps not so much for the responsible reader. But keep in mind that the average newspaper reader, if there is such a thing, and always keeping in mind that this is very general, the average newspaper reader in the country has a grade 8 education. That's why newspaper language is always written simply - it's written so that a person with a grade 8 education can understand it."

* *

> "I think the reader gets a better kick out of it. I don't know why. I am not saying that you should gear your story to satisfy a reader. You do your story hopefully with a view that is going to be relatively accurate, but I think the reader gets a better kick out of that kind of thing."

* *

> "I would like to see less of it, but that's what people want."

* *

* *

> "It's hard to come up with a general answer for that, but if there were a general black and white answer I am afraid it would have to be yes...there does seem to be a strong appetite in a minority of the public I would guess."

* *

In a different vein we have already noted that there is also a great deal of controversy related to the perceived tendency of the media to stimulate or exacerbate conflict situations. Covering a riot, or any type of civil disturbance, is at best a hazardous endeavour. Nevertheless, despite these considerations few media agencies were found to have guidelines for reporters and photographers covering such incidents. Of the five news agencies contacted (the Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, the Ottawa Citizen, Canadian Press and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) only the C.B.C. was found to have guidelines for personnel involved in reporting such incidents. The C.B.C. guidelines, however, were both very general and very informal, suggesting only that

> "the intrusion of cameras into a scene of riot or civil disorder raises complex problems, and places heavy responsibility on the broadcaster. There is every evidence that, in some situations the presence of television cameras has had a moderating effect on violent incidents. In other cases it is clear that the presence of cameras has been a provocation to violence. Where plans are being made for coverage of events where civil violence may be expected, every precaution should be taken that the presence of C.B.C. reporters and cameras is not used as a 'provocation'."[9]

Generally, however, the opinion obtained from most of the reporters interviewed was that their conduct at the scene of a disturbance is a matter of news judgement and common sense, and as such has to be left to the discretion of the individual newsman.

* *

"Virtually none, he [a reporter] is his own man. To use the vernacular, he calls it as he sees it. He is the man on the spot and he is responsible to himself. That's chiefly it....A reporter is sent on a job and he does the job with a minimum of instruction. He gets no guidelines from his editor at all."

* *

"From my own experience I don't think there are any general ones established by the media. Editors don't hand out little forms that say should this occur you do this. If you get into a situation where there's a possibility of violence you've got two things to think of. Firstly, your own skin, and secondly trying to observe whats going on in an objective way. It's pretty difficult. If you're saying is there a criteria that can be applied I would say no. No two situations are similar."

* *

"There are no formal guidelines at the Globe and Mail. It's up to you how far into the crowd you want to get."

* *

Concerning the question of the availability of information at the scene of a disturbance, several of the reporters indicated that the police were usually helpful with respect to crowd estimates and other such basic information. However, they indicated that in most cases such co-operation is contingent upon the pressure police are under and the restrictions imposed by the Police Act.[10]

* *

"It's very difficult to estimate the number in a crowd, so what we do is talk to the most senior police officer on the scene and ask him for his estimate of the crowd and whatever he says we would attribute this estimate to him....Police information is reasonably accurate keeping in mind that police want to show themselves in the best light."

* *

"In an instance of a demonstration like that the information that one is looking for is - How many men have they got there, arrests if any, casualties if any? It is generally kind of formal stuff that one would get

from them in the general course of events anyway. But if you're thinking of more in terms of background stuff, like the police saying that we knew these people were full of Marxists, and it was going to be a bloody encounter to begin with so that we pulled in the riot squad way ahead - that's not the kind of stuff that you would get normally and you would have to generally depend on someone who had pretty good contacts with the police - someone who worked the police beat."

* *

"I always do my own counts, and then I'll look around for a senior police officer, and say what do you think the crowd is. This, of course, becomes part of a time wasting question as far as they're concerned. If you're into a violent situation they're up to their ears with their own work....A lot of the difference in police information goes up and down with the individual officers involved....Of course the Police Act bars policemen from communicating with the press or public without permission of their superior officers."

* *

A number of newsmen, particularly news photographers, did not seem to consider the police to be either helpful or cooperative. Two of the reporters interviewed offered some serious and detailed criticisms from the media perspective about police-press relations.

* *

"They wouldn't give you the time of day."

* *

"One of the major difficulties is the official obstruction of the press such as authorities not allowing photographers admittance to a public place, or saying you can't stand there...I don't know of any case where a photographer needs protection from a crowd."

* *

"The relations between the Press and the Metro police force are very limited, and in some cases it takes up to 24 hours before you even get information about something, and on the spot there's absolutely no information at all. Only certain senior officers are allowed to talk to you and that's from the rank of inspector and up...They withhold the majority of information. That particular night [the Kosygin demonstration] I think the biggest rub against the police was that no one would say exactly what they

did, how many did it, and the basis of it....The police in Toronto have specific orders that they are not to talk to the press. They have been told that they can be charged under the Police Act. The only people that can talk to the press are the inspectors of each division during the day and then at night only the duty desk inspector...if he's available. On the scene many police will talk to you because you don't quote them per se as an individual. They'll help you out but they're awfully careful. The Chief had a senior officers' meeting, up to a year ago when I was closely associated with the police, every month and he would read items from different newspapers and say how did they get this and how did they get that, and this shouldn't have been given out....the result now is that even good stories about the police aren't coming out."

* *

"Very often police have to be the source of official information. There's no alternative there and you have to take their word...Anytime the police have to use force in a situation then they're not co-operative, especially if you're carrying a camera, they're most unco-operative. They don't want pictures anywhere giving the impression, valid or otherwise, that they may be abusing the general public...when it comes to police and press relations you're never going to change a great deal as long as you have police departments structured the way they are in this country. You take the current Metro police force and their police-press relations - I would say if anything they are minus 2000 and you'll never improve them....The Maloney Report and the Morand Report supposedly dealt with problems concerning the police and what they in effect did was touch two pimples on a body that's covered with pimples. You have people running police departments today whose whole attitude is - secrecy must prevail. And you build up antagonisms with the media as a result of that, and you get the situation where the only kind of press coming out about the police is adverse. Very often it's just a case of damn sheer stupidity on the part of the police administration that they get that kind of publicity and only that kind of publicity....Improve police-press relations? Police are always willing to cooperate with a reporter who allows himself to be co-opted. If he's willing to be co-opted then they'll always co-operate. We have examples of it in this city, and this province. And when I say co-opted I mean that the reporter allows a cop to fix a ticket for him, so the cop is a good guy. Because just as cops work on theory that you get something on the guy you work with and that protects you, they also work on that theory in dealing with the media. And what they've run into in the past five years or so is that they're not getting the kind of guys who are necessarily willing to be co-opted and so you're creating all kinds of walls."

* *

Most of the newsmen interviewed seemed well aware of the character of their relationship with the protestors, as well as the general relation between protest and the media. Almost all of them acknowledged that demonstrators frequently attempt to manipulate and play to the media, and that some of the behaviour of demonstrators is attributable to media presence.

* *

"I've paraded with those people on several occasions up there, walking along, talking with them with their picket signs. They were completely orderly and completely responsible until somebody came along with a TV camera and then somebody handed them matches, they lit torches, they got into the whole bag. It's all part of pseudo events and they are created a lot - on some occasions completely created by the media who want good pictures for their cameras."

* *

"Oh sure they would play to the gallery, very much so, and particularly if there was an empathy, or a sympathy and a rapport between the demonstrators and a specific newsman...I certainly know - but I can't document them - I know of situations where reporters were friendly with people who always seemed to be involved in these demonstrations. Reporters who, for example, would know ahead of time when there was going to be a huge gathering and they would be preconditioned to report this particular happening when it did occur."

* *

"I would guess that a majority of demonstrations as such wouldn't happen if the media didn't cover them. A demonstration is designed not just to get the attention of the people on the street, it's to get publicity for some cause. And if the press weren't there I would say a majority of demonstrations likely wouldn't happen."

* *

"It happens all the time....a lot of these things shouldn't be covered at all - they should be ignored! For example, if the press had ignored the Nazi demonstration it would have subsided much more easily."

* *

* *

"Demonstrations have become an art. People stage them for press coverage. Professional demonstrators are always trying to get photos into the paper. For example, a man is being led away by the police, he bends his arm back throws back his head, rolls his eyes with a look of anguish even though the policeman may be laughing. This happens with perpetual demonstrators - they try to put the media presence to good use."

* *

"Oh yes, sure, the Maoists and you name any other groups. Generally they always make sure that they phone the press. Very few incidents would happen spontaneously without the press being there."

* *

"I suppose it's possible that it does have some effect. Look at the number of photographers who get bashed around for taking photographs of people at demonstrations. From that point of view demonstrators aren't all that keen at having their photographs taken....Large gatherings of people for various reasons create their own individual character. A crowd becomes an individual character with its own identity and its own reality. I suspect that there are a large number of things that go into the creating of a riot....and the presence of the media might well be one of those, but I wouldn't have thought that it was a major one. I would have thought the issues, the frustration, the size, the make up of the crowd, the behaviour of the police, those would have been perhaps larger influences."

* *

It was further suggested however that the media is not always an involuntary party in such manipulation. One of the newsmen interviewed has alleged that with respect to the controversy surrounding the Yorkville incident the press did not necessarily play the role of impartial observer.

* *

"This is not the sort of thing that I would stand in the witness box and lay my hand on the Bible or my heart but it was the feeling at the time that a certain C.B.C. crew (or crews) arranged [they really set it up] a situation which they knew damned fine the police couldn't walk away

from - like kids lying across the street for example, in order to get good footage on this....The National Film Board didn't do themselves a lot of good at that time either. The particular situation I just can't remember what it was....I think that there was not too much doubt that there was a certain amount of orchestration there."

* *

While most of the reporters recognized the intention of the demonstrators to exploit the presence of the media, there seemed to be considerable disagreement over the extent to which the media should allow itself to be used in this respect. Several of the newsmen interviewed conceived of demonstrations as an important outlet which should not be denied media coverage. Others, however, appeared to be much more cautious about how much assistance the media should give demonstrators and minority groups in articulating their grievances.

* *

"What are the odds that if you cut off the reporting on so-called violence events as we have them here that you aren't in effect going to deny the outlets that these people need for their frustrations and what the hell do you create then. You may create the very thing that does lead to real violence....the media should be an outlet for them. The media should be an outlet for most people in society. It's not....a lot of the helpless, those who are looking for solution to their particular problems don't have a power base to manipulate the media.... and so it's not accessible to them. Look at the cons... they've gotten sophisticated to the point where they can now say we're getting coverage - but what did they have to do to get coverage. They had to go and carry violence to an extreme....But you've got to give every group accessibility. If you don't, they get it anyway by creating these pseudo-demonstrations, these pseudo-violent events."

* *

"If we stop covering the demonstrations do they stop demonstrating or they accelerate to the point that they make a big enough bang that you can't ignore it?"

* *

"I'm not sure that a newspaper or a radio station or a television station are duty bound to give large amounts of space or time to any group that comes along simply

> because they say they've got a griveance. The newspapers and the radio and television stations, of course, are partly there for the people they talk about. But their job is far more to provide a service to their customers. These judgements are always difficult to make. When does a disadvantaged group become a legitimate news story? Is it only when it engages in some sort of violence or anti-social activity? I'm not sure that's true."

* *

> "The minorities of today wouldn't be anywhere unless the media gave them coverage. And I think that has maybe caused some problems today. The majority won't speak up and the minorities speak up and the news media react to it. We give them the coverage. A minority of people is being heard, the majority isn't."

* *

As mentioned in other sections, the "form/content" controversy goes to the very heart of what news is and what the role of the press should be in a democratic society. Unfortunately, there was little agreement among the various media representatives interviewed as to what constitutes news and how much space should be given to a discussion of the issues. There were those who considered violence to be news and the issues to be irrelevant. Others insisted that newspapers should not allow themselves to become propaganda sheets by devoting too much attention to the issues underlying violent conflict. Furthermore, while some reporters felt that violence may be played up at the expense of issues, others suggested that while the coverage does frequently focus on the violence this is perfectly justifiable.

* *

> "Violence is news. - N.E.W.S. Do I have to spell it for you!"

* *

> "A disturbance in society is obviously a matter of importance because we place a great deal of value on an orderly non-violent society. And, so when these things happen they develop an importance of their own which doesn't have much to do with the validity of the cause being espoused."

* *

* *

"If you get into that [issues] and start interviewing every character who has got an axe to grind you could spend weeks writing articles. There is no question about it. But the point is - what are you really doing? You're just giving outlets to new forms of propaganda."

* *

"Yes there was far too much focus on the violence. You couldn't count them. There weren't that many incidents of violence and the violence was not all that violent in Yorkville. There were beatings. I can't think of one fatality....I don't think there was much discussion of issues, the issues were very clouded at the time. The older reporters perhaps didn't get under the surface. The younger ones - yes, perhaps the younger ones did get under the surface and said all right there is a demonstration on the street this is only a symptom. It's a symptom of something else that is much more deeply rooted than appears on the surface. I think they were trying to get under it, but in general no, the issues were not clear."

* *

"The issues I think were well known. Basically they were not new issues. In our story there was a big description of the anti-Communist feeling and a small number of interviews that were in the story. I think the emotion that these people felt did come through to an extent. As far as the issue as such I think it was sort of a basic assumption that people at the time knew that a large number of Eastern European immigrants to Canada were strongly anti-Communist. So there probably wasn't a basic need to go into the whole situation."

* *

Intimately related to this question, is the role that follow-up coverage might have in providing a reasoned and more informed analysis of a civil disturbance. As noted in Chapter III, 40% of all incidents receive some follow-up coverage - with an average of one article. While it seems that follow-up coverage and backgrounders could be quite helpful in allowing the reader to put an event in perspective, most of the media representatives interviewed felt there was little news interest in such endeavours.

* *

"No there isn't follow-up. It's not adequate because there's no news interest in it."

* *

"It's a policy to follow-up, but following-up is frequently one of those things most difficult to do in the trade. This paper [the Globe and Mail] does it more than most, but you are always caught up with today's news and following up yesterday's news sometimes takes a back seat."

* *

"I believe the Globe does this. The more sensational style newspapers haven't got the room to do it, haven't got the staff to do it, and haven't got the space to do it in the paper."

* *

Conclusion

While we have been unable to determine any direct causal relationship between the media and violence, some of the evidence and testimony presented in this chapter would seem to argue that there is definitely reason for concern. A comparison of news reports of violence in three different newspapers indicated that there is both a wide variation in the coverage of such events, and a general tendency to isolate the violence from its context. Most participants viewed public manifestations of discontent as a means of publicizing their grievances with the assistance of the media. The media's penchant, however, for focusing on the violent aspects, at the expense of a consideration of the issues, frequently diminishes the value and credibility of a protest and may even stimulate a cycle of escalation. Furthermore, there seem to be some obvious and fundamental problems in police-press relations, especially with respect to the presence of the media on the scene of a violent confrontation. Understandably, there is a delicate problem

involved. Both the media and police have their own set of priorities, and they are frequently at odds with each other. Undeniably the primary function of the police is to maintain public order, while not infringing on the rights of the protestors to present their grievances. The media, on the other hand, also have a responsibility to the public to keep it informed of major occurrences in society. At the same time these responsibilities are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Beyond certain obvious limitations, neither side has the right to interfere with the other's attempt to carry out its responsibilities. It is obvious, however, from the testimony presented here, that such is not the case. Police-press relations are evidently in need of considerable improvement. While it is not a primary function of the police to act as a source of news, they should recognize their value in this regard by making provisions for the dissemination of accurate and up-to-date information. This need not interfere with the police department's role at the scene of a disturbance. The media, for its part, should recognize the potential volatility of its position at the scene of a confrontation, and should conduct itself in such a manner as to avoid stimulating or aggravating a disturbance. This applies particularly to newspaper photographers and television cameramen who insist in being at the vortex of a demonstration. The inability of the police and media to reach some sort of compromise only serves to unnecessarily complicate the scenario.

Footnotes to Chapter IV

[1]An effort was made to contact a major figure in each category for each of the seven incidents. As many of these events had taken place at least five years ago, an extensive telephone search was required.

[2]The three questionnaires are included in the Appendix. It should be noted, however, that in the course of the various interviews a number of supplementary or follow-up questions were also posed. All interviews conducted in person were tape recorded and form part of the general body of research. The limited number of interviews that were conducted by telephone were transcribed rather than tape recorded.

[3]These narratives have been prepared using the coverage of each incident as provided by the Globe and Mail, the Ottawa Citizen, and the Toronto Star.

[4]Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957).

[5]The following tables indicate the total average paid circulation in Ontario over the last decade, of the three newspapers utilized in this analysis.

THE TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL

Total Average Paid Circulation, Province of Ontario
for 12 months ending:

	Morning, Mon. to Fri.
September 30, 1975	242,209
September 30, 1974	255,792
September 30, 1973	256,361
September 30, 1972	259,090
September 30, 1971	254,403
September 30, 1970	256,862
September 30, 1969	254,300
September 30, 1968	247,598
September 30, 1967	237,413
September 30, 1966	225,636

Source: Audit Bureau of Circulations, Audit Reports.

THE OTTAWA CITIZEN

Total Average Paid Circulation, Province of Ontario
for 12 months ending:

	Evening, Mon. to Fri.
March 31, 1975	81,095
March 31, 1974	83,619
March 31, 1973	81,333
March 31, 1972	78,958
March 31, 1971	74,927
March 31, 1970	74,631
March 31, 1969	74,779
March 31, 1968	70,264
March 31, 1967	70,335
March 31, 1966	68,470

Source: Audit Bureau of Circulations, Audit Reports.

THE TORONTO STAR

Total Average Paid Circulation, Province of Ontario
for 12 months ending:

	Evening, Mon. to Fri.
September 30, 1975	482,916
September 30, 1974	501,323
September 30, 1973	508,048
September 30, 1972 (11 months)	505,482
September 30, 1971	376,932
September 30, 1970	374,729
September 30, 1969	367,267
September 30, 1968	360,931
September 30, 1967	351,159
September 30, 1966	346,240

Source: Audit Bureau of Circulations, Audit Reports.

[6]It should be noted that the date next to each heading is that of the first reporting day rather than the date of the actual incident.

[7]A number of analysts have suggested the existence of an almost mathematical relationship between distance and news coverage.

[8]Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry in Relation to the Conduct of the Public and the Metropolitan Toronto Police, June 5, 1972, pp. 66-67.

[9]Communication from Cliff Lonsdale, Chief News Editor, Television, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, November 8, 1976.

[10]Guidelines with respect to the release of information to the news media can be found in by-law no. 22, Regulations Regarding the Government of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force, Section 453.

Chapter V

Basic Conclusions and Recommendations

This study has sought to explore the relationships between the media, collective conflict and violence. In the course of the inquiry we have brought to bear a number of the principal investigative techniques of modern social science. Employing a pyramidal research strategy, we began with a general international perspective and culminated with a consideration of the details of seven case studies from the Province of Ontario. At each stage of the pyramid we have presented a number of empirical findings and conclusions. In this final chapter we summarize some of the more essential conclusions and develop from them a number of policy recommendations.

The research findings reported in the first four chapters have confirmed that:

1. The literature on the behavioural effects of the media is worrying, but not conclusive about the effects of the media on violence.

2. Examination of the cross-national data on 18 states similar to Canada indicates no consistent relationship between media exposure and levels of collective conflict and violence.

3. While possessing one of the highest levels of media exposure, Canada has one of the lowest levels of collective conflict in the world. When compared with a sample of developed democracies, however, Canada ranks around the median level of collective conflict and violence for such countries.

4. In general the violence in Canada has been episodic and only a few violence-prone groups have existed over a long period of time.

5. Collective violence in Quebec has been considerably more related to politics than has been the case in Ontario.

6. There were 129 incidents of collective violence involving a minimum of 50 people in the Province of Ontario between 1965 and 1975. There were also nine incidents of individual political violence, mostly bombings of government buildings and foreign embassies.

7. During that period the press was saturated with this violence.

8. Articles related to political violence formed about 8% of the front page volume of the Globe and Mail between 1965 and 1975. When the volume of the violence-related categories of war and defence news and crime news are added, the total volume is approximately 20%.

9. There was no discernible relationship between the magnitude of these incidents and the type of coverage they were accorded in the media.

10. The press in Ontario gave proportionately greater space to social, often insignificant, demonstrations than to economic, and drawn out strife.

11. In terms of both numbers of participants and total volume of initial coverage, incidents over foreign political issues were far more prominent in Ontario than were incidents motivated by economic or domestic political issues.

12. The strong American media penetration of Ontario may be said to have been significant in providing justification for collective conflict and violence in the province.

13. There is a tendency in the media to focus overwhelmingly on violence, while obscuring the issues of confrontation.

14. There are indications that media presence at the scene of a disturbance has on occasion stimulated or exacerbated the confrontation.

15. It is evident that the media on occasion becomes involved in the creation of news, either by consciously allowing themselves to be manipulated by "dramatic" protestors or by directly orchestrating an event.

16. The nature of police-press relations was found to be in considerable need of improvement as there proved to be indications of mutual suspicion and hostility which made cooperation between these two parties difficult.

Recommendations

I Overall

Our over-arching conclusion is that although there is reason to keep a "watching brief" with regard to the effects of the media on collective conflict and violence, there is absolutely no evidence, and there are plenty of contrary reasons, for any form of censorship of media from the materials examined. The roles of the dissatisfied to obtain publicity for their activities, the press to provide adequate coverage, and the police to protect public safety are all aspirations of which Canadians can be proud. However, within the dimensions drawn by these goals there are genuine difficulties on occasion in enabling the public to receive the benefits of all three goals.

II General

1. Ambiguity in research findings is no cause for complacency. An Ontario conference of media and police personnel should be called yearly to discuss the relations between these two bodies.

2. On a voluntary basis this conference should discuss guidelines for activities during and after civil disturbances. In the United States guidelines already exist at the major television networks and

with at least two newspapers (Washington Post and San Diego Evening Tribune.) We have found no equivalent guidelines at three of Ontario's major daily newspapers or at this country's major news service. Only the C.B.C. was discovered to have any guidelines, however informal, for personnel covering such events. Some journalists, of course, believe that no guidelines will be helpful. M. S. Hayden, editor of the Detroit News, maintains the trouble with formal guidelines is "that they are inevitably based on yesterday's riots."[1] This opinion was echoed by a number of the journalists whose views were reported in the testimony section of Chapter IV. But consideration of such problems could at least rationalize internalized norms about proper behaviour in the collection of news in the course of civil disorders.

3. Canadian social scientists should be encouraged to carry out more research on communications in Canada. Research findings in this field are slim, and the attention given to scientific methodology and rigor is even slimmer. At least some of the research costs should be borne by the media themselves. The American view that: "It is recommended that the burden of research and proof be placed squarely on the mass media, especially commercial television, to carry out meaningful research on the psychological and social effects of mass media portrayals of violence"[2] seems excessive. However, commercial enterprises and state run corporations should take an interest in research in this field by contributing to funds established by the Ontario Government.

III During Collective Conflict and Violence

1. There is no reason to censure or ban the media, but there are obvious difficulties which could be corrected.

2. The media should be aware of the legal restrictions on demonstrators, rioters and the police. In this regard an information package produced by law officers for the media throughout the province should be produced. It should explain such notions as martial law, rules for dispersal of crowds, permits required, etc. A similar package has already been developed by the Brantford Police Department for use in that community.

3. Media presence at the scene of a riot or political disturbance should not provoke more violence. The chances of this happening could be diminished by:

- Avoiding the blinding of policemen with camera lights, flashguns, or getting equipment in the way of security precautions. In this regard the type of equipment can matter; for example, hand-held silent cameras rather than mobile TV units can be used.[3]

- Avoiding the dissemination of rumours about collective conflict events.

- Avoiding coverage which draws people to the scene of the disturbance at the very time the police are attempting to disperse crowds.

- Avoiding coverage that informs the criminal element of society about the tactical deployment of the police.

- Providing journalists with easily recognizable credentials and marked cars.

- Establishing press pools to cover major demonstrations and visits by foreign dignitaries as a means of reducing the number of unnecessary personnel on the scene.

- Preventing journalists from staging events. There is evidence of such activities by newsmen at the Chicago Convention[4] and some contention that this was done by paid employees of the National Film Board at the Yorkville riots in Ontario.

IV Police and Media

1. Many of the logistical and practical difficulties outlined in Chapter IV could be avoided by better media and police co-operation. Of course, if the media or demonstrators engage in unlawful activities they should be arrested, but the essence of the police-media relationship should be one of mutual co-operation. For example:

- There should be discussions between the police and the press about basic plans and intentions before conflicts begin.

- There could be joint planning sessions each year for regular re-appraisal of methods and future difficulties.

- Under no circumstances should the police confiscate newsmen's materials, notebooks, tapes or films. In some cases films have actually helped policemen justify their behaviour.[5] No one wants his unlawful behaviour filmed, but he may want his "near to" unlawful behaviour filmed.

- Impersonation of newsmen in crises should be prevented by requiring media officials to wear easily recognizable identification tags.

- When violence erupts the police should have automatic communications with the mass media. Rumour centres, consisting of a battery of telephones with staff equipped with the latest information, should be set up at times of major social upheaval. The police should want accurate information given out by the media, especially since it will be conveyed by peer groups anyway.[6]

V Delay of Information

One of the most controversial themes about the relation of the media to collective conflict is its impact on creating new violence through dissemination of correct and timely information. While many

agree that there should be no censorship, there is a dispute about when information should be given to the public. The question is double-edged. If information about the precise location of a demonstration is given out then looters and other would-be demonstrators will be drawn to the scene. If not - then some unfortunate individuals may happen into the area because they have not been properly informed. The Report of the Study Team on Miami Civil Disturbances told the following story:

> "[During the early minutes of the riot in Miami], as at all times before and after, the activities of the news media were unrestricted in the area of the disturbance. They used their own discretion in determining where to go and what to do. The fact that the disturbances were taking place was aired promptly on two radio stations serving primarily a black community. One newscaster made a telephone call to one of the stations from the scene, and his report came "live" on the air in the midst of a popular rock-n-roll show. This medium, perhaps more than any other was responsible for quickly spreading the word and attracting more people to the scene with concomitant problems."[7]

In such situations:

- The media could advise the public about the general location of the events, but possibly not provide the precise details for some time.

- How much time? According to the Eisenhower Report "most of the newsmen with whom we discussed the problem suggest a delay of at least 30 minutes to confirm the story, make certain the facts are clear, and avoid exaggeration."[8] We suggest that the police-media conference discuss this proposal and work out a satisfactory arrangement.

- The media should provide information to the public about how to avoid the area of the problem by suggesting alternative routes.

VI The Media

In carrying out their duty to accurately report the news, the press should take some responsibility for not increasing violence.

1. The news should provide perspective, but not be overly emotional. This means that the press should concentrate on the issues in the confrontation as well as merely describing the volatile or violent incidents.

2. Reportage of violence should not be assumed to be harmful. It can be beneficial. The problem is to provide a balanced coverage. Nevertheless journalists should refrain from overstating the degree of conflict.

3. The media has a responsibility not only to indicate the truth about events, but also to be comprehensive in their reports. That is, the message sent can be accurate in itself but lack or omit important details. While the basic requirements for good reporting should normally suffice, it may be necessary to set guidelines for rapidly escalating violence.

4. Balanced assessments require more than mere reporting of an event. Both the film and print media have difficulties defining a complete story. The most obvious difficulty is in television. As Walter Scott, NBC board chairman has said: "Because television is a visual medium, it may scan the background and significance of events to focus on the outward appearance - the comings and goings of statesmen instead of the issue that confronts them."[9] The same charge may be made about the press. It should provide more background on social issues rather than merely skimming the surface.[10] Lange, Baker and Ball listed the requirements of balanced coverage as:

> a) What was the purpose of the demonstration? What is the nature of the grievance? Why are the demonstrators there?

b) The events leading up to the demonstration. Have other remedies been sought such as administrative relief or negotiations either on the grievances or the right to demonstrate? If so, what has been the response of the objects (city officials) of the demonstration?

c) The demonstration. How many people were present? How did they control themselves? Do not focus only on the most extreme conduct or dress.

d) What provocations, if any, were directed toward the police? Did the police use more force than was necessary to maintain order? Were there any extenuating circumstance, such as physical exhaustion or security needs?[11]

5. Inflammatory language about groups - racial, religious, etc. should be avoided.

6. The most experienced journalists should be used to cover disturbances.

Footnotes to Chapter V

[1]Daniel Walker, Rights in Conflict: Chicago's 7 Brutal Days, A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Bantam, 1968), p. 193.

[2]D. L. Lange, R. K. Baker, and S. J. Ball, Mass Media and Violence, A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. 9 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 381.

[3]All of these methods were harmful in the case of the 1965 Watts riot, see Lange, Baker and Ball, ibid., p. 104.

[4]The American evidence is contradictory. Walker, op. cit., maintains there was staged news while Lange, Baker and Ball, op. cit., p. 159, dismisses the charge.

[5]Lange, Baker and Ball, op. cit., Chapter 6.

[6]"News of the 1943 Detroit race riot was censored because of war. Yet, Negroes in rural Mississippi, 700 miles away, received news of the event one day later from Pullman car porters on the Illinois Central Railway," cited in Lange, Baker and Ball, ibid., p. 115, from Ben H. Bagdikan, "Editorial Responsibility in Times of Urban Disorder," The Media and the Cities, ed. by Charles U. Daly (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 17.

[7]Louis J. Hector and Paul L. E. Helliwell, et al. Miami Report: The Report of the Miami Study Team on Civil Disturbances in Miami, Florida during the week of August 5, 1968. A Report Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 11.

[8]Lange, Baker and Ball, op. cit., p. 114.

[9]Reported in Lange, Baker and Ball, op. cit., p. 96.

[10]This charge against the press in Canada has also been made by Phyllis Wilson, "The Nature of News," Journalism, Communication and the Law, ed. by G. Stuart Adam (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 23-34.

[11]Lange, Baker and Ball, op. cit., p. 95.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF REPORTED COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE EVENTS. GLOBE AND MAIL; JANUARY 1, 1965 TO DECEMBER 31, 1975.

	Date	Locale	Description
1	March 7, 1965	Toronto	University of Toronto Fraternity vs. Police
2	March 10, 1965	Toronto	University of Toronto students' Civil Rights Demonstration.
3	March 12, 1965	Toronto	Civil Rights Demonstration.
4	March 16, 1965	Toronto	Civil Rights Demonstration.
5	May 16, 1965	Toronto	Anti-Semitic Rally.
6*	May 30, 1965	Toronto	Nazi Demonstration.
7	Sept. 19, 1965	Toronto	New City Hall Riot.
8	Oct. 9, 1965	Kitchener	Teamsters Strike.
9	Feb. 10, 1966	Toronto/ Brantford	Teamsters Strike.
10	Feb. 21, 1966	Brantford	Teamsters Strike.
11	Feb. 22, 1966	Peterborough	Textile Workers Strike.
12	Feb. 28, 1966	Toronto	Subway Vandalism.
13	Feb. 28, 1966	Toronto	Teamsters Strike.
14	March 18, 1966	Sudbury	School Maintenance Strike.
15	March 26, 1966	Ottawa	Anti-Vietnam War Demonstration.
16	May 22, 1966	Wasaga Beach	Motorcycle Gang Violence.
17	May 29, 1966	Toronto	Juvenile Violence.
18	July 15, 1966	Sudbury	INCO Strike.
19	August 6, 1966	Hamilton	Stelco Strike.
20	Sept. 4, 1966	Grand Bend	Juvenile Violence.
21	May 24, 1967	Ottawa	Farmer's Demonstration.
22	June 18, 1967	Toronto	Soccer Riot.
23*	August 20, 1967	Yorkville Toronto	Yorkville Hippie Riots.
24	August 23, 1967	London	Steelworkers Strike.
25	Nov. 7, 1967	Ottawa	Anti-Bolshevik Demonstration.
26	Nov. 20, 1967	Toronto	Anti-Dow Chemical Demonstration.
27	Dec. 13, 1967	Toronto	Anti-Dow Chemical Demonstration.
28	Jan. 18, 1968	Toronto	Anti-Vietnam War Demonstration.

APPENDIX A (cont'd)

	Date	Locale	Description
29	April 14, 1968	Campbellford	Atwater Arrest Riot.
30	April 27, 1968	Toronto	Anti-Vietnam War Demonstration.
31	June 13, 1968	Toronto	Goodyear Strike.
32	July 2, 1968	London	Street Festival Riot.
33	July 10, 1968	Toronto	Dr. Spock Demonstration.
34	July 12, 1968	Toronto	Johnson Arrest Incident.
35	July 28, 1968	Ridgeway	Beach Dispute.
36	August 6, 1968	Wallaceburg	Plastic Strike.
37	Oct. 28, 1968	Toronto	Anti-Vietnam War Demonstration.
38	Nov. 5, 1968	Peterborough	Newspaper Workers Strike.
39	Nov. 29, 1968	Peterborough	Newspaper Workers Strike.
40	Dec. 5, 1968	Peterborough	Newspaper Workers Strike.
41	July 12, 1969	Crystal Beach	Juvenile Violence.
42	July 18, 1969	Toronto	Black vs. Portuguese Riot.
43	July 20, 1969	Niagara Falls	Motorcycle Gang.
44	July 20, 1969	Port Colborne	Private Beach Dispute.
45	August 22, 1969	Ottawa	Anti-Soviet Demonstration.
46	Oct. 12, 1969	Toronto	Repression in Quebec Rally.
47	Oct. 28, 1969	Seaforth	Motorcycle Gang.
48	Nov. 15, 1969	Toronto	Anti-Vietnam War Demonstration.
49	Feb. 28, 1979	Ottawa	Anti-Vietnam War Demonstration.
50	April 2, 1970	Toronto	Dunlop Tire Rally.
51	April 4, 1970	Toronto	Anti-Lenin Rally.
52	April 18, 1970	Ottawa	Anti-Vietnam War Demonstration.
53*	May 5, 1970	Toronto	Kent State Demonstration.
54*	May 9, 1970	Toronto	Kent State Demonstration.
55	June 9, 1970	Chatham	Motor Wheel Industries.
56	June 19, 1970	Toronto	Potters Strike.
57	June 22, 1970	Toronto	Edmund Burke Society vs. William Kunsler.
58	June 27, 1970	Toronto	Rock Concert.
59	July 10, 1970	Toronto	Ontario Hydro Sit-In.
60	August 15, 1970	Toronto	RCMP Drug Raid.
61	Sept. 11, 1970	Toronto	RCMP Drug Raid.

APPENDIX A (cont'd)

	Date	Locale	Description
62	Sept. 20, 1970	Toronto	Pro P.L.O. Rally.
63	Oct. 31, 1970	Toronto	Anti-Vietnam War Protest.
64	March 3, 1971	Toronto	Anti-Trudeau Rally.
65	March 28, 1971	Toronto	Edmund Burke Society.
66	May 5, 1971	Kitchener	Raymond's Snack Food.
67	May 27, 1971	Toronto	Drug Raid.
68	June 25, 1971	Hamilton	Dominion Glass.
69	July 11, 1971	Toronto	Edmund Burke Society in Chinatown.
70	July 12, 1971	St. Catherines	Kimberly Clark Strike.
71	July 18, 1971	Toronto	University of Toronto Tent Community.
72	July 18, 1971	Toronto	Pro-Pakistan Rally.
73	July 29, 1971	St. Catherines	Kimberly Clark Strike.
74	August 11, 1971	Ottawa	Garbage Workers Strike.
75*	August 25, 1971	Brantford	Canadian Textile Workers (Texpack).
76	Sept. 7, 1971	Brantford	Canadian Textile Workers.
77	Sept. 9, 1971	Brantford	Canadian Textile Workers.
78	Sept. 14, 1971	Brantford	Canadian Textile Workers.
79	Oct. 15, 1971	Rexdale	Canadian Textile Workers.
80	Oct. 16, 1971	Toronto	Anniversary of War Measures Act.
81*	Oct. 25, 1971	Toronto	Anti-Kosygin Demonstration.
82	Nov. 3, 1971	Toronto	Anti-Amchitka Demonstration.
83	Nov. 6, 1971	Windsor	Anti-Amchitka Demonstration.
84	Nov. 9, 1971	Oshawa	Duplate Canada Picket Line.
85	Nov. 24, 1971	Toronto	Douglas Aircraft Strike.
86	Nov. 28, 1971	Toronto	Anti-Tito Demonstration.
87	Dec. 3, 1971	Toronto	Douglas Aircraft.
88	March 12, 1972	Toronto	University of Toronto Library Incident.
89	March 21, 1972	Toronto	Occupation of Simcoe Hall, University of Toronto.
90	March 23, 1972	Waterloo	Anti-Trudeau Rally.
91	April 19, 1972	Toronto	Metro Garbage Strike.
92	July 6, 1972	Kitchener	Dare Foods Strike.
93	July 6, 1972	Toronto	Bleecker St. Tenants Eviction.

APPENDIX A (cont'd)

	Date	Locale	Description
94	July 8, 1972	Hamilton	Juvenile Violence.
95	July 10, 1972	Kitchener	Dare Foods Strike.
96	August 25, 1972	Toronto	Greenwood Raceway.
97	Sept. 4, 1972	Toronto	Canada-Russia Hockey Game Incident.
98	Sept. 10, 1972	Brantford	Six Nations Festival.
99	Sept. 13, 1972	Toronto	Western Guard Meeting.
100	Sept. 15, 1972	Toronto	Kraus Transport.
101	Oct. 1, 1972	Sarnia	Bar Brawl.
102	Feb. 10, 1973	Kitchener	Bar Brawl.
103	Feb. 18, 1973	Toronto	Cops Are Tops Rally.
104	July 21, 1973	Toronto	Consumer Glass.
105	July 29, 1973	Toronto	Western Guard Celebrates Mussolini's Birthday.
106	Aug. 22, 1973	Toronto	Worker's Compensation Board Demonstration.
107	Aug. 30, 1973	Ottawa	Railway Workers Demonstration.
108	Sept. 6, 1973	Toronto	Canadian Textile and Chemical Workers.
109	Oct. 15, 1973	Sarnia	Chemical Workers.
110	Oct. 16, 1973	Toronto	Canadian Textile and Chemical Workers.
111	Nov. 14, 1973	Toronto	Canadian Textile and Chemical Workers.
112	Nov. 29, 1973	Toronto	Canadian Textile and Chemical Workers.
113	March 28, 1974	Toronto	S.D.S. Disturbance, University of Toronto.
114	April 7, 1974	Toronto	Racial Disturbance, University of Toronto.
115	April 23, 1974	Toronto	Postal Strike Disturbance.
116	April 29, 1974	Mississauga Toronto	Teamster Picket Line.
117	June 13, 1974	Toronto	Stop Banfield Demonstration.
118	Aug. 10, 1974	Parry Sound	RCMP Drug Raid.
119	Aug. 28, 1974	Chatham	Picket Line Disruption.
120	Sept. 7, 1974	London	Wonder Bread Disturbance.

APPENDIX A (cont'd)

	Date	Locale	Description
121*	Sept. 30, 1974	Ottawa	Indian Demonstration on Parliament Hill.
122	Oct. 15, 1974	St. Catherines	Eaton-Yale Picket Line Disturbance.
123	Oct. 19, 1974	Toronto	Rochdale Drug Raid.
124	Oct. 19, 1974	Oakville	Bar Brawl.
125	May 17-18, 1975	Sauble Beach	Campers Battle Police.
126	July 13, 1975	Toronto	Soccer Fight.
127	Sept. 23, 1975	Thunder Bay	Paper Workers Picket Line.
128	Nov. 24, 1975	Wallaceburg	Hotel Incident.
129	Dec. 2, 1975	Toronto	Postal Strike Disturbance.

* identifies the 6 acts of collective violence which were investigated in depth (case studies)

APPENDIX B

LIST OF REPORTED ACTS OF INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE. GLOBE AND MAIL; JANUARY 1, 1965 TO DECEMBER 31, 1975

	Date	Locale	Description
1	May 18, 1966	Ottawa	Bomb at Parliament.
2	Sept. 22, 1966	Ottawa	Bombing of Cuban Embassy.
3	Jan. 29, 1967	Ottawa	Bombing of Yugoslavian Embassy.
	Jan. 29, 1967	Toronto	Bombing of Yugoslavian Consulate.
4	Dec. 31, 1968	Ottawa	Bombing, near National Film Board.
5	Jan. 2, 1969	Ottawa	Bombs found in three mailboxes.
6	June 24, 1970	Ottawa	Bombing at National Defence Headquarters.
7*	Oct. 18, 1971	Ottawa	Attack on Premier Kosygin of the U.S.S.R.
8	Dec. 26, 1971	Toronto	Air Canada Plane hijacked to Cuba.
9	Sept. 20, 1972	Ottawa	Letterbombs sent to Israeli Embassy.

* identifies the act of individual political violence which was investigated in depth (case study)

APPENDIX C

CODING SHEETS FOR RANDOM SAMPLE

Theme Frequency

Front Page Articles

	article	photo
Political Violence		
Ontario	_____	_____
Canada	_____	_____
International	_____	_____

* * * * *

War & Defence News	_____	_____
Crime News	_____	_____
Accident & Disaster	_____	_____
Popular Amusement	_____	_____
Human Interest	_____	_____
Economic Activity	_____	_____
Politics & Government	_____	_____
Education & Arts	_____	_____
Other	_____	_____

No. of articles on page _____

No. of photos on page _____

Volume Analysis*

Front Page Articles

Political Violence

- Ontario _____
- Canada _____
- International _____

War & Defence News _____

Crime News _____

Accident & Disaster _____

Popular Amusement _____

Human Interest _____

Economic Activity _____

Politics & Government _____

Education & Arts _____

Other _____

* volume expressed as square inches

Front Page Placement

the location of articles dealing with political violence are noted as to quadrant

ONTARIO

CANADA (except Ontario)

INTERNATIONAL (except Canada)

APPENDIX D

CODING SHEET FOR COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE EVENTS

1. Date of Violent Event: This means the day that the event broke out. Any violent event that overlaps the 24-hour limit and extends for more than one day in a particular locality will still be considered one event. If, however, there is a 24-hour gap, requiring remobilization of coercive and insurgent elements, then the incident becomes a separate entity.

2. Locality and Province Where Event Occurred: This should be indicated for each separate locality unless they form the same continuous metropolitan area, because each case consists of a day/town unit of analysis.

3. Duration of Collective Violence: Coded on a scale of geometric progression whose first two intervals are "one half day or less," "one day", etc.

4. Precipitating Incident that Unleashed the Violence: Any fortuitous event or occasion, such as disorderly behavior by a few demonstrators or excessive zeal by police, that bring about a confrontation. State issue that caused the mobilization as well.

5. Estimated Number of Participants: These will most probably be very rough estimates. Give all figures as well as sources and place the most probable ones in parentheses.

6. Estimated Number of Security Forces e.g. Military and Police, etc.: (See number 5 above)

7. Names of Organization Reportedly Involved: The organizations that sponsored the demonstration or meeting. Give complete names as well as areas they, or the affiliate, represent.

8. Social Status of Participants: Their broad professional category, e.g. workers-skilled, students, white collar. Whenever possible also include specific profession, e.g. university student, plumber, etc.

9. Primary Targets of Violence: (1) Property targets such as public, private, foreign, or any property. (2) Political actors and as public figures, military and police; private political groups, several of the above; foreign public figures, any political actors. (3) Nonpolitical actors such as communal groups, economic groups or a combination of these.

10. Reported Number of Arrests: (See # 5)

11. Reported Number of Participant Casualties: Number injured, see # 5.

12. Security Forces Casualties: (See # 5)

13. Estimated Property Damage: (See # 5)

14. Other Significant Information:

APPENDIX E

CODING SHEET FOR MEDIA EVALUATION OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE EVENTS

Coder: _____ Newspaper: _____

Date of Incident: _____

Is this the first report? _____ Subsequent report? _____

Date of first report _____

Date of Subsequent report _____

Page number(s) _____

General Description of Event:

_____

_____

_____

Other Information of Relevance:

_____

_____

Source of Information: (i.e. individual reporter, wire service, etc.)

_____

1. Position:

   a. first page headline story _____

   b. first page upper half _____

   c. first page lower half _____

   d. story before editorial page but after first page, i.e. pp. 2-5 _____

   e. within first section after editorial page _____

   f. first page of subsequent section _____

   g. elsewhere _____

2. Volume

   expressed as square inches _____

3. Photographs

   a. background _____

   b. action _____

   position:

   a. front page upper half _____

   b. front page lower half _____

   c. after first page but before editorial page _____

   d. within first section after editorial page _____

   e. first page of second section _____

   f. elsewhere _____

   volume:

   expressed as square inches _____

4. Editorial Section:

Editorial _____

volume _____

Cartoon _____

volume _____

APPENDIX F

CASE STUDIES INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES; PARTICIPANTS, MEDIA, AUTHORITIES

Questionnaire for Participants -1-

Name:

Address:

---

1. What recommendations would you suggest that we make to the Royal Commission concerning media coverage of violent events?

---

2. Do you think that demonstrations in other parts of the world which we frequently see on TV, can have an impact on what goes on in Toronto?

---

3. Do you feel that the media provides a useful forum for the expression of political discontent?

---

4. Regarding the (particular case study), what do you feel was the principal issue at stake?

---

5. Could you briefly describe the sequence of events leading up to the incident and the aftermath?

6. Did you read the Globe and Mail's coverage of the incident at the time? If not, did you follow the incident in any other newspaper?

7. How would you evaluate the Globe and Mail's coverage of the incident? How would you evaluate any other newspaper's coverage of the incident?

8. If you followed television and radio coverage of the incident, how would you evaluate it?

9. In the coverage of the demonstration/strike, was there adequate discussion of the issues at stake?

10. Was there any sort of planning or dress-rehearsal for the demonstration? Was a demonstration permit issued?

11. Do you feel that your own personal role in the incident was objectively reported?

12. During the demonstration/strike, were you aware of the presence of the representatives of the media?

13. Do you feel that representatives of the news media were willing to hear your side of the incident when given the opportunity?

14. Did the reportage focus too strongly on the violent aspects of the incident?

15. Frequently in any large confrontation, there may be a number of spurious rumors afloat, did you see your role as dispelling such rumours?

16. Was there any sort of news embargo concerning this (particular case)?

17. Do you feel that you may have been manipulated by the press?

18. Was the confrontation worthwhile in provoking constructive change, or at least awareness of the problem on the part of the public?

19. Do you know if there exists any film or newsreel footage concerning this particular incident?

Questionnaire for Participants

---

20. Do you have any general comments concerning the violence content of news reporting?

---

21. May we see you again if necessary?

Questionnaire for Media -1-

Name:

Address:

---

1. What recommendations would you suggest that we make to the Royal Commission concerning media coverage of violent events?

---

2. What constraints or guidelines, if any, govern the sort of reporting that you are able to do?

---

3. What is your most difficult task in reporting demonstrations/strikes?

---

4. At the scene of any major demonstration or strike, do policemen generally act as news sources about such basic information as numbers of demonstrators, arrests, etc? Or do reporters base their accounts on their own observations?

---

5. Do you think that demonstrations in other parts of the world which we frequently see on TV, can have an impact on what goes on in Toronto?

---

6. Are stories containing reports of violence more interesting to the reader?

---

7. Do you rely on other newsmen in obtaining information about stories you're writing?

---

8. Regarding stories which carry your byline, does the re-write editor normally make any major revisions?

---

9. Regarding major stories such as demonstrations and strikes, how thoroughly are you able to check the facts of a story before submitting your copy to the news editor?

---

10. How much of the average demonstrator's behavior is due to the presence of the media on the scene?

---

11. Do you feel that there is sufficient follow-up on such stories to adequately inform the public?

---

12. In your coverage of demonstrations and strikes, do you feel that you may at times have been manipulated by the police or the militants?

---

13. Frequently in any large confrontation, there may be a number of spurious rumors afloat, do you see your job as dispelling such misleading stories?

14. Can you tell me some specifics about the news organization of the Globe and Mail?

15. Regarding the (particular case study), what do you feel was the principal issue at stake?

16. Could you briefly describe the sequence of events leading up to the incident and the aftermath?

17. How would you rate the Globe and Mail's overall coverage of the incident?

18. If you followed television and radio coverage of the incident, how would you evaluate it?

19. Was there any sort of news embargo concerning this (particular case)?

20. How good a job did the police do in handling the incident?

---

21. In the coverage of the demonstration, was there adequate discussion of the principal issues at stake?

---

22. Do you feel that the media provides a useful forum for the expression of political discontent?

---

23. Did the reportage focus too strongly on the violent aspects of the incident?

---

24. Have you made any errors of judgment in handling a story in the last few years?

---

25. Do you know if there exists any film or newsreel footage concerning this particular incident?

---

26. Do you have any general comments concerning the violence content of news reporting?

---

27. May we see you again if necessary?

Questionnaire for Authorities -1-

Name:

Address:

---

1. What recommendations would you suggest that we make to the Royal Commission concerning media coverage of violent events?

---

2. Are there any sort of guidelines (city or provincial) concerning the sharing of information with news reporters? What constraints do policemen, as well as news reporters, have in dealing with violent demonstrations and strikes?

---

3. At the scene of any major demonstration or strike, do policemen generally act as news sources about such basic information as numbers of demonstrators, arrests, etc.? Or do reporters base their accounts on their own observations?

---

4. Do you think that demonstrations in other parts of the world which we frequently see on TV, can have an impact on what goes on in Toronto?

---

5. Frequently in any large confrontation, there may be a number of spurious rumors afloat, do you see your job as dispelling such misleading stories?

6. Is there a body of law which relates specifically to demonstrations? From a legal point of view, what is your responsibility in dealing with such situations?

7. How much of the average demonstrator's behavior is due to the presence of the media?

8. Is police training adequate to deal with demonstrations which erupt into violence?

9. Does the presence of the news media make the police's job more difficult? Is media equipment on the scene such as cameras, strobe lights, recording devices, etc. a hindrance to you in the performance of your duties?

10. Do you feel that the media provides a useful forum for the expression of political discontent?

11. Regarding the (particular case study), what do you feel was the principal issue at stake?

12. Could you briefly describe the sequence of events leading up to the incident and the aftermath?

13. Did you read the Globe and Mail's coverage of the incident at the time? If not, did you follow the incident in any other newspapers?

14. How would you evaluate the Globe and Mail's coverage of the incident? How would you evaluate any other newspaper's coverage of the incident?

15. If you followed television and radio coverage of the incident, how would you evaluate it?

16. Did the reportage focus too strongly on the violent aspects of the incident?

17. Was there any sort of planning or dress-rehearsal for the demonstration as far as you could tell? Was a demonstration permit issued?

18. Was there any sort of news embargo concerning this (particular case)?

19. Overall, how good a job did the media do in covering this (particular case)?

20. Have you made any errors of judgment in dealing with such an incident in the last few years?

21. Do you know if there exists any film or newsreel footage concerning this particular incident?

22. Do you have any general comments concerning the violence content of news reporting?

23. May we see you again if necessary?

Bibliography

The select bibliography which follows lists the major works which have influenced this volume on Collective Conflict, Violence and the Media. For more extensive, but less specialized, bibliographies on other aspects of political violence see Micheal J. Kelly and Thomas H. Mitchell, Violence, Internal War and Revolution: A Select Bibliography (Ottawa: Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Bibliography Series, 1976) and Robert J. Jackson and Michael Stein, Issues in Comparative Politics (New York: St. Martins Press, 1971).

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